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ABSTRACT 
 
My dissertation examines the various ways in which the following novels written 
by Jeanette Winterson — Written on the Body (1992), Gut Symmetries (1997), 
The.PowerBook (2000), and The Stone Gods (2007) — interrogate and denaturalize 
preexisting power structures by disentangling the body from the discursively inscribed 
identity categories of gender and sex. Dominant conceptions concerning desire, 
commonly thought to be an innate byproduct of a wholly “natural” body, are likewise 
disrupted in the unraveling of gender and sex from corporeality. Desire is thus opened up 
to possibilities that exist beyond the limited purview of gendered, heterosexist ideologies. 
Much like the field of queer theory, this dissertation draws together different 
branches of knowledge — poststructuralism and resignification, psychoanalysis, 
nomadism, posthumanism, cyborg narratives — in order to closely analyze what 
Winterson’s works do to bodies, to language, to gender, to sexuality. The novels studied 
here offer a way of re-insinuating bodies to desire in ways that are much more inclusive 
and much less prohibitive.   
Although my consideration of these novels critically engages with many theorists 
throughout, there are four key thinkers that helped to shape each chapter: Judith Butler, 
Elizabeth Grosz, Katherine N. Hayles and Donna Haraway. My first chapter examines 
the parallels between Butler’s theory of the sex/gender/desire matrix and Written on the 
Body, assessing the novel’s twofold operation of resignification: the body is first 
extricated from its naturalization before becoming reformulated in ways that move 
outside of the framework of the current grand narratives on desire. My second chapter 
surveys the relationship between Grosz and the Deleuzian “Bodies without Organs” 
iii 
(BwOs) in Gut Symmetries, while my third chapter explores Hayles’s version of 
posthumanism alongside Haraway’s figure of the cyborg, in relation to The.PowerBook 
and The Stone Gods, respectively. These novels widen the cracks in the signifying 
system, shifting conceptions of materiality and desire elsewhere. If we are to 
acknowledge that desire does indeed come from outside rather than from within the 
subject, then sexuality can be dissociated from the subject’s body — subsequently 
endangering gender’s impact on how we conceive of our desire. 
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 1 
PROLOGUE 
 
“To worm into the heart and mind until what one truly desires has been 
encased in dark walls of what one ought to desire, is the success of the 
serpent. Serpents of state, serpents of religion, serpent sin the service of 
education, monied serpents, mythic serpents, weaving their lies backwards 
into history.” — Jeanette Winterson, Art Objects: Essays on Ecstasy and 
Effrontery 
 
 
I. Bodies Insinuated to Desire 
In recent years, critical perspectives on the relationship between the human body 
and sexuality have been shifting. Rather than viewing corporeality as wholly biological, 
theorists from many different schools of thought are instead conceptualizing the body as 
an intermediary: between the physicality of flesh-and-blood arousal and the signifying 
systems through which the subject understands and experiences sensations of desire.1 
What is troubling here is that these signifying systems, and particularly the discursively 
constructed category of gender through which the subject comes to know its own body, 
are embedded in heteronormative ideologies. Throughout her thirty year long career, 
British novelist Jeanette Winterson has expressed an interest in disentangling the 
                                               
 
1 In their introduction to The Body: A Reader (2005), Mariam Fraser and Monica Greco 
make the observation that “it is commonplace now not to refer to the body but to bodies 
in the plural, to recognize also that there is no body as such which is given and fixed for 
all time and to recognize also that experiences rooted in different forms of embodiment 
may be radically incommensurable” (3). I incorporate this definition into my own 
treatment of the body — so although I will often refer to the body in the singular, my 
version of the body is plural, shifting, and multiple. 
 
 
2 
relations among the body, gender, discourse, and desire. In “The Semiotics of Sex,” from 
her 1995 non-fiction volume Art Objects: Essays on Ecstasy and Effrontery, she cautions 
her readers to “be wary of bodies insinuated to desire what they do not desire” (115).2 
The notion that bodies are insinuated to desire anything at all suggests the intervention of 
outside forces infiltrating the corporeal boundary, which serves to undercut essentialist 
beliefs about desire as originating from some innate location within the body. In the same 
essay, Winterson identifies the primary objective of writing and art-making, as: “prising 
away old dead structures that have rusted almost unnoticed into our flesh” (116). This 
passage suggests that discourse works to inscribe ideologies not just onto the epidermal 
border, but also into our flesh; the subject unconsciously legitimizes preexisting 
discourses concerning gender, sex and sexuality by forming its psychic identity in 
relation to the signifiers imprinted upon the surface of its skin — signifiers that are 
informed by the very same discourses.  
My dissertation explores the ways in which Winterson’s work not only 
interrogates the complex interweaving of the discourses that regulate the subject’s sense 
of self, but also endeavours to extricate identity categories from one another. Such 
disentangling is problematic, for any attempt to extract desire from discursive 
constructions is complicated by the very body that processes it, a body that has already 
been shaped through the subject’s interpellation of its cultural conditions. In her essay 
                                               
 
2 According to Winterson’s personal website (www.jeanettewinterson.com), in the title 
Art Objects: Essays on Ecstasy and Effrontery, the word “objects” is not meant to be 
parsed as a noun, but as a verb; art is objecting to the various ways in which language has 
been channeled into culturally sanctioned discourses. 
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“Sexual Indifference and Lesbian Interpretation,” Teresa de Lauretis offers insight with 
her prescription: that before desire can be removed from indissoluble knowledges of 
gender, sexuality and reproduction, the body must be rewritten in ways that move 
“beyond its pre-coded, conventional representations” (de Lauretis 149-50) in order to 
open up desire to possibilities that move beyond the categories of gender and sex, as they 
currently operate.  
In this work, I perform close reading analyses of four novels selected from 
Winterson’s canon: Written on the Body (1992), Gut Symmetries (1997), The.PowerBook 
(2000), and The Stone Gods (2007): novels which have all been published in close 
proximity, and novels which I view as engaging in conversation with one another. 
Examining these novels in correspondence with a number of theoretical schools, such as 
queer theory, psychoanalysis, Deleuzian philosophy, new materialism, posthumanism, 
and cyborg theory, I explore what much of the current criticism on Winterson’s work 
fails to examine: the body itself — how bodies are perceived on a cultural level, and what 
bodies are capable of doing. Although my consideration of these novels critically 
interlocks with many theorists throughout, my analysis is most influenced by four key 
thinkers — Judith Butler, Elizabeth Grosz, Katherine N. Hayles, and Donna Haraway —  
all of whom fall somewhere in the paradigm of queer theory with their focus on the 
indeterminacy and instability of sexual identities. Beginning with an analysis of the 
relationship between Butler’s theory of the sex/gender/desire matrix and Written on the 
Body, I assess how Winterson’s work takes up the Butlerian strategy of resignification: 
the body is first extrapolated from discourses of naturalization before becoming 
reformulated in ways that might allow it to move outside of the framework of the current 
4 
grand narratives concerning desire.3 Grosz is paired with the new-age narrative of Gut 
Symmetries in my second chapter, while my third chapter explores Hayles’s version of 
posthumanism alongside Haraway’s figure of the cyborg, in relation to The.PowerBook 
and The Stone Gods, respectively. I have chosen to study these particular novels mainly 
because I find them so provocative in terms of the way they deconstruct the 
sex/gender/desire matrix; their specific re-workings of the discursively inscribed 
boundaries of corporeality inspires ways of conceiving desire liberated from 
heteronormativity and the various binaries — culture/nature, subject/object, 
inside/outside, real/artificial — that heteronormativity requires. Such reconfigurations are 
important, for in undermining both the validity and concreteness of the seemingly-solid 
material body, Winterson’s writing undoes the gendered, heteronormative doctrines 
imprinted upon, and absorbed into, the subject’s skin. 
On a larger, cultural scale, the political implications of such un-doings are 
potentially vast, as they threaten to displace the long-reigning regimes of power which 
have been instrumental in authoring not only the body, but also the ways in which 
embodied subjects come to process desire: through the constructs of sex and gender, and 
the conflating of subjectivity with sexual identity. When these novels unravel the body 
                                               
 
3 In Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity (1990), Butler describes 
the sex/gender/desire matrix as such: “The institution of a compulsory and naturalized 
heterosexuality requires and regulates gender as a binary relation in which the masculine 
term is differentiated from a feminine term, and this differentiation is accomplished 
through the practices of heterosexual desire. The   act of differentiating the two 
oppositional moments of the binary results in a consolidation of each term, the respective 
internal coherence of sex, gender, and desire” (22-3). I explore the sex/gender/desire 
matrix further in my first chapter. 
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from sex and gender, they simultaneously free up desire from the corrals of sexual 
categorization; while the subject still remains a body, the identity category of sexuality 
becomes troubled when the body is no longer conceived as the source of desire — and as 
Butler notes, troubling one pillar of the sex/gender/desire structure troubles the entire 
foundation.4 In the novels studied here, desire may run its course in and through the 
sensuous, feeling body but it is never rooted somewhere deep within the body’s 
chromosomal makeup: desire always comes from elsewhere. It is this de-naturalization 
and consequent disembodiment of desire that I find so compelling, as it serves to uproot 
and destabilize the heterosexist sex/gender/desire matrix.  
 
II. Changing the Script: Moving Beyond the Legible Body 
Winterson’s work has always expressed an interest in subverting identity 
categories. Both The Passion (1987) and Sexing the Cherry (1989) boast powerful female 
characters with bodies that undermine patriarchal and heterosexist discourses by defying 
the inscriptions associated with femininity; the webbed feet belonging to The Passion’s 
Villanelle render her androgynous, while Sexing the Cherry’s Dog-Woman is 
monstrously large with cavernous man-swallowing genitalia.5 These bodies both exceed 
and defect from the norms associated with their sex. In The Female Grotesque: Risk, 
                                               
 
4  See Chapter One, “Subjects of Sex/Gender/Desire” from Butler’s Gender Trouble, 
pages iv-vi. 
5 In The Passion’s version of Venice, all boatmen are male with webbing between their 
toes. That Villanelle is born female but also has this webbing is viewed as an aberration 
of her sex; in an allusion to both circumcision and castration anxiety, a midwife labours 
to sever the webbing but to no avail. Villanelle’s webbed feet remains intact.  
6 
Excess and Modernity (1994), Mary Russo affirms that the “image of the uncanny, 
grotesque body as doubled, monstrous, deformed [...] might be used affirmatively to 
destabilize the idealizations of the female body or to realign the mechanisms of desire” 
(221). As Paulina Palmer observes, Villanelle’s ambiguous body carries signifiers that 
exist in surplus of the feminine (Palmer 87). Lisa Moore views the Dog-Woman as 
similarly excessive, her body hosting a profusion of qualities that “ironizes normative 
femininity”; the Dog-Woman’s mammoth size transforms the inscriptions associated with 
biologically female body, ultimately pointing to the potential of the body to deconstruct 
itself (Moore 120). Both Palmer and Moore perceive Winterson’s exaltation of the 
grotesque body as explicitly political; to briefly appropriate Julia Kristeva’s vernacular, 
the “abject” bodies of Villanelle and the Dog-Woman thwart idealizations of femininity, 
while simultaneously revealing the extent to which institutionalized heterosexism both 
requires and relies upon these morphological idealizations.6   
What Villanelle and the Dog-Woman do is expose the instability of sex: that they 
can exist in excess of its gendered norms speaks to the impossibility of a universal, self-
identical woman. This is not insignificant. However, I argue that while glorifying the so-
called abnormalities of the female body is certainly a worthwhile project, Winterson’s 
following works go much further in terms of destabilizing what it means to have a body 
at all. We still read the bodies of Villanelle and the Dog-Woman as female, despite their 
abject qualities, and thus they are still subsumed by the sex/gender/desire matrix. 
                                               
 
6 In The Powers of Horror (1982), Kristeva defines abjection as that which troubles the 
boundaries of the body, and the self/other distinction that such boundaries enable. 
7 
Moreover, it remains unclear how “mechanisms of desire,” as suggested by Russo, are 
realigned by an approbation of the grotesque. 
 In her essay “The Erupting Lesbian Body,” Cath Stowers notes that Winterson’s 
earlier novels appear interested “in portraying a celebratory ‘tattoo’ of the female body, 
but the only other tattoo is inner […] that interiority of meaning which can only be 
reached by a re-mapping of that which is usually left invisible, and a reciprocity of Self 
and Other, writer and reader” (96). By re-mapping the various established discourses that 
determine how the body has been culturally constituted, Winterson’s more recent work 
has progressed from an emphasis on the messy realities of the body to a rethinking of 
these realities altogether: in other words, transitioning from a project devoted to writing 
the body to a strategy that revises the normalizing discourses that have been inscribed 
upon its surface and subsumed within — collapsing the inside/outside binary. Moving 
away from a definitively feminist project of valorizing the female body, the novels that 
are the subject of this dissertation instead focus on how the corporeal inscriptions 
associated with sexual difference are responsible for this “inner tattoo,” what insinuates 
bodies to desire what they do not desire. These works are representative of a more 
concerted effort to tackle this issue of insinuated corporeality; in both undermining and 
then reconfiguring the dominant discourses that impact how the body is materialized as a 
cultural product, the characters in these novels simultaneously come to process their 
desires in ways that go beyond the legible surface of the skin. As Haraway muses, “why 
should bodies end at the skin?” (Haraway 178). 
 For her critics, however, the work Winterson performs in The Passion and Sexing 
the Cherry was unobjectionable, even pleasurable; it can be sexy to be subversive, and 
8 
Winterson does it well. When her writing became increasingly transgressive, moving the 
body too far beyond the limits of what is familiar and recognizable, the reaction became 
negative and even spiteful. For instance, reviews of Written on the Body accused 
Winterson of intellectual aggrandizement and “high-pitched rhapsodies” (Kemp 71a); as 
Joan Smith argues in The Guardian, Winterson employs “a language drunk on its own 
richness, unable to distinguish between the sublime and mere showing off” (Smith 26). 
Of Gut Symmetries, Adam Mar-Jones writes: “Winterson seems hypnotised by her own 
performance, radioactive with self-belief” (Mars-Jones 15) while Lucy Grealy similarly 
admonishes Winterson for “simply listening to herself speak” (Grealy 55). In her review 
of The.PowerBook, E. Jane Dickson suggests that “Winterson’s grunting and straining 
after greatness is downright distressing to the reader” (Dickson “Dot.com”). And 
although many critics saw The Stone Gods as a return to her previous form (as she here 
abandons the conceit of the bisexual love triangle that anchors the plot of Written on the 
Body, Gut Symmetries and The.PowerBook), she was still reproved by Tim Adams for 
disrupting the narrative flow with “sudden personal interventions” (Adams “Stranger”).7 
                                               
 
7 It is worth noting that the reviews that I have selected here are not simply criticizing the 
novels; they demonstrate a real sense of dislike for Winterson as a person. Many 
Winterson scholars have noted that this hostility coincides with Winterson’s increasingly 
public persona as the enfant terrible of contemporary fiction in the United Kingdom. Not 
only did she select her own novel for Telegraph’s 1993 Book of the Year list, she also 
gave her own name when The Sunday Times invited her to nominate the greatest living 
writer, stating that “no one working in the English language now comes close to my 
exuberance, my passion, and my fidelity to words” (Freely “God’s Gift”). Then there was 
the infamous incident in 1994 when, after reading an unfavourable review by Nicci 
Gerrard, Winterson broke down the fundamental boundary between reviewer and 
reviewed by going to Gerrard’s house and interrupting her dinner party with verbally 
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As Brian Finney observes in his appraisal of Winterson’s critical reception, a wide array 
of reviews and essays appear to agree upon one thing: from Written on the Body on, 
Winterson’s career trajectory experienced “a catastrophic decline from its earlier 
promise” (Finney 24).   
 Several reviewers also expressed feelings of alienation as a result of the subject 
matter of her more recent novels, the majority of which revolve around a love affair 
between two women at the expense of a jilted husband. In his review of Art & Lies 
(1995), William Pritchard is made to feel apprehensive by her apparent “contempt for 
hearth and home, the family [...] and especially for men” (Pritchard 14-15). Peter Kemp 
likewise criticizes Winterson’s “propensity for scrawling gender-spite across her pages,” 
arguing in his review of Written on the Body that the novel demonstrates a flagrant 
contempt for heterosexual marriage and the husbands within them (Kemp 71a). David 
Sexton’s assessment of Gut Symmetries notes that while Winterson “writes deplorably 
about heterosexual sex […] she can celebrate lesbianism with almost persuasive fervour” 
(Sexton 27). And then, later: “Winterson has indulged herself hugely” (30).  
 What is so baffling about such critiques is that prior to the publication of Written 
on the Body, Winterson had produced novels with explicitly lesbian, anti-marriage 
themes. Not only that, she had received accolades for them. For instance, she was the 
recipient of the John Llewellyn Rhys prize and the EM Forster award, for The Passion 
and Sexing the Cherry respectively, novels that could also be perceived as threatening the 
                                                                                                                                            
 
abusive demands for an explanation. Winterson was quick to earn a reputation as an all-
too-willing transgressor of propriety (Westman “Legacy”). 
10 
sanctity of marriage with their portrait of female same-sex relationships. And her first 
novel Oranges are Not the Only Fruit (1985), a semi-autobiographical and often comedic 
lesbian Künstlerroman, won the prestigious Whitbread award for first novel — despite its 
outright challenge to the same heteronormative institutions that Pritchard, Kemp and 
Sexton all seem so keen to uphold. There is something else surfacing here in these 
negative critiques. To me, it appears as though these reviewers are feeling antagonized by 
what these texts are producing: disruptive new ways of thinking about the body and 
desire. The general sense of both suspicion and uneasiness that these novels instigate is 
encapsulated by Brian Bouldrey’s review of The.PowerBook for the San Francisco Gate: 
“Certainly, it’s Winterson’s intention to pull the rug out from under the reader, to 
reawaken jaded senses. But with so much power taken away, where can a reader find his 
footing?” (Bouldrey “Your Own Way”). 
 Bouldrey here has touched upon the one crucial aspect that succeeds in dividing 
her canon, a feature that first emerges with the publication of Written on the Body: by 
destabilizing normative conceptions of what it means to have a body, Winterson takes 
away the ground upon which identities are constructed, causing readers to lose their 
subjective footing. Although Bouldrey never mentions the body (demonstrating once 
again that the body is so naturalized, it often goes without saying), there are three other 
key words in his testimony: power, reader and his. My first chapter on Written on the 
Body explores the ways in which the body is read into being, into actualization; however, 
the novel also acknowledges that these readings draw from ideologies that are permeated 
with patriarchal power dynamics concerning what it means to possess a body at all and 
what readings get to be invested with privilege. As Patricia Duncker notes in her review 
11 
of Written on the Body, Winterson’s work overturns the “settled order of men’s power 
over meanings, language and texts” (Duncker 82). What Duncker does not note, however, 
is that this overturning is accomplished by undermining what we think we know about 
our bodies and the ways that they experience and express desire. 
 Undoing dominant conceptions of the body does threaten the very basis through 
which our sense of selfhood is established. The colour of our skin, the sex of our bodies, 
possible disabilities we may have, the clothes we wear — without a body, how can we 
read who we, and others, are? The.PowerBook acknowledges the cultural anxieties that 
underlie the destabilization of materiality through a character known only by the name of 
her online avatar, Tulip. Despite her engagement with cybernetic technologies, Tulip is 
averse to the notion of giving up her “real” body in favour of a virtual identity. However, 
as we will see in my third chapter, Tulip’s “real” body contains her within a time and 
space that has been orchestrated by patriarchal, heteronormative regimes. The identity 
that comes packaged alongside Tulip’s body is one that reduces her to the domesticated 
constraints of her role as wife. Although this role makes Tulip feel that she can recognize 
herself, her entire identity has been determined by forces designed to entrap her into a life 
of passive servitude.  
 In “The Semiotics of Sex,” Winterson observes that the categories of gender and 
sexuality have long coexisted in order to both contain and reduce fear — fear of the 
unknown, of that which exceeds language and exposes its limitations, threatening to undo 
the subject’s ego (117). However, the subject’s “I” or, rather, the identity it clings to, is 
always first and foremost a product of discourse and therefore requires on-going, 
intensive interrogation; the power dynamics moving through discourse are ingrained in 
12 
all of us, “rusted almost unnoticed into the flesh” (116). Butler raises an important 
question in her 1990 work Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity 
when she asks: “If ‘identity’ is an effect of discursive practices, to what extent is gender 
identity, constructed as a relationship among sex, gender, sexual practice, and desire, the 
effect of a regulatory practice that can be identified as compulsory heterosexuality?” (24). 
As an identity category, gender as it currently operates cannot be extrapolated from 
heteronormativity; thus, Winterson’s recent novels attempt to weaken the preexisting 
scripts on desire, which she designates as “clichéd” and restrictive, by attacking gender 
and its frequent companion, sexual identity, from the very base of their legitimation: the 
body. 
 
III. Challenging the Concept of “Inner Nature”: Theoretical Perspectives on 
Disembodied Desire 
Although the body as an object of critical study spans across many disciplines 
(such as biology, psychoanalysis, poststructuralism, posthumanism), many of them are 
brought together, in some form, within the extensive scope of queer theory. Winterson’s 
preoccupation with the body is one that is mirrored by this field of thought, with its 
centralizing focus on the production, dissemination and internalization of normalizing 
discourses concerning gender and sex, as imprinted onto the body/product. I admit that I 
hesitate to position Winterson’s work in alignment with anything at all, particularly as 
she herself rejects all forms of labeling when it comes to her writing, even from within 
marginalized categories; whenever she is called a “lesbian” writer, she is quick to rebuke 
the consolidation of her personal sexual preference with her art (Art Objects 104). 
13 
However, Winterson’s resistance to definition is also a fundamental characteristic of 
queer theory. In her introduction to the field, Annamarie Jagose attests that the word 
“queer” is purposeful, as it includes but is not limited to homosexual desire, suggesting 
definitional indeterminacy and elasticity (Jagose 1). Unlike gay and lesbian studies, then, 
queer theory is not interested in further sedimenting identity categories, but rather adopts 
a range of theoretical material in its examination of the various contexts (historical, 
political, psychic, linguistic) in which all things “queer” emerge.   
Moreover, Winterson’s concern with how one’s body and desires become shaped 
by outside ideologies is one that is paralleled in queer theory; according to Jagose, queer 
theory explores the ways in which “our understanding of ourselves as coherent, unified, 
and self-determining subjects is an effect of those representational codes commonly used 
to describe the self and through which, consequently, identity come to be understood” 
(78). However, as Jagose affirms, it is difficult to rupture heteronormativity, as its “very 
claim to naturalization is intimately connected with an individual sense of self, with the 
way in which each of us imagines our own sexuality to be primary, elemental and 
private” (17).  
This argument is an extension of one held by David M. Halperin. In One Hundred 
Years of Homosexuality: And Other Essays on Greek Love (1990), he states that it is the 
conventions of the sexual system that procure the very “self-confirming inner truth of 
‘nature’” that gives the entire structure a sense of legitimacy (18). Halperin’s own 
argument finds its origins in Michel Foucault’s groundbreaking History of Sexuality; 
Volume 1 (1979); as Halperin later attests in his 1995 work Saint Foucault: Towards a 
Gay Hagiography, Foucault “politicizes both truth and the body: he reconstitutes 
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knowledge and sexuality as sites of contestation, thereby opening up new opportunities 
for both scholarly and political intervention” (42). Truth and the body — it is a tenacious 
little coupling, one that can be difficult to break apart. For Foucault, they were united in 
the Victorian period, through two modes: the production of confession procedures, and 
the production and proliferation of scientific discourses. These two modes acted in 
tandem to turn sex into an object of knowledge and to crystallize the “truth” of one’s sex, 
which now is perceived to come from the interior of the body, the “inner nature” to which 
Halperin refers.8  
However, this inner nature does not originate from the body’s interiority at all, but 
rather is constituted from discourses that exist outside of the body — to be subsumed by 
the subject through the process of interpellation, below the levels of consciousness.9 
                                               
 
8 Queer theory is indebted to Foucault in a number of ways, despite his own insistence 
that his work had little to do with gay liberation (Halperin Saint Foucault 31). Even if he 
did not see the connection, Foucault viewed homosexuality as a “historic opportunity to 
open up new relational and affective potentialities” (67). Speaking about bathhouses, for 
instance, Foucault writes that they “afford an exceptional possibility of 
desubjectivization, of desubjection… It’s not the affirmation of identity that’s important, 
it’s the affirmation of non-identity” (94). It is specifically his recognition of the 
affirmation of non-identity that makes Foucault the “father of queer theory” — despite 
his own objection to the title. 
9 Many disenfranchised minority groups, such as members of the LGBTQ community, 
have found it necessary to politically mobilize around the identity category of sexuality. 
For instance, take American singer and pop culture phenomenon Lady Gaga’s 2011 hit 
“Born This Way.” The song became an anthem for gay and lesbian activists, who argued 
that sexuality is not a choice, but rather an innate characteristic of whatever body 
(regardless of sex) that one is born into: they had no choice, they were born homosexual. 
However, as it stands today, there is still no proven link between one’s sexual preference 
and one’s biological constitution. What is even more reductive about this stance is its 
reliance on essentialist determinism: the “Born This Way” rally cry denies the impact of 
discourse on the subject — an impact that, by the way, does not offer the subject much 
choice either. What this example demonstrates is the ways in which discourse shapes the 
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Many queer theorists (see, for example: Butler, Michael Warner, Elizabeth Freeman, Lee 
Edelman) have taken up with Pierre Bourdieu’s theory of power and practice, from his 
1980 work The Logic of Practice: 
 
All the schemes of perception and appreciation in which a group deposits its 
fundamental structures, and the schemes of expression through which it 
provides them with the beginnings of an objectification and therefore 
reinforcement, intervene between the individual and his/her body. Application 
of the fundamental schemes to one’s body, and more especially to those parts 
of the body that are most pertinent in terms of these schemes, is doubtless of 
the privileged occasions for the incorporation of the schemes, because of the 
heavy investments placed in the body. (73) 
 
In response to Bourdieu, Butler writes that these heavy investments are based upon a 
“regulatory fiction of heterosexual coherence, [which] disguises itself as a developmental 
law regulating the sexual field that it purports to describe” (Gender Trouble 136). 
Winterson’s work rescripts these “heavy investments placed in the body” in ways that 
aim to transform the insinuations that drive subjects to desire what they desire.10  
                                                                                                                                            
 
subject to the extent that its identity comes to viewed as a natural extension of the body, 
whether that particular identity is a privileged one or not. 
10 In her essay “Compulsory Heterosexuality and Lesbian Existence” (1980), Adrienne 
Rich points out that knowledge about sexual practices outside of heterosexuality have 
been withheld. Instead, heterosexuality has been propagandized as the only option. Her 
essay is concerned with “how and why women’s choice of women as passionate 
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 In addition to queer theory, Lacanian psychoanalysis proves valuable to my 
readings, and comes into play in some form in each of my chapters. In Volatile Bodies: 
Towards a Corporeal Feminism (1994), Elizabeth Grosz underlines the usefulness of 
psychoanalytic theory in reconceiving the body: 
 
What psychoanalytic theory makes clear is that the body is literally written 
on, inscribed, by desire and signification, at the anatomical, physiological, 
and neurological levels. The body is in no sense naturally or innately 
psychical, sexual, or sexed. It is indeterminate and indeterminable outside its 
social constitution as a body of a particular type. This implies that the body 
which it presumes and helps to explain is an open-ended, pliable set of 
significations, capable of being rewritten, reconstituted, in quite other terms 
than those which mark it, and consequently capable of reinscribing the forms 
of sexed identity and psychical subjectivity at work today. (60) 
 
In his work Beyond Sexuality (2000), Tim Dean develops a connection between the 
psychoanalytic framework and queer theory, arguing that both fields work to disentangle 
normative ideologies from desire through the process of denaturalization and indeed, 
psychoanalysis is most productive in its understanding of the relationship between 
discourse and corporeality. Lacanian psychoanalysis, in particular, is also responsible for 
                                                                                                                                            
 
comrades, life partners, co-workers, lovers, community has been crushed, invalidated, 
forced into hiding and disguise; and second, the virtual or total neglect of lesbian 
existence in a wide range of writings, including feminist scholarship” (227). 
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the definition of desire that my dissertation largely engages. According to Lacan, desire 
stems from the subject’s desire for recognition from the other; however, this recognition 
is mitigated by what the subject believes the other to desire, a belief which is, in turn, 
driven by the subject’s desire to be recognized. How one experiences desire is informed 
by what the subject perceives as the other’s objects and what the other appears to be 
lacking. “Man’s desire is the desire of the Other,” states Lacan (Écrits 28).11 Thus, he 
concludes that desire is not something innate to the body, nor does desire ever really 
belong to the subject’s body; rather, desire is always located in the orbit of the other. As 
Lacan claims: “Man’s very desire is constituted, [Hegel] tells us, under the sign of 
mediation: it is the desire to have one’s desire recognized. Its object is a desire, that of 
other people, in the sense that man has no object that is constituted for his desire without 
some mediation” (182). It is this mediation by the Other that Winterson finds so 
restrictive: the concept that something from the outside — i.e.; the discursively 
constructed identity categories of gender, sex, and sexuality, as inscribed on the body to 
be recognized by the other — could be mediating the subject’s desiring process to a large 
degree.  
However, although psychoanalysis proves a useful ally in some aspects of my 
analysis, the field does not go far enough in probing the means through which these 
prevailing systems of mediation might be capable of transformation, as Butler, Grosz, 
                                               
 
11 Lacan distinguishes between the little “o” other and big “O” Other as such: the other is 
the one who mirrors back the subject’s desire for recognition and also what the subject 
thinks the other desires, at the level of the imaginary through the act of transference. The 
Other operates at the level of the Symbolic, representing the authoritative, Oedipalizing 
“Name-of-the-Father” that regulates the whole of culture and language. 
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Hayles, Haraway and certainly Winterson’s fiction suggest that they are. Thus, this 
dissertation also bridges psychoanalytic perspectives with Deleuzian nomadism as I trace 
Winterson’s movement away a focus on textual bodies towards the indeterminate borders 
that the virtual dimension, with its inherent lack of visible or graspable materiality, 
incites. Written on the Body, Gut Symmetries, The.PowerBook and The Stone Gods all 
engage on some level with nomadic thought, which Deleuzian philosopher and new 
materialist Rosi Braidotti describes as a process that “aims at decolonizing the thinking 
subject from the dualistic grip [of] established normative heterosexual modes of thought” 
(Nomadic Theory 21-22). The novels explore what happens to desire in the absence of 
concrete, knowable materiality, when the body becomes viewed as what Braidotti calls an 
incorporeal but not disembodied “complex assemblage of virtualities” (“Affirming the 
Affirmative” 32). The novels studied here systematically destabilize the identity 
categories that rely on corporeal inscriptions for sustenance, thus divesting bodies of the 
meaning long attributed to them. The next section of this introduction explains how I 
assess the various textual possibilities that emerge in Winterson’s radical critique of the 
link between identity categories and the body, as her novels search for the momentary 
ruptures in the Symbolic, the very field of intelligibility and recognition that governs 
subjectivity. 
 
IV. Resignifying the Identity Categories of Gender and Sex 
My first chapter explores the ways in which the bodies in Written on the Body are 
literally written on, inscribed with signification. Lucie Armitt calls Written on the Body 
“the watershed novel in Winterson’s oeuvre,” when everything changes (Armitt 20). 
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Although Armitt does not pinpoint what changes, exactly, I contend that it is with this 
novel that Winterson begins the work of undoing notions of the natural body by 
highlighting its textuality, its palimpsestic quality. If the body can be written upon, then 
surely it can be open to revision — but as we have seen with Winterson’s earlier work, 
revision is not entirely enough. Bodies need to be resignified. According to Butler’s 
Gender Trouble, resignification involves “a thoroughgoing appropriation and 
redeployment of the categories of identity themselves, not merely to contest ‘sex’ but to 
articulate the convergence of multiple sexual discourses at the site of identity in order to 
render that category permanently problematic” (128). 
Winterson’s own textual resignifications begin with denaturalization, practicing 
what Toril Moi calls a “non-essentialist form of writing” in order to undermine the 
normalizing discourses implicated in the authoring of the body (Moi 10). This non-
essentialism is first made evident in Written on the Body, with the decision to employ a 
self-admittedly unreliable narrator that has no name and no gender, and a host of 
contradictory clues that keep readers guessing. The trick is a neat one, for not only do the 
narrator’s multiple positions foreground the performativity of gender, but these positions 
also highlight the extent to which we read the other’s body for signs of his, her, but truly 
its identity; in effect, we mobilize the other into recognition using preexisting, inherited 
scripts. The first section of this chapter assesses how we read indeterminacy and 
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disidentification, when the narrator’s body exists outside the scope of what Butler calls 
the preexisting domain of cultural intelligibility (Gender Trouble 23).12  
This chapter also examines the varied ways in which Written on the Body’s 
narrator attempts to write a new script, one that refuses to adhere to the clichés that have 
long dictated how desire is processed. “I don’t want to reproduce, but to make something 
completely new,” the narrator states (108). And yet, the narrator is constantly ensnared by 
his/her reliance on materiality, on the lover’s body as concrete, perceivable, and thus 
knowable. S/he requires a mode of representation to convey desire for his/her married 
beloved, a woman named Louise, but the modes of representation that currently exist 
only serve to transform Louise into an object. Desire always exceeds the narrator’s 
attempts to contain it, observe it, transform it into discourse, however arch and inventive 
these attempts may be. The narrator fares better, in terms of expressing his/her desire, 
when s/he forsakes his/her attempts to control Louise’s representation; in the third and 
final section of the novel, his/her reality disintegrates into fantasy as the plot breaks apart, 
becoming increasingly spatially and temporally fragmented and disorienting. Here, it is 
virtuality that brings the other closer as the distinction between subject/object subsides. 
My second chapter addresses Gut Symmetries and what Winterson, in Art Objects, 
calls the “tyranny of matter,” as the novel assesses the ways in which a focus on the 
mostly unseeable pre-personal forces (energy, time, space) that precondition and 
actualize matter (and are matter themselves) might disrupt the heteronormative ideologies 
                                               
 
12 Although Butler uses several versions of this phrase often throughout her substantial 
body of work, the concept first appears in Gender Trouble. 
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that both mobilize and foreclose our perceptions of corporeality (59). Like other works in 
Winterson’s oeuvre, the novel is thematically bound to the relationship between 
corporeality and desire; however, it is more concerned with what is happening on the 
other side of the skin, considering the exterior forces of time and space that not only 
encircle the body but actually serve to make up its matter. Gut Symmetries takes up with 
the discourse of theoretical physics in its description of the extramarital affair between 
quantum physicist Alice and her colleague Jove, an infidelity that becomes triangulated 
when Alice and Jove’s poet wife Stella fall in love. While Jove insists upon the 
concreteness of his matter and the corporeal boundaries that his matter institutes, Alice 
and Stella’s union represents the interrelationship between energy and matter: radically 
open, they are connected through a constant exchange of the energies that comprise them, 
running through one and into the other. 
As Ruth Holliday and John Hassard argue in their introduction to Contested 
Bodies (2001), thinking “about specific bodies and the spaces through which they flow 
can tell us important things about the ways in which the same bodies are regulated 
differently in different spaces” (8). While Alice affirms that space is indeed curved, that it 
curves through the body, she nonetheless makes the claim that before meeting Stella, her 
brain had been “cordoned by habit to grow in a straight line” (GS 11). Such “cordoning” 
reflects Grosz’s arguments: that socially accepted norms, which amass legitimation and 
authority with the passage of time, extensively impact how bodies respond to their 
exterior surroundings — both spatially and temporally. In a collection of essays called 
Space, Time and Perversions (1995), Grosz states that “if bodies are to be re-conceived, 
not only must their matter and form be rethought, but so too must their environment and 
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spatio-temporal location […] the possibility of further alternatives must be explored” 
(84, 98, emphases in original). The materiality of the body allows the subject to perceive 
its spatio-temporal location, but the body itself is still a socially mediated product — and 
the subject’s understanding of space and time is likewise mediated. However, things 
change when the body’s properties, the reality of its various intangible virtualities, are 
acknowledged. This chapter explores Winterson’s shift in focus from bodily inscriptions, 
as in Written on the Body, to a body without boundaries. Alice and Stella’s bodies, in 
particular, are not just surrounded by time, space, and energy, but play an active role in 
all of it. 
Although virtuality comes into play in both Written on the Body and Gut 
Symmetries, it is positioned as the central site of resignification in The.PowerBook and 
The Stone Gods, the subjects of my third chapter. The majority of The.PowerBook 
ostensibly takes place in the hyperreal dimension of the internet, and explores the means 
through which cyberspace re-codes the pre-coded body, rearranging the lines of what is 
now our “laptop DNA”; The.PowerBook also addresses how desire might become 
simultaneously altered by such re-codings (4). The online domain tends to be considered 
in terms of a Cartesian mind/body split, in which the “virtual” mind is free to travel from 
one avatar to the next, while the “real” body remains passively seated behind the 
computer screen. Winterson’s protagonist Ali/x, who also makes her living re-writing old 
stories and e-mailing them to her clients, describes the experience as “disappear[ing] into 
a web of co-ordinates” (94).  
However, as the work of Hayles demonstrates, cybernetic experience does not 
mean disembodiment; the body still exists, and is undoubtedly impacted by these virtual 
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happenings projected onto the screen. There is a perceived chasm between what Hayles, 
in How We Became Posthuman: Virtual Bodies in Cybernetics, Literature, and 
Informatics (1999), calls the enacted body and the represented body, but the two are 
always threaded together “through the technology that connects them,” “mutating and 
flexible machine interfaces” that synthesize this fragmented body into a posthuman body 
(xiii). It must be noted that this technology is heavily influenced by the preexisting 
domain of cultural intelligibility; nonetheless, this chapter investigates the positive ways 
in which the effects of internet technologies have transformed how bodies (now 
posthuman) negotiate their desires in The.PowerBook. The novel’s use of cyberspace 
problematizes prominent conceptions about materiality. Bodies can indeed be resignified 
— or in this case, re-coded — into something that moves beyond the sex/gender 
categories that have long sustained the heteronormative paradigm.    
This chapter continues along the posthuman vein with my discussion of cyborg 
bodies in The Stone Gods; in the novel’s futuristic, apocalyptic world, bodies have 
become physically fused with technology. Heterosexual copulation is not necessary for 
reproduction, and in many ways, technology has supplanted biology. According to 
Haraway’s A Manifesto for Cyborgs (1991), with this new technological capacity, 
posthuman bodies can no longer be envisaged as “sacred within themselves”; as 
evidenced in The Stone Gods, devoid of the anchoring point of the natural, the cyborg is 
henceforth disengaged from the prevailing binary oppositions that support the 
sex/gender/desire matrix (196). Winterson utilizes the figure of the cyborg to imagine an 
identity that would exist beyond the supposed “real” or “natural” body, ultimately giving 
rise to “quite different political possibilities from those proposed by the mundane fiction 
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of Man and Woman” (222). One of The Stone God’s characters, a state-of-the-art Robo 
sapiens, makes a pointed observation, and one that Winterson’s novels, particularly the 
ones studied here, generally seem keen to highlight: “Gender is a human concept, […] 
and not interesting” (63). 
 The work Winterson begins in Written in the Body, with its focus on corporeality, 
text, time, space, and virtuality, reverberates through the rest of the novels in my study 
and closes with The Stone Gods, set in a future realm where boundaries between what is 
“real” and what has been constructed are becoming increasingly unclear. Importantly, 
these novels destabilize the conception of wholly embodied desire by undercutting 
dominant conceptualizations of what bodies are — all without undermining or dismissing 
the reality of embodiment and lived, felt, sensuous experience. What this means, and 
what makes these particular novels so volatile (and subsequently, so troubling for so 
many members of her audience), is that desire can become unhinged from the various 
heteronormative discourses that regulate it, discourses which have gained legitimation 
through their own naturalization of the body.  
 
V. Conclusion 
 I read the novels examined in this project as an active response to Foucault’s 
postulation: that the articulation of “other forms of pleasures, of relationships, 
coexistences, attachments, [and] love intensities” will lead to the eventual sedimentation 
of “a different economy of bodies and desires” (interview in Lévy 674, emphasis in 
original; History of Sexuality 159). Her texts challenge the dominant normalizing 
discourses that have been imposed upon the body, while providing a number of 
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alternative and fertile frameworks for rethinking not only the body, but the ways in which 
desire is something that is disembodied: coming into the body from elsewhere. These 
novels break down that boundary between the interior self and the body’s exterior 
surroundings, demonstrating how a body that desires is not only impacted but also shaped 
by what is happening on the outside — and that desire is always on the outside, divorcing 
desire from essentialist and potentially pathological notions of sexuality. As long as we 
remain speaking subjects of the Symbolic, the body will forever undergo some form of 
insinuation; that fact is inescapable. However, the discourses that are doing the 
insinuating can be altered in ways that potentiate and actualize pleasures rather than 
foreclose them. 
 In “The Semiotics of Sex,” Winterson states that her work is always “pushing at 
the boundaries we thought were fixed” (116). Pushing at these ostensibly fixed 
boundaries allows us to imagine the possibility of a life that can be lived otherwise, as 
Winterson does in Written on the Body, Gut Symmetries, The.PowerBook and The Stone 
Gods. This is a political move, and a very meaningful one: for fantasy, immateriality, 
energy, virtuality are all very “real” facets of human experience — allowing them into 
our discourses will open up new possibilities for desire and desiring practices, beyond the 
constraints of heteronormativity. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
Moving Beyond the Skin in Written on the Body: Language, Gender, and Productive 
Ruptures of Signification  
 
“The lover knows what it is to be the beloved. The beloved knows in her 
own body the power of the lover.” — Jeanette Winterson, Art Objects: 
Essays on Ecstasy and Effrontery 
 
 
I. Introduction 
 Written on the Body (1992) is a contemporary love story, one that departs from the 
fantastical historical fiction narratives that distinguished Winterson’s two preceding 
works, The Passion (1987) and Sexing the Cherry (1989). However, Written on the Body 
does employ one unusual structural element that is characteristic of Winterson’s tongue-
in-cheek style: the novel’s contents are recounted almost entirely in the first person, by an 
unnamed narrator whose gender is never revealed to the readers. Such an omission 
transforms what would otherwise be a traditional heteronormative boy-meets-girl 
narrative into a game of hermeneutics: the narrator’s primary love object is female, so is 
s/he heterosexual? Or is this a same-sex romance? The narrator’s gender remains 
unconfirmed, and subsequently the question of his/her sexual identity cannot be resolved. 
Nonetheless, the greater part of Written on the Body’s scholarship appears devoted to 
unraveling the mystery instigated by the narrator’s ambiguity. This chapter appraises the 
critical response to the novel, as most have come to variations of the same conclusion: 
that the narrator is a woman and therefore lesbian or, more prevalently, that s/he is a 
lesbian and therefore a woman. However, as I attest, this preoccupation with the trope of 
the indecipherable narrator results in a failure to give due consideration to how a 
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narrative performs in the absence of the narrator’s gender, and the means through which 
his/her imagined corporeal surface actualizes according to culturally constructed 
signifiers of gender which have arrived before the body itself. This chapter explores how 
these signifiers also impact how desire is negotiated, recalling Winterson’s supposition 
from her work Art Objects: Essays on Ecstasy and Effrontery (1995), that bodies are 
“insinuated to desire what they do not desire” (115), taking into account how normative 
discourses might become unsettled by a closer examination of the ways in which 
language sometimes fails to signify.     
 I read the narrator’s continued deferral of gender as representative of Judith 
Butler’s poststructuralist project, to “denaturalize and resignify bodily categories” 
(Gender Trouble xii). While I am not the first to draw a parallel between Written on the 
Body and Butler’s work, my argument focuses predominantly on how Butler’s analysis of 
the preexisting domain of cultural intelligibility aligns with Winterson’s ambiguously 
sexed narrator; my review of the novel’s current criticism serves to demonstrate the 
extent to which the “other” does not just read about the narrator, but actually writes upon 
and thus constitutes his/her body, drawing upon normalizing discourses of the 
sex/gender/desire matrix that precedes it. As Butler indicates, the body is not wholly 
natural but rather a politically invested template upon which these normalizing discourses 
are imprinted. For instance, despite the narrator’s illegible status, the language used to 
describe him/her is always already implicitly gendered: that I am compelled by force of 
habit to refer to the narrator using the conflated pronouns s/he, him/her, and his/her 
speaks to the current limitation of possibilities outside of this category in the English 
language. Even the plural pronoun “they,” which can be used in the singular forms to 
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treat gender ambiguous situations, would still implicitly refer to both men and women 
(and is also grammatically difficult to invoke). That said, it is true that the narrator could 
be addressed in a multitude of ways, such as by the initial “N” for narrator; no one is ever 
forced to use the prevailing language and certainly gender neutral pronouns could also be 
taken up to describe the narrator.13 However, while this strategy would thwart the sexing 
of discourse, such an approach ultimately denies what the novel is attempting to 
demonstrate: the inescapability of gender’s impact on how we read and write bodies. Our 
gaze genders the other according to their sex, which is already gendered. 
Expressions of desire are channeled through this heavily gendered Symbolic 
order, indicated here by the narrator’s struggle to relate the rapture of his/her passion for 
Louise in ways that surpass (and therefore trouble) what already exists. In my discussion 
of the novel, I return to Teresa de Lauretis’s essay “Sexual Indifference and Lesbian 
Representation,” in which she makes the contention that before desire can be removed 
“from discourse of gender, with its indissoluble knowledge of sexuality and 
reproduction,” the body must first be rewritten “beyond its pre-coded, conventional 
representations” (149-50). Borrowing from Tim Dean’s Beyond Sexuality (2000), I also 
explore how Written on the Body not only exposes corporeality as a textually inscribed 
product rather than purely biological, but actually re-conceives the body altogether 
through the destabilization of the skin ego, the primordial boundary between self and 
                                               
 
13  Although there is an abundance of gender neutral pronouns — including, but not 
limited to, “zie/hir/hir,” “ey/em/eir,” and “jee/jeir/jem” — none of them have been 
adopted into common speech, outside of LGBTQ communities (which also, it should be 
noted, are often unable to agree upon which pronoun to implement). 
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other. Although grounded in a psychotic-melancholic fantasy, the narrator’s 
incorporation of the other is ultimately one that resignifies the body by undoing the 
perception of a stable, concrete surface upon which inscriptions can become permanently 
imprinted. While the narrator’s impossible gender remains central to most readings of 
Written on the Body, I am more interested in the ways in which his/her body becomes 
reconstituted within an erotic economy that is also nomadic and virtual rather than purely 
grounded in materiality: an erotic economy that can move beyond the binary of sexual 
difference written onto the body. 
 
II. Reading the Body into Recognition: Butler’s Preexisting Grids of Cultural 
Intelligibility 
 Structurally arranged into three distinctive sections, the plot of Written on the Body 
takes place in London and surrounding areas. At first, the novel bears resemblance to a 
more conventional love story, as the narrator recounts his/her previous romantic 
entanglements and eventual affair with a married woman named Louise Rosenthal (née 
Fox), the “you” to whom the narrator’s “I” addresses the majority of the novel. Louise 
eventually chooses to leave her marriage, but it is not the happily-ever-after the narrator 
was after — soon afterwards, s/he discovers that Louise had been diagnosed with chronic 
lymphocytic leukemia. Louise’s now-estranged husband Elgin, who happens to be a 
prominent oncology specialist, informs the narrator that he will only grant Louise access 
to the best treatment on one condition: the narrator must leave London immediately, and 
renounce all ties to Elgin’s wife. In the physical absence of Louise’s body, the narrator 
develops a frenzied obsession with anatomical textbooks, a fixation that comprises the 
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novel’s second stage — one that, as we will see, pays significant homage to Monique 
Wittig’s The Lesbian Body (1973). The third and final section marks a return to the 
earlier story, but is far less linear; the difference between chronological and narrative 
time is often not clarified. Related in what appears to be the present day, from which the 
novel’s first portion has been recounted, the narrator is now working as a bartender in 
Yorkshire and still mourning his/her lost Louise. After receiving encouragement from a 
new but unwanted love interest in the form of a colleague named Gail Right, the narrator 
embarks upon a disorienting and ultimately futile quest to recover Louise, who has all but 
disappeared. In the final pages of the novel, our dejected and heartbroken narrator returns 
to the pastoral cottage, where his/her beloved suddenly surfaces: “From the kitchen door, 
Louise’s face. Paler, thinner, but her hair still mane-wide and the colour of blood. I put 
out my hand and felt her fingers, she took my fingers and put them to her mouth. The scar 
under the lip burned me. Am I stark mad?  She’s warm” (Winterson 190).14 The scene is 
a cryptic one, as it remains unclear whether Louise’s appearance is real (“She’s warm”), 
or a mere figment of a crazed narrator’s phantasmagoric imaginings (“Am I stark mad?”).   
 Despite Written on the Body’s many obfuscations and experimental qualities, the 
majority of its criticism focuses on the mutually incompatible signifiers of both 
masculinity and femininity that pervade the narrator’s characterization. To cite just a few 
examples, the narrator compares him/herself to Alice in Wonderland and Lauren Bacall, 
an Adam, Christopher Robin, a “cheap thug” and a “private dick” (86, 95). S/he urinates 
                                               
 
14 Unless otherwise indicated, all references to Winterson in this chapter are from Written 
on the Body (1992). 
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while sitting down, but also standing up. S/he reads Playboy, but has admitted to flipping 
through women’s magazines in the waiting room out of boredom. S/he has worn 
stockings to work. In the early stages of his/her relationship with Louise, the narrator 
enacts both passive and active characteristics, by encompassing the swooning submission 
of a woman being romanced and the seductive prowess of a philandering Casanova all at 
once. For instance, the narrator confesses that Louise causes him/her to “quiver like a 
schoolgirl” and feel “like a convent virgin” (82, 94). But in the pages between, s/he is 
described as a womanizer in possession of “Mercutio’s swagger” (86). Not only are the 
narrator’s own descriptions of him/herself the subject of interrogation, but his/her 
interactions with others are similarly scrutinized for clues that might disclose his/her 
gender.  
For this reason, Louise is perhaps the novel’s most frustrating character. As the 
narrator’s central love object, she is the most likely candidate to reveal his/her gender to 
us, and yet her treatment of the narrator is blatantly evasive. She tells the narrator about 
the first time she had ever glimpsed him/her, from across a park: “I thought you were the 
most beautiful creature male or female that I had ever seen” (84). This might seem 
careless on Winterson’s part, to call attention to the narrator’s ambiguity so explicitly. 
However, the scene also performs another important function: in classifying the narrator 
as either “male or female,” Louise’s observation serves to highlight the limitation of 
possibilities outside of these two categories. The narrator is not just a beautiful creature, 
but also a beautiful creature that is male or female, and nothing else. The novel never 
attempts to escape the sexing of bodies but rather, indicates the lack of an outside to it, 
particularly in the Western binary model of identity as represented here in the early 
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1990s. In order to reconcile the narrator’s neutrality, the other characters appear almost 
hyper-gendered; as we will see, Louise is unequivocally femme, while Elgin is typecast 
as the calculated, unsympathetic male doctor. The narrator’s ex-lovers likewise fit the 
mold of various recognizable stereotypes (most evident in Inge, the radical — and 
therefore ostensibly lesbian — feminist). The use of already standardized and thus easily 
recognizable personas makes it easier for readers to form opinions about the narrator’s 
identity, for we can read how the narrator responds to the gendered actions of the other 
characters in order to determine what kind of body s/he inhabits. Is his/her gaze male or 
female? Once again, the novel refuses to present an outside to gender.  
Most of Written on the Body’s characters and scenes are riddled with far subtler 
incongruities than Louise’s “male or female” comment. Take for instance a moment that 
transpires near the end of the novel, when the narrator confronts Elgin. Here, the ways in 
which Elgin and his “hot date” react to the narrator’s exploits incites confusion (169). 
Upon catching sight of Elgin, the narrator lunges at him; Elgin retaliates by punching 
him/her in the stomach. When the narrator slides to the floor, Elgin proceeds to 
repeatedly kick him/her in the shins. If the narrator is a man, then Elgin would be acting 
in self-defense and the case would be tidily closed. If the narrator is a woman, on the 
other hand, then Elgin’s violence is cast in a far more questionable light. His actions 
throughout the text are deplorable, so it is not unfathomable that he would physically 
harm a woman. Elgin’s girlfriend, however, accuses the narrator of being “disgusting”; 
this reaction is perplexing only if the narrator is female (171). Readers who have assumed 
the narrator to be female throughout the text might find the girlfriend’s reaction to be a 
challenging one, if she has just witnessed her new lover assaulting a woman and I admit 
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this was the scene that finally convinced me that the narrator must be female. 
Nonetheless, my presuppositions about how Elgin’s girlfriend should react to his 
aggressive behaviour are similarly subjected to the demands of gender, demonstrating the 
extent to which socially constructed representations have infiltrated every facet of my 
perception.   
 The narrator’s varied representations of his/her former lovers are also laid open to 
the reader’s scrutiny; however, his/her various episodic reflections on past sexual 
escapades only further serve to obscure his/her gender identity. One recollection in 
particular has instigated a good deal of critical consideration, as it contains a steady 
succession of gender-bending signifiers. In the passage, the narrator reminiscences about 
Inge, a Dutch anarcha-feminist whose favoured pastimes include detonating symbols of 
phallic oppression; her preferred target, for this reason, were urinals. In his/her own 
musings on their significance, the narrator reveals an intimate knowledge of men’s toilets 
when s/he depicts them as “fairly liberal places,” appearing well acquainted with the 
social dynamics of this private male space (22). However, s/he also claims to have no 
idea “why men like doing everything together,” simultaneously admitting that the 
behaviour of men often confounds him/her (22). The scene’s next puzzling moment 
manifests in Inge’s insistence that the narrator is not “fit to be an assistant in the fight 
towards a new matriarchy because [s/he] had QUALMS” (22, capitalization in original). 
The qualms themselves are never made clear: are they a result of the narrator’s 
identification with other members of the male sex? Or perhaps the narrator simply prefers 
a more peaceful form of protesting? 
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 Despite Inge’s obvious reservations concerning the narrator’s commitment to the 
campaign, she nonetheless assigns him/her a mission: s/he is to venture into the urinals 
and “warn the row of guys that they were in danger of having their balls blown off unless 
they left at once” (22). Herein lies yet another nebulous occurrence, and again, it is the 
other’s reaction that is canvassed for clues: the men inside respond to the narrator’s 
dramatic entrance with indifference, contemptuously flicking away the drops and 
swapping tips about racing. In fact, they are provoked to action only when the narrator 
reveals his/her possession of a gun. On the one hand, the intrusion of a female into this 
fundamentally masculine space might have been more likely to startle them, which would 
then suggest that the narrator is male (23). On the other, their scornful behaviour also 
implies that they are not intimidated, even by the narrator’s threat of castration: their 
inability to take the narrator seriously could mean that s/he is a woman. The emergence 
of the pistol, a phallic symbol if there ever was one, levels the playing field considerably; 
the men are finally persuaded to flee the room.   
 Despite its deliberate ambiguity, critical evaluations of the scene tend to deposit 
the narrator into a female body by privileging signifiers of femininity and denying or 
ignoring the presence of masculine possibilities. For example, Ute Kauer’s article 
“Narration and Gender: The Role of the First-Person Narrator in Written on the Body” 
recognizes that the novel works to deconstruct conventions about “gender, and specific 
male or female behaviour” (45). At the same time, however, she nonetheless contends 
that the narrator’s exhibition of solidarity with the feminist cause ends up disclosing 
his/her status as a woman: “The narrator cannot withhold her sympathy and thus 
counteracts the design to keep the own gender undeclared” (49). This line of reasoning 
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disregards the scene’s various discordant details: the narrator’s seeming familiarity with 
male spaces, his/her “qualms” regarding the destruction of these patriarchal structures, 
the questionably subdued reaction of the men inside. Kauer’s assertion is further 
problematic in that it also relies on stereotypes. With the implication that men are 
incapable of feeling a sense of political comradeship with their female counterparts, 
Kauer is leaning on essentialist notions: that masculinity is insensitive and self-serving, 
which is defined against the feminine predisposition to be emotional, compassionate, and 
nurturing. In this instance, she falls victim to Written on the Body’s red herrings, which 
work to expose the reader’s own habitual (and therefore normative) expectations about 
how gender “should” be performed. 
Most critics have been more careful to tiptoe around the opacity of narrator’s 
gender, while nonetheless deeming Written on the Body to be a same-sex love story. For 
instance, in Other Sexes: Rewriting Difference from Woolf to Winterson (1986), Andrea 
L. Harris acknowledges the narrator as “technically ungendered,” but still maintains that 
s/he must be a lesbian, as “it is impossible to imagine Inge as anything but a lesbian” 
(143). Harris’s argument relies on two assumptions: that radical feminists are prone to 
homosexuality and that heterosexual women are less predisposed to dissident politics. 
Emma Parker’s argument also relies on similarly gendered stereotypes in her discussion 
of the narrator’s probable lesbianism. In her article “Lost in Translation: Gender and the 
Figure of the Translator in Contemporary Queer Fiction,” Parker juxtaposes Louise’s 
delicate prettiness, with her “petticoats, silk clothes, and hair that looks like a swarm of 
butterflies” against the masculine nature of the narrator’s occasionally violent, “whiskey-
swilling” demeanour in order to make the claim that the narrator and Louise follow the 
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distinctive pattern of a lesbian butch/femme coupling (124). Parker’s appropriation of the 
butch/femme model is a replication of the heterosexual rubric, in which the social 
construct of gender provides the characteristics of “oppositional” masculine/feminine 
desire that sustains the heteronormative narrative. Thus, her argument serves to solidify 
the narrator’s sexual identity through the sanctioning dynamic of gender, while omitting 
that which either exceeds or conflates its binary logic.  
For instance, Parker’s reading favours the narrator’s self-representation as a 
“parody of the sporting colonel... fancying a glass of sherry” (Winterson 77, emphasis 
my own). That s/he is a parody further implies his/her impersonation of masculinity, if 
we are to follow Parker’s rationale. However, in her fixation on the narrator’s enacted 
butchness, she completely disregards his/his self-avowed feminine attributes, such his/her 
confession that s/he enjoys composing flower arrangements. Even more problematic, 
Parker overlooks another important quality altogether: although s/he is most often 
involved with married women, the narrator also confirms several romantic relationships 
with men (92, 143, 152). As Susan Lanser points out in “Queering Narratology,” this 
information immediately “erases the possibility of a strictly heterosexual male”; however, 
it also troubles the butch/femme dichotomy, particularly in the narrator’s description of 
his/her ex-boyfriend, amusingly nicknamed Crazy Frank (Lanser 255). Crazy Frank, it 
turns out, is a failed butch: “[He] had the body of a bull, an image he intensified by 
wearing great gold hoops through his nipples. Unfortunately he had joined the hoops with 
a chain of heavy gold links. The effect should have been deeply butch but in fact rather 
looked like the handle of a Chanel shopping bag” (Winterson 93). That Crazy Frank does 
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not succeed in performing masculinity, despite his occupation of a male body, further 
speaks to the tenuousness of the connection between gender and biological sex. 
 Although the narrator reveals his/her sexual identity as bisexual, the majority of 
critical perspectives have nonetheless agreed that s/he is most likely a lesbian. In her 
work Heterosexual Plots and Lesbian Narratives (1996), Marilyn Farwell recounts an 
incident which highlights what I believe to be the chief reason that the narrator is by and 
large regarded as a lesbian character, despite the novel’s confirmation of bisexuality: the 
reader’s knowledge of Winterson’s own sexual preference. As Farwell remembers it, the 
judging panel for 1993’s Lambda Award for Lesbian Fiction could not agree upon 
whether or not Written on the Body could be classified as a lesbian text, due to the 
narrator’s ambiguity. Ultimately, they came to the decision that since a lesbian wrote the 
novel, it could be categorized under the bracket of lesbian fiction. Moreover, as 
Winterson’s previous work includes semi-autobiographical elements, a reader familiar 
with her canon might be more likely to expect a narrator modeled after her own personal 
experiences. As Carolyn Allen rightly observes, in Following Djuna: Women Lovers and 
the Erotics of Loss (1996): “Winterson’s self identification as a lesbian together with her 
fame as the author of Oranges Are Not the Only Fruit (1985), an explicitly lesbian 
narrative about the coming out of its protagonist ‘Jeanette,’ drives the decision to imagine 
‘I’ as Louise’s woman lover” (49). Written on the Body is frequently referenced as a 
sequel to her first novel Oranges are Not the Only Fruit, and it has been argued that 
Winterson’s own personal history influenced the story. After all, she gained notoriety for 
her own love affairs: most infamously, she became the subject of scandal when she 
romanced her one-time literary agent Pat Kavanagh, who was married at the time to 
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Winterson’s contemporary, novelist Julian Barnes. Winterson was so bold as to dedicate 
The Passion to Kavanagh, a novel that would have given the Lambda panel no cause for 
confusion. Although she claimed otherwise, it was popular opinion that Winterson based 
the character of Louise on Kavanagh. Certainly, one would be hard-pressed to deny the 
physical similarities between the two red haired, pre-Raphaelite beauties.   
As a result of these self-representational traces, Patricia Duncker accuses 
Winterson of “closeting” her narrator; as her article “Jeanette Winterson and the 
Aftermath of Feminism” alleges, “Written on the Body is a text full of lost opportunities. 
Winterson refuses to write an ‘out’ lesbian novel [...] she is losing more than she gains” 
(85). For Duncker, Written on the Body is politically void as a consequence of 
Winterson’s refusal to speak for the entire marginalized community of women who desire 
women. Many of the non-fictional essays in Winterson’s Art Objects: Essays on Ecstasy 
and Effrontery (1995), published three years following Written on the Body, respond to 
the public’s preoccupation with her personal proclivities, as well as the burden of 
representation foisted upon her. As she declares in “The Semiotics of Sex”: “I am a writer 
who happens to be a lesbian. I am not a lesbian who happens to write” (110).  
Her resistance notwithstanding, a good number of critics have developed an 
argument around Winterson’s intrinsically “lesbian” style of writing. Rather than 
focusing their attention on the narrator’s various gendered characteristics or even 
Winterson’s own authorial self-representational tendencies, they instead employ the 
novel’s form and composition as evidence of the narrator’s lesbianism. For example, 
while Patricia Juliana Smith allows for the primary omission of the narrator’s sex, she 
nonetheless insists that the implicit allusions to female genitalia throughout the text 
39 
reveal it to be a woman-centric love story. Lisa Moore contends that it is these indirect 
references to the female sex organ, in combination with the text’s insistence “upon a 
deferral of fixed sexual identities,” that renders the novel compatible with the genre of 
“lesbian postmodernism” (Moore 105). As she articulates, the narrator can be perceived 
as “a figure constructed of disparate body parts, desire, identities and histories, put 
together in a postmodern pastiche that nonetheless allows for the grand romantic tradition 
of lesbian cultural politics” (110). For her part, Cath Stowers concedes that Written on the 
Body promotes “mixed gendered and fluid identities,” but like Smith and Moore, she still 
maintains that the novel “could provide insights into what a distinctly lesbian aesthetic 
may look like, suggesting potential figurations of an enduring battle with gender 
binaries” (“Journeying” 153). For Stowers, although the novel begins with a 
“masculinist” approach, the appearance of Louise at Written on the Body’s conclusion 
suggests an “erupting of lesbian desire,” one that “detonates male paradigms, rupturing 
male models of travel, gender, desire, and fracturing patriarchal systems of signification” 
(“Erupting” 98).   
 Moore and Stowers in particular forge a connection between the narratological 
structure of Written on the Body and the work of self-identified “radical lesbian” 
Monique Wittig, as the second section pays tribute to her novel The Lesbian Body: both 
texts dismember, dissect and catalogue the body’s various parts before engaging in the 
process of resignification, infusing corporeality with an eroticism that exceeds the 
monolithic purview of science. However, as its title indicates, The Lesbian Body is a 
definitively lesbian novel, and one that puts into practice Wittig’s anti-essentialist 
philosophies. In one of her most oft-quoted postulations, Wittig declares that “the refusal 
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to become (or to remain) heterosexual always meant to refuse to become a man or a 
woman, consciously or not” (Straight Mind 13). Moore and Stowers both ultimately read 
the narrator as a logical reversal of this contention: that to refuse to become a man or 
woman means to refuse to become heterosexual. Wittig further proposes that only the 
figure of the lesbian can encompass the space of “not-man, not-woman,” as it is the only 
identity that exists beyond the constraints of heteronormative binaries (13). Appropriating 
the same reasoning followed by the above analyses, then the narrator, as most 
emphatically not-man and not-woman, must therefore be a lesbian. Lesbianism becomes 
positioned a revolutionary signifier, one which has the capacity to move beyond the 
limits of gender.   
 I find this a provocative approach, one that recognizes the novel’s fascination 
with gender without tacitly denying it. However, what remains unclear to me here is the 
actual feasibility of Wittig’s theorizing: can one extract the lesbian from the category of 
woman, or are these categories irrevocably bound by the visible femaleness of the body? 
In his work Homos (1995), Leo Bersani describes a lecture given by Wittig at Vassar 
College. In a moment both “incomparably absurd and poignant” all at once, Bersani bears 
reluctant witness to a member of the audience asking Wittig whether or not she possessed 
female genitalia (45). Wittig answered no. According to Bersani, this response “rapidly 
reinscribed ‘lesbian’ on her body, effectively erasing the cultural sign and stigma of 
‘woman’” (45). However, as Bersani points out, the question itself nonetheless performed 
the work of simultaneously creating her as a woman: although Wittig may refuse the 
social conventions associated with her sex, she cannot control that the other will perceive 
her in gendered terms due to the visible markings of her body.  
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The same issue applies here. According to Leigh Gilmore’s article “Without 
Names: An Anatomy of Absence in Jeanette Winterson’s Written on the Body”:  
 
Both text itself and the topos of gendered and sexual identity here are ‘written 
on the body’ in such a way that the body cannot simply offer a transparently 
visible or unambiguously legible proof of ‘identity,’ but that does not remove 
the problem of identification, of establishing how ‘we’ know ‘one’ (a woman, 
a lesbian, an autobiography) when ‘we’ see ‘one’. The body is usually 
thought to provide compelling, even irrefutable, proof of sex and gender, and 
ultimately of unique identity. The body coalesces under the name of sex. 
(130-131) 
 
As Gilmore asserts, the body itself is a sign that is read. Critics who believe they have 
“unraveled” the mystery of the narrator’s gender have done so by gathering textual 
evidence (signs of masculinity or femininity) that will serve to create the imagined 
boundaries of his/her corporeality: the narrator’s possession of butch characteristics 
(positioned in proximity to Louise’s femme-ness), Winterson’s own self-identification as 
a lesbian, and the novel’s intertextual affiliation with other works in the lesbian canon, 
are all signifiers of the narrator’s female sex. It is the readers, then, who serve to 
construct, discursively, the narrator’s body. 
I disagree with readers who claim to have figured out the narrator’s gender: to 
insist that s/he is a woman, or that s/he is a man is an argument that, for me, misses the 
point — that our reading process depends on knowing his/her gender in order to develop 
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an informed opinion on the relationship between the narrator and Louise, indicating the 
extent to which gender impacts our understanding of sexuality. And the fact remains: 
readers do not know what kind of body the narrator inhabits, despite whatever 
conclusions they may have drawn. However, it would be erroneous to say that Written on 
the Body evades or disregards gender, for the narrator’s characterization — including the 
ways in which s/he desires — cannot be interpreted in ways that exist outside of gender. 
As Gilmore observes, the text’s various gendered clues succeed in rendering the 
narrator’s identity legible only when situated in relation to “a grid of intelligibility 
already in place” (128, emphasis in original).  Although Gilmore herself does not make 
this connection, this grid parallels what Butler calls the “preexisting domain of cultural 
intelligibility”: a complex infrastructure of competing and colliding cultural knowledges 
about sex, gender and sexuality that will come to actuate the body’s viability in the 
cultural realm. These discursively established frameworks operate in conjunction to 
sustain heteronormative ideologies; as Butler states in her 1993 work Bodies That Matter: 
On the Discursive Limits of Sex, the “heterosexualization of desire requires and institutes 
the production of discrete and asymmetrical opposition between ‘feminine’ and 
‘masculine,’ where these are understood as expressive attributes of  ‘male’ and ‘female’” 
(23). However, Butler also confirms that the category of sex itself is in fact sedimented 
by the very gendered expressions that are said to be its effects: sex cannot be experienced 
in ways that go beyond conceptions of gender, and therefore, the body cannot be 
extricated from the social constructions that have informed our recognition of it. If 
corporeality can only be perceived through discourse, then these perceptions — of what it 
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means to possess male or female genitalia, for instance — rely on constitutions that arrive 
prior to the body’s existence.   
 Although she contests the possibility of a pre-discursive body, Butler does not 
suggest that materiality itself does not exist; she acknowledges that the body does retain 
certain biological facts. However, these physical behaviours (eating, sleeping, defecation, 
etc.) cannot be comprehended by the subject in its organic states because bodies can 
“only appear, only endure, only live within the productive constraints” of the language 
that is available to describe them (v). As she confirms, the body can never make “itself 
known or legible outside of the cultural articulation in which it appears. This does not 
mean that culture produces the materiality of the body. It only means that the body is 
always given to us, and to others, in some way” (Breen and Blumenfeld 12). Importantly, 
the body is given to us through the binary category of gender, as language does not 
recognize the plurality of possibilities outside of it. From the very moment the infant 
enters into the world, its corporeal boundaries are materialized in compliance with what 
Butler calls a “heavily regulatory gendered schema” (Bodies That Matter v). This 
immediacy is demonstrated by the first proclamation of gender made in the birthing 
room, as the following example depicts:   
 
Consider the medical interpellation which [...] shifts an infant from an ‘it’ to a 
‘she’ or ‘he,’ and in that naming, the girl is ‘girled,’ brought into the domain 
of language and kinship through the interpellation of gendered. But that 
‘girling’ of the girl does not end there; on the contrary, that founding 
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interpellation is reiterated by various authorities and throughout various 
intervals of time to reenforce or contest this naturalized effect. (xvii) 
 
In order to be recognized by the other and remain a socially viable subject in the 
Symbolic realm, the female must continue to cite the norm of her gender. The constancy 
of this “corporeally enacted femininity” allows gender to retain the appearance of 
naturalness when in fact, this embodiment is the incarnation of historically and culturally 
specific ideologies (232).  
However, as Butler states in her preceding work Gender Trouble: Feminism and 
the Subversion of Identity (1990), gender is really more of a “doing, though not a doing 
by a subject who might be said to preexist the deed” (33). Butler is careful to emphasize 
that the subject does not “put on” this role like a mask or a costume: for her, it is not 
possible to arrive before the act of performativity itself. In Bodies That Matter, she 
redefines her conceptualization of performativity, in response to the widespread 
misinterpretation of her discussion in Gender Trouble regarding performances by drag 
queens: as she articulates, performance can be distinguished as a “bounded act” whereas 
performativity “consists in a reiteration of norms which precede, constrain, and exceed 
the performer’s ‘will’ or ‘choice’ (232). Unlike performance, performativity can be 
defined as pre-formativity: it forms the subject in advance of his or her entry into the 
Symbolic. As she further clarifies: “There is no ‘one’ who takes on a gender norm. On 
the contrary, this citation of the gender norm is necessary in order to qualify as a ‘one,’ to 
become viable as a ‘one,’ where subject-formation is dependent on the prior operation of 
legitimating gender norms” (232).   
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 Even aberrations, like Written on the Body’s narrator, are subsumed by this 
gendered system, as it still corroborates the degree to which these deviating subjects have 
failed to comply. Butler states that “social constraints, taboos, prohibitions, threats of 
punishment operate in the ritualized repetition of norms, and this repetition constitutes 
the temporalized scene of gender construction and destabilization. There is no subject 
who precedes or enacts this repetition of norms” (21). As such, the narrator cannot 
circumvent the connotations of gender. This inescapability is demonstrated by 
Winterson’s own response to a question regarding Written on the Body’s unspecified 
protagonist: she admits that she views the narrator as a woman, and on other occasions, 
as a man — but never as non-gendered (Stewart 74). In her work The Signs of the Body, 
Dorte Marie Søndergaard observes that “[i]ndividuals are read as signs of gender. No 
matter how confusingly the individual forms its appearance, its co-actors will never give 
up. They can be apprehensive, but will struggle endlessly to become able to reach a 
conclusive reading” (Søndergaard 105, note to 91).15 Feminine/masculine signifiers may 
become partially immobilized when the body itself is obscured, but even then, gender 
remains a vigorous, definitive force.  
Moreover, it is the other’s understanding of preexisting gender norms that frames 
the body’s shape, engendering “a process of materialization that stabilizes over time to 
produce the effect of boundary, fixity and surface we call matter” (Bodies That Matter 9). 
As Butler reaffirms in Excitable Speech: A Politics of the Performative (1997): “That one 
                                               
 
15As quoted in Marie Herholdt Jørgensen’s Empty Space and Points of Light: The Self, 
Time, Sex, and Gender in Selected Works by Jeanette Winterson. 
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comes to ‘be’ through a dependency on the Other [...] must be recast in linguistic terms to 
the extent that the terms by which recognition is regulated, allocated, and refused are part 
of the larger social rituals of interpretation” (26). Written on the Body reveals the means 
through which the narrator’s identity is regulated and allocated by the audience, in 
concord with preexisting discursive categories, while the possibility of a genderless 
narrator is largely refused. Although its form may fluctuate, readers will nonetheless 
continually affix the narrator into a body that can be recognized. Thus, the body is a kind 
of writerly text in the Barthesian sense: the reader does not just passively gaze upon the 
body, but plays an active role in producing it.16 
 Butler borrows from Michel Foucault’s account of nineteenth century 
hermaphrodite Herculine Barbin’s journals in order to explore the ways in which bodies 
come to be shaped through the gaze of the other. Despite the ambiguity of her body, 
Barbin was assigned a female sex at birth. Her eventual desire for women was related — 
by the British legal system, no less — to the male parts of his/her body; according to the 
dominant heteronormative logic, Barbin’s libidinal investment in women means that s/he 
must actually be male and therefore masculine. In this way, his/her body was rendered 
meaningful, shaped and translated into a legible text relative to preexisting knowledges 
about sex and gender. Like Written on the Body’s narrator, the consolidation of Barbin’s 
sexual identity with the incoherent sex of his/her body demonstrates the extent to which 
                                               
 
16 In his 1973 work The Pleasure of the Text, Roland Barthes distinguishes between two 
types of texts: a readerly text and a writerly text. Readerly texts fix meaning into place, 
disavowing multiple interpretations. The reader is not given the choice to participate. 
Writerly texts, on the other hand, enlist the reader to construct the significance of the text 
— its meaning has not been preordained by the author.  
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corporeality is “fully textualized”: “the other” draws from “the juridical discourse on 
univocal sex” in order to assign a gender to the subject’s body (Gender Trouble 155).17 
For Butler, although it is not possible to “fully inhabit [...] the name by which one’s 
social identity is inaugurated and mobilized,” recognition remains a powerful force: it is 
“not conferred on a subject, but forms that subject” (Bodies That Matter 226, emphasis 
my own). Barbin’s struggle to transition successfully from female to male reveals a body 
in excess of these culturally mandated knowledges; suspended in the unlivable Symbolic 
space between the two sexes, s/he eventually committed suicide in 1868. As Barbin’s 
example illustrates, one can only become a viable subject in and through the recognition 
of these already established frameworks of knowledge. Critical readings which claim to 
determine the narrator’s gender, thus rendering him/her viable, have missed the mark 
entirely; although the category of gender cannot be evaded, the novel still works to 
weaken the normative discourses by exposing the ways in which the body materializes in 
accordance with the other’s preexisting conceptions.18   
The narrator’s recollection of yet another former lover serves to undermine 
authorial power of readers by demonstrating the slipperiness of all narrative forms. In the 
scene, which is again permeated with gendered contradictions, the narrator dreams about 
                                               
 
17 I would like to clarify that Butler is not adopting Lacan’s version of the gaze. Lacan 
views the gaze as that which reveals the screen image as coming from an imaginary 
projection, which in turn produces a trompe l’oeil. In Lacanian thought, the ways in 
which the other perceives the subject will never be fully known by the subject: the 
subject is all too consumed by its own imaginings of what the other might be seeing. 
18 Butler also suggests that the “ideal” norm of either femininity or masculinity is an 
oxymoron: it cannot exist because it differs for everyone. There is no one person in 
charge of the ideal. Therefore, the normalization process can never achieve the essence of 
the gender norm.  
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an ex-girlfriend named Amy who had been interested in the art of papier-mâché. Amy 
had constructed a yellow and green serpent with a red tongue and teeth made out of silver 
foil that she then positioned inside the letter-box attached to her front door. Significantly, 
her letter-box was located “crotch-level”; in order to ring the bell, one was forced to aim 
one’s genitals at the head of the snake (Winterson 41). Upon first encountering the 
creation, the narrator dismisses it as a joke. However, when Amy appears, dressed in her 
kaftan and long string of beads, she confesses that she had indeed placed a rat-trap in the 
jaw for the benefit of a postman that had been bothering her; she then demonstrates its 
real purpose by using the serpent to slice a leek clean in half. Like the scene in the men’s 
toilet, the dream also evokes the psychoanalytic framework of castration anxiety; 
however, its real locus emerges when Amy tells the narrator not to worry, for s/he has 
“nothing to be frightened of” (42). Amy’s remark could be construed in several ways: if 
the narrator has nothing to fear from this vagina dentata of a letter-box, this could then 
mean that s/he has nothing to lose and is therefore already “castrated.” On the other hand, 
it is also entirely possible that unlike Amy’s lewd postman, the narrator is not vulgar 
enough to put his penis into a letter-box and therefore, should have no need to feel 
concern; there is evidence throughout the novel to support the narrator’s assertion that 
despite his/her extensive sexual history, s/he is actually a rather “mild-mannered sort” 
(22).    
 There is yet another possibility, one that readers primarily concerned with 
uncovering the narrator’s gender might have overlooked altogether. It is never made clear 
whether or not the narrator dreamed about Amy, which prompted the memory of the 
letter-box incident, or if the entire episode itself comprised the contents of the dream. 
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After all, the narrator describes the dream as “lurid,” an appropriate word for this 
macabre spectacle; s/he awakens feeling “sweaty and chilled” (41). The lack of clarity is 
not surprising: not only is the narrator ambiguous, but s/he is also self-admittedly 
unreliable. Earlier in the book, s/he becomes confused about the order of events in the 
story s/he is telling us. S/he claims to have fed Louise “plums the colour of bruises” but 
then remembers that there are no ripe plums that time of year, thus causing him/her to 
wonder: “Have I got it wrong this hesitant chronology?” (17). A few pages later, s/he 
turns his/her attention directly to the reader: “I can tell by now you are wondering 
whether I can be trusted as a narrator” (24). This statement signals the narrator’s first 
acknowledgment that s/he is aware of the presence of the readers, interrupting the 
narrative sequence by temporarily shifting the “you” from Louise to his/her audience.   
 While the narrator’s self-reflexivity does subvert the authority typically invested 
in autodiegetic narrators by reminding the reader that this is just a story, it also points 
back to one of the novel’s most fundamental concerns: the deficiencies of all narratives 
which lay claim to their own truth effects. And certainly, the reader’s quest to unveil the 
narrator’s gender relies upon discursively constructed ideologies that have been 
formulated in much the same way as works of fiction. As Butler verifies: “If the inner 
truth of gender is a fabrication and if a true gender is a fantasy instituted and inscribed on 
the surface of bodies, then it seems that genders can neither be true nor false, but are only 
produced as the truth effects of a discourse of primary and stable identity” (Gender 
Trouble 174). Written on the Body appears to respond to Butler’s contention: not only 
does the novel shine a light on long-held presumptions about gender and sexuality 
identity categories, but it works to uproot them altogether by emphasizing the ways in 
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which the body materializes as a product of culture to be both read and authored by the 
other’s gendered and gendering gaze.  
 The critical reception of Written on the Body demonstrates the extent to which 
corporeal surfaces are constructed in relation to the other’s recognition, to their citational 
regard, one that remains entrenched in the preexisting domain of cultural intelligibility — 
as the example of Herculine Barbin has demonstrated. The capacity to experience desire 
is produced in a similar way, as the subject’s relation to its own body is formed in and 
through a language that has been thoroughly gendered. Butler conceives of desire as 
created within a language embedded with preexisting — albeit historically and culturally 
contingent — knowledges about sex and gender: a network of ideologies that “enables 
certain identifications and forecloses and/or disavows other identifications” (Bodies That 
Matter 3).  This dynamic is impelled by “the heterosexual imperative,” an edict which I 
have already argued simultaneously sustains and is sustained by the corporeally inscribed 
opposition of masculine/feminine. The body cannot be made legible in the absence of 
gender; thus, even “abject” sexual practices and behaviours cannot be articulated in ways 
that move outside of the binaries inherent in sexual difference. As such, the subject’s 
capacity to process desire is shaped by the same kinds of discursively orchestrated 
operations of gender that are complicit in the materialization of the body.  
 
III. “It’s the clichés that cause the trouble”: The Impossible Language of Desire 
Written on the Body explores the narrator’s efforts to account for his/her desires 
without employing the fundamentally gendered category of sexual identity. The various 
limitations of discourse are emblematized by the novel’s specific articulation of the 
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cliché. As the narrator discovers, s/he cannot process his/her passion for Louise without 
relying upon a language that predates it. Throughout the narrative, she repeats again and 
again that “[i]t is the clichés that cause the trouble” (Winterson 10, 21, 26, 71, 155, 180). 
Clichés reveal not only how technologies of power/knowledge become naturalized 
through reiterative accumulation, as Butler has noted, but also the ways in which they 
come to persuade or even actuate the very effects that they describe — as the narrator 
him/herself indicates when s/he asks the following question about the phrase “I love 
you”: “Why is it that the most unoriginal thing we can say to one another is still the thing 
we long to hear?” (9). In his article, “Bonded by Language: Jeanette Winterson’s Written 
on the Body,” Brian Finney makes an interesting point: that the novel is really about “the 
language of desire” (23). As he proposes, the crux of the narrative is not the ungendered 
narrator after all, but the trouble that s/he encounters in attempting to navigate the 
discourse of love without “falling back on language already made familiar by past use” 
(25). Although the narrator endeavours to express his/her love for Louise in ways that 
surpass the banality of convention, s/he continually finds him/herself ensnared by clichés.   
 The onset of the novel offers a smattering of examples of the most commonplace 
clichés on desire:  “Love makes the world go round. Love is blind. All you need is love. 
Nobody ever died of a broken heart. You’ll get over it. It’ll be different when you’re 
married. Think of the children. Time’s a great healer. Still waiting for Mr. Right? Miss 
Right? and maybe all the little Rights?” (Winterson 10). Clichés cause trouble not just 
because they trivialize that which is potentially profound: as Sonia Front points out, their 
constant repetition allows for the appearance of truth or naturalness and therefore, they 
possess the capacity to regulate and determine how desire is experienced (Front 50). 
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Indeed, although these ubiquitous and therefore stale expressions or ideas are received as 
harmless, these prosaicisms are permeated with normative ideologies; expressions of love 
are saturated with them, so much that the phrase “‘I love you’ is always a quotation,” a 
citation of a norm already crystallized (Winterson 10). As the narrator explains, tellingly:  
 
I want the diluted version, the sloppy language, the insignificant gestures.  The 
saggy armchair of clichés. It’s all right, millions of bottoms have sat here 
before me. The springs are well worn, the fabric smelly and familiar.  I don’t 
have to be frightened, look, my grandma and grandad did it, he in a stiff collar 
and club tie, she in white muslin straining a little at the life beneath. They did 
it, my parents did it, now I will do it won’t I, arms outstretched, not to hold 
you, just to keep my balance, sleepwalking to that armchair. How happy we 
will be. How happy everyone will be. And they all lived happily ever after. 
(10) 
 
The conventionalization of these clichés offers a false sense of recognition, one that 
threatens to lull the subject into somnambulistic complacency with prevailing social 
expectations.  
 The narrator’s penchant for having affairs with married women also materializes 
as a tired reiteration of the same melodramatic script, a fragment of which is outlined on 
pages 14 - 15. The character named Naked Woman tells her Lover that while she has 
never been sexually satisfied by her husband, she could never be so cruel or so selfish as 
to tell him the truth of her indiscretion; the scene ends with the Lover crying alone in the 
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bathroom. As the narrator laments, it is “the same story every time”: the adulterous wife 
returns to her husband (13). In the next passage, the narrator describes his/her former 
lover, a cuckolding dentist named Bathsheba. Despite her two-year liaison with the 
narrator, Bathsheba considered herself to be “a happily married woman” (16). Shortly 
after returning from a six-week journey to South Africa, she tactlessly informed the 
narrator that her husband Uriah had contracted a venereal disease on a previous business 
trip. That her husband was also unfaithful demonstrates the lack of actual commitment in 
their partnership. And yet, Bathsheba — whose namesake is the Biblical figure, the 
“daughter of the oath” who was seduced by King David while still married to her own 
version of Uriah — remained faithful not to Uriah, but to her “perfect public marriage” 
(45). For the increasingly jaded narrator, marriage is little more than a “shell” that people 
collect for other people to admire: they need only pledge themselves to their roles as 
Husband and Wife, even when the marriage itself is hollow (15).  
And to the outside observer, Elgin and Louise also appeared the very epitome of 
the perfect heteronormative union as the accomplished Doctor and his beautiful, 
culturally cultivated wife; upon first meeting the couple, the narrator believed them to be 
“happily married and had been so for ten years” (29). Later, in the early stages of 
Louise’s affair with the narrator, the truth is revealed: Elgin agreed to turn a blind eye to 
his wife’s betrayal in exchange for her continued silence regarding his various sexual 
kinks and occasional employment of prostitutes. While the narrator may scorn the 
institution of marriage for its pretense, s/he also entered into a similar social arrangement: 
after one too many enactments of the aforementioned script between the Naked Woman 
and the speechless Lover, the narrator decided to “consider” Jacqueline, a single but dull 
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zoo-keeper who had fallen in love with the narrator. S/he did not reciprocate the feeling, 
but was longing for the security provided by the saggy armchair, and the accompanying 
“[l]ate night TV and snoring side by side into the millennium. Till death us do part. 
Anniversary darling? What’s wrong with that?” (26). Although bored by the “particular 
numbness” of this new life, the narrator lived peacefully with Jacqueline for a year, 
essentially taking advantage of her affection simply because “she had had the right shape 
to fit for a while” (60, 61).    
 The narrator’s affairs, while technically more exciting and less structured than 
monogamous relationships, were also inundated with preexisting ideologies concerning 
sexual desire, further demonstrating the inescapability of language’s various 
interventions. As the narrator admits: “I was trapped in a cliché every bit as redundant as 
my parents’ roses round the door. I was looking for the perfect coupling; the never-sleep 
non-stop mighty orgasm. Ecstasy without end. I was deep in the slop-bucket of romance” 
(21). When s/he embarks upon another affair, this time with Louise, s/he promises that 
things will be different this time. However, despite his/her interest in going beyond the 
hegemony of traditional scripts, of both the “hearth” and “quest” variety (81), s/he still 
depicts Louise in conventionalized terms. Early in the novel, the narrator remembers a 
conversation with Inge the anarcha-feminist, who had asked: 
 
“Don’t you know that Renoir claimed he painted with his penis?”  
“Don’t worry [...] He did. When he died they found nothing between his balls 
but an old brush.” 
“You’re making it up.”  
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Am I? (22) 
 
The passage is paralleled by a conversation between the narrator and yet another ex-
girlfriend named Catherine, in which the narrator declared that when Henry Miller died, 
he was discovered with “nothing between his legs but a ball point pen” (60). Catherine 
also accused the narrator of falsifying the story, to which s/he responded, “Am I?” (60). 
Not only is the narrator once again revealed as a potentially untrustworthy source, but 
s/he is also guilty of similar modes of idealization: whether s/he is male or female, the 
ways in which the narrator expresses his/her desire for Louise are comparable to both 
Renoir and Miller in that his/her representations of Louise serve to objectify her.  
   For example, the narrator states that if s/he were to paint a portrait of Louise, 
s/he would: 
 
[…] paint her hair as a swarm of butterflies. A million Red Admirals in a halo 
of movement and light. There are plenty of legends about women turning into 
trees but are there any about trees turning into women? Is it odd to say that 
your lover reminds you of a tree? Well she does, it’s the way her hair fills with 
wind and sweeps out around her head. Very often I expect her to rustle. (28-29) 
 
Throughout the text, the narrator portrays Louise solely in relation to her femininity, a 
role that she appears to embody effortlessly: according to the narrator, “Louise charmed 
everyone. She brought [Elgin] attention, contacts, she cooked, she decorated, she was 
clever and above all, she was beautiful” (35). Even in the narrator’s own estimation, 
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Louise’s beauty is privileged “above all.” For her part, Louise appears to be aware of her 
own value as a possession. When speaking to the narrator about Elgin, she states: “He 
knew I was beautiful, that I was a prize. He wanted something showy but not vulgar. He 
wanted to go up to the world and say, ‘Look what I’ve got’” (34). Although the narrator 
strives to differ from Louise’s pedantic, controlling husband, s/he also seems just as 
proud to have Louise on his/her arm as s/he discerns with great interest the ways in which 
others gaze upon his/her beloved: “During the interval of The Marriage of Figaro, I 
realized how often other people looked at Louise [...] The ties twitched when Louise 
walked by and the suits pulled themselves in a little” (32).    
 When the narrator’s descriptions of Louise are juxtaposed against recollections of 
his/her other lovers, the import of her delicate beauty is made all the more apparent. For 
instance, the narrator’s impression of Jacqueline is relayed in straightforward, brusque 
statements: “She told me all about the problems facing the lemurs in the Zoo. She 
brought her own mop. She worked nine to five Monday to Friday, drove a Mini and got 
her reading from book clubs. She exhibited no fetishes, foibles, freak-outs or fuck-ups” 
(26). The narrator spends little time in communicating Jacqueline’s physical appearance, 
only complaining at one point that she smelled like a zoo (40). When Jacqueline asked if 
the narrator is seeing Louise, the narrator thinks: “I see her when I look at you. I see her 
when I don’t look at you” (56). Jacqueline is not to be gazed upon with admiration; in 
fact, that narrator does not see her at all. When the narrator finally ends their relationship, 
Jacqueline betrays her meek persona with a volatile reaction: she trashes the narrator’s 
flat, smearing excrement on the bathroom door and mirror, and later, physically attacks 
Louise with a broken shard of glass. The narrator admits, in that moment: “I wanted to 
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wipe her away. I wanted to blot out her blazing stupid face” (86). For him/her, Jacqueline 
should cease to exist at all in the presence of Louise’s idealized femininity. 
 Even worse than Jacqueline’s invisible plainness, perhaps, is Gail’s appearance, 
which leaves the narrator “horror-struck” (147). S/he describes Gail, the morning after 
spending the evening together: “She looked like a prime cut of streaky bacon. Her eyes 
were small and red from the night before. Her hair stuck out like a straw rick” (147). 
Gail’s unwanted sexual advances, the ways in which she mentioned the narrator’s light 
and nimble fingers, are enough to send the narrator “to the toilet just ahead of his/her 
vomit” (148). His/her physical reaction to Gail’s obesity and general unsightliness is 
reflective of attitudes towards women who fail at being the right amount of feminine; 
they become abject, socially ostracized, the object of revulsion rather than desire. Both 
the narrator’s disgust and subsequent guilt about his/her disgust can be attributed to the 
policing effects of gender’s regulatory norms. Similarly, the reasons for which the 
narrator admires Louise cannot be disentangled from Butler’s preexisting domain of 
cultural intelligibility: in contradistinction to both Jacqueline and Gail, Louise was 
feminine enough to earn her position as object of the narrator’s gaze — of the other’s 
gaze. Here the narrator participates in a patriarchal economy that, whether or not the 
narrator is male or female, fetishizes female bodies. Tellingly, when the narrator admits 
the reason s/he took so long to break up with Inge, despite their frequent clashing over 
politics and Inge’s various idiosyncrasies: “Why didn’t I dump Inge and head for a 
Singles bar? The answer is her breasts” (24).      
 The narrator is often unaware of his/her objectification, and yet, the reader’s 
impression of Louise is formed entirely though his/her visual consumption of her body; 
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s/he is always looking at Louise. Take for example, the novel’s introduction to Louise, in 
a memory conveyed by the narrator: s/he was watching Louise swimming naked in a 
river, oblivious to the presence of a nearby family:   
 
Mum saw you go in and heaved herself off a stripey fold-out camping stool. 
“You ought to be ashamed of yourself. There’s families out here.” 
 You laughed and waved, your body bright beneath the clear green water, 
its shape fitting your shape, holding to you, faithful to you. You turned on your 
back and your nipples grazed the surface of the river and the river decorated 
your hair with beads. You are creamy but for your hair your red hair that flanks 
you on either side. (11) 
 
For Susann Cockal, this early scene sets the stage for the novel’s overall thematic stance: 
that dominant understandings of corporeality are shaped by the force of discourse, with 
all of its preexisting cultural trappings. In her article “Expression in a Diffuse Landscape: 
Contexts for Jeanette Winterson’s Lyricism,” Cockal observes that “what we know about 
[Louise’s] body is its impact on its surroundings and on the narrator. Narrative style cups 
Louise and holds her much as the river holds her, forming around her body” (18). Here, 
the reader sees Louise’s body through two sets of eyes: the conservative Mum, “sagging 
over the thermos” and the narrator’s version, which attains a privileged quality as a result 
of his/her self-appointed positioning at the centre of his/her own story as the “I” 
(Winterson 11). The problem that comes to the surface then, is what kind of narrative 
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styles does the narrator’s reading and writerly gaze, as the beloved’s “other,” draw upon 
to materialize the borders of Louise’s body?   
 Although the narrator insists that s/he “want[s] to make something entirely new,” 
s/he has few options but to follow the scripts that preexist his/her romantic interest in 
Louise: the superseding discourses of love are structured in relation to the prevailing 
hierarchies (108). Intertextual references dominate the narrator’s descriptions of Louise, 
highlighting the pervasiveness of exterior influences. Throughout the novel, the narrator 
makes both direct and indirect references to such texts as Madame Bovary, Anna 
Karenina, Romeo and Juliet, A Midsummer Night’s Dream, Song of Solomon and Jane 
Eyre, to name just a few. Even the narrator’s introduction of Louise, floating in the river 
with her red hair flanking her pale skin, calls to mind John Everett Millais’s painting of 
Hamlet’s drowned Ophelia. In addition to the arts, the narrator also integrates different 
fields of knowledge into his/her recollections of Louise, such as marine biology: “She 
opens and shuts like a sea anemone. She’s refilled each day with fresh tides of longing” 
(73); meteorology: “Louise, stars in your eyes, my own constellation” (187); and 
molecular chemistry: “We touch one another, bond and break, drift away on force-fields 
we don’t understand. Docking here inside Louise may heal a damaged heart, on the other 
hand it may be an expensively ruinous experiment” (62). The narrator attempts to 
conceive of his/her love for Louise in different ways by adopting discourses that are not 
usually appropriated to discuss desire; however, s/he is still limited by a language that has 
arrived before him/her, one that has already transformed “I love you” into a quotation.    
 As Jennifer Gustar observes in her article, “The Body of Romance: Citation and 
Mourning in Written on the Body,” even though the narrator wishes to escape what Butler 
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calls the “citational legacy” of clichés, this legacy nonetheless “haunts us as we speak” 
(26). Gustar’s argument borrows from Catherine Belsey’s assertion, that “[l]overs speak, 
and yet in doing so they are spoken by a language that precedes them, that is not at their 
disposal, under their control” (Belsey 84). Late in the novel, when s/he is unable to find 
Louise, the narrator asks Gail if it was possible that s/he had simply invented her, to 
which his/her similarly lovelorn colleague responds: “No, but you tried to. [...] She 
wasn’t yours for the making” (Winterson 189). In Gail’s opinion, the problem with the 
narrator is that s/he wants to live in a novel but as she puts it, in her own succinct terms: 
“this isn’t War and Peace, honey, it’s Yorkshire” (160). Here, Gail turns out to be as 
“right” as her last name, as she pinpoints the root of the narrator’s problem: his/her 
comprehension of love had derived from narratives that have long determined what the 
appropriate (and appropriately gendered) responses to desire might be. Moreover, in 
seeking recognition from the other, the subject must inevitably mediate its desires in 
correlation to the domain of cultural intelligibility.  
 When Louise surprises the narrator with her announcement that she intends to 
leave her marriage, she succeeds in breaking from the traditional script previously 
outlined by the narrator in the dialogue between the Naked Woman and the Crying Lover 
in the Bathroom. Louise begs the narrator to do the same, telling him/her: “I want you to 
come to me without a past. Those lines you’ve learned, forget them” (54). Instead, the 
narrator decides to leave, preferring not to think of his/her actions as “running out” on 
her: “That doesn’t sound like the heroics I’d had in mind. Hadn’t I sacrificed myself for 
her? Offered my life for her life? [...] I had to leave. She would have died for my sake. 
Wasn’t it better for me to live a half life for her sake?” (159). Too late does s/he come to 
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realize that this decision was persuaded by the cliché of the gallant knight in shining 
amour who rescues the pretty damsel in distress. Indeed, the narrator’s resolve to save 
Louise complies directly with conventional romantic standards — but Louise was never a 
damsel in distress (159). Here, we return to de Lauretis’s statement, that before the 
gendered dynamics embedded in the language of desire can be overcome, the body must 
first be reconfigured “beyond its pre-coded, conventional representations” (de Lauretis 
150). In the novel’s second section, the narrator attempts to rewrite Louise’s body, to 
reclaim it from the annals of phallocentric, heteronormative discourses. However, as s/he 
discovers, although language can be taken up in ways that undermine its own authority, a 
paradox remains: in her poem “The Burning of Paper Instead of Children,” Adrienne 
Rich describes it best: “this is the oppressor’s language / yet i need it to talk to you” (18). 
 
IV. Rewritten on the Body: Author(izing) the Other 
 In her overview of Written on the Body, Susana Onega Jaén describes the 
narrator’s battle with Elgin for possession of Louise’s body in patriarchal terms: “While 
Elgin behaves as the senexiratus of Plautinian comedy, the narrator assumes the role of 
all-enduring and romantic lover, a melancholy Werther, ready to sacrifice himself for the 
good of his beloved” (Jaén 124). In refusing to permit Louise agency, the narrator further 
solidifies her as an object. And although the narrator’s eventual revisions of Louise 
attempt to recover her body from the annals of dominant androcentric discourses, s/he 
only serves to reinstate the beloved as other, as object to be held up by the male gaze. 
However, the novel’s experimental middle section is not without its subversive elements. 
Here, the linearity of the plot is brusquely interrupted as the narrator begins the project of 
62 
dismembering and excavating both the anatomical textbooks and Louise’s body into four 
pieces: The Cells, Tissues, Systems and Cavities; The Skin; The Skeleton; and The 
Special Senses. A textbook definition of each component is offered in authoritative block 
letters, and then followed by the narrator’s own account of Louise: her cells, tissues, 
systems and cavities; her skin; her skeleton; her special senses. The narrator’s deeply 
personal rewritings challenge the authority invested in the field of medicine, a domain 
embodied by Elgin’s profession as an oncologist.   
 It is not incidental that the discourse the narrator aims to reinscribe is a scientific 
one: according to Butler, science works “in the service of other political and social 
interests” in its production of “ostensibly natural facts of sex” (Gender Trouble 7). Elgin 
also abuses the authority invested in science to serve his own interests, as Gregory 
Rubinson observes in article “Body Languages: Scientific and Aesthetic Discourses in 
Jeanette Winterson’s Written on the Body”: 
 
[Elgin] uses his alliance with and access to medical technology to stake his 
claim to Louise’s body and position himself as the only person authorized to 
speak for her. It is a measure of the predominance of medical discourse that the 
promise of Louise’s bodily salvation persuades the narrator to cede his/her 
claim to Louise, his/her assumption being that a diseased body automatically 
belongs to science. (222)   
 
In terms of treating leukemia, the discourse of medicine is invested with totalizing 
power/knowledge; the narrator believes that Louise’s best chance of survival lies within it 
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and therefore, complies with Elgin’s demands. The institution of medical research is both 
calculated and impartial all at once, and this sense of detachment is symbolized by 
Elgin’s oft-played computer games in which he is able to strategize and execute 
simulated surgeries while remaining at a physical remove from the patient. The narrator 
finds a similar form of disconnection in the anatomical textbooks that s/he devours in 
Louise’s absence; although s/he hopes to rediscover her lost body in them, s/he only finds 
a discourse that is stark and alienating in its impersonality, a “dispassionate view of the 
sucking, sweating, greedy, defecating self” (Winterson 111).  The narrator’s revisions 
offer a comparatively tender version of the beloved’s body, one that exceeds the 
privileged scientific perspective; s/he promises to dissect the clinical discourse in order to 
find “a love-poem to Louise” (111).    
 As the narrator comes to realize, doctors are no better-equipped to write about 
Louise’s body than s/he, as they appear unable to comprehend its constant mutations: 
 
Metastasis is the problem. Cancer has a unique property: it can travel from the 
site of origin to distant tissues. It is usually metastasis which kills the patient 
and the biology of metastasis is what doctors don’t understand. They are not 
conditioned to understand it. In doctor-think the body is a series of bits to be 
isolated and treated as necessary, that the body in its very disease may act as a 
whole is an upsetting concept. (175) 
 
Louise’s body exists in a perpetual state of motion; even Elgin admits that he does not 
know “why it happens or how to stop it” (105). The cancerous body cannot be so easily 
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classified by medical partitioning or blazons, and it cannot be contained by scientific 
definitions. And yet, despite the limitations of their knowledge, “doctor-think” remains 
the leading authority on the body. For his/her part, the narrator chooses to embrace 
Louise’s lived reality, by adopting a poetic discourse that is far more representative of her 
present condition than the medical textbooks: the words here are slippery, evasive, 
accelerated.  Instead of conceiving the scapula as “a flat triangular shaped bone which 
lies on the posterior wall superficial to the ribs and separated from them by muscle,” for 
instance, the narrator reinscribes the beloved’s shoulder blades as “great gold wings cut 
away from the sun” (131); building upon this image, s/he then likens Louise to “the 
winged horse Pegasus who would not be saddled” (131). His/her substitutive descriptions 
are not fixed into place, but offer a sense of mobility and continued metamorphosis. 
Poetry plays up the instability of language, demonstrating the ways in which meaning can 
slip. Like the cancer in Louise’s blood, the words here have “turned bandit. They don’t 
obey the rules” (115). These dense, metaphoric revisions provide an alternative viewpoint 
of Louise’s body, as transformative and fluid; the narrator translates the textbooks into a 
different kind of language, one that is transfused with a rich sensuality.19   
 These revisions also indicate the contingency of the junction between language 
and knowledge. For despite their ascertaining of the body’s various functions and 
operations, what can these men of science possibly claim to know about Louise’s hair, 
                                               
 
19 This description of a transformative, fluid body is reflective of the Deleuzian “Body 
without Organs” (BwO). The BwO becomes a central point of focus in my second 
chapter’s analysis of Gut Symmetries (1997), which continues the arc of body-as-text by 
exploring how deterritorialization impacts how bodies are read.  
65 
her eyes, her clavicle? In his/her translation of “The Cells, Tissues, Systems and Cavities 
of the Body,” the narrator first provides the anatomical textbook’s sparse, impassive 
definition of the cranial cavity: “For descriptive purposes the human body is separated 
into cavities. The cranial cavity contains the brain. Its boundaries are formed by the bones 
of the skull” (119). S/he then offers his/her own comparatively familiar depiction of 
Louise: “I know how your hair tumbles from its chignon and washes your shoulders in 
light. I know the calcium of your cheekbones. I know the weapon of your jaw” (120). 
The repetition of the clause “I know” implies the narrator’s intimate knowledge of 
Louise’s body, but it also potentially — and problematically — transposes her physical 
characteristics into factual evidence. Once again, Louise is reduced to an object capable 
of the narrator’s apprehension. As Rubinson points out, these anatomical revisions 
attempt to capture and colonize Louise, but in a different way: 
 
Louise’s status as an independent person is increasingly jeopardized as the 
narrator constructs her in a plethora of metaphoric terms. [...] As the metaphors 
proliferate, Louise becomes almost grotesque. Furthermore, although invoking 
Louise complexly, the narrator never construes her as a subject in her own 
right. Despite, or because of, all the transcendent images she inspires, she is an 
object for worship, and the narrator inscribes her in such a multitude of 
discourses and metaphors that Louise seems almost imprisoned in them. 
(Rubinson 226) 
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Despite his/her attempts to do otherwise, the narrator fails to subvert the inscriptions 
written onto Louise’s body. Instead, s/he ends up engaging in the same masculine 
enterprise as both Elgin and the scientific texts that he exploits.   
 In the same passage on the cranial cavity, the narrator states that s/he is “the 
archeologists of tombs,” asking Louise (though she is not present to give her consent) to 
allow him/her to penetrate her (Winterson 119):  
 
I would devote my life to marking your passageways, the entrances and exits 
of that impressive mausoleum, your body. [...] I can’t enter you in clothes that 
won’t show the stains, my hands full of tools to record and analyze. If I come 
to you with a torch and a notebook, a medical diagram and a cloth to wipe up 
the mess, I’ll have you bagged neat and tidy. I’ll store you in plastic like 
chicken livers. Womb, gut, brain, neatly labelled and returned. Is that how to 
know another human being? (119) 
 
The image of the narrator as an explorer who will devote his/her life to “marking” the 
other’s body evokes the image of the early male settler, eager to register his existence on 
a newly discovered terrain. However, s/he also questions this need to compartmentalize 
the body, wondering: “Is that what it takes to know someone?” The final sentence of this 
passage disrupts the ones that came before it, for even the most thorough investigations 
of the body’s various parts and their functions will always inevitably fail to be completely 
comprehensive.  
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 The narrator’s vocation as a Russian-to-English translator is a fitting one: Russian 
language is structurally different, and many of its words have no English equivalent. 
Therefore, like Louise’s constantly shifting body, Russian prosody exceeds the signifiers 
imposed upon it; in order to preserve the essence of the text’s meaning, the narrator must 
rely on his/her own personalized interpretation of its context. This reveals the extent to 
which the knowledges that comprise these labels are provisional, which can also be 
perceived in his/her translations of Louise’s body; the narrator’s version of “what it takes 
to know someone” enters into competition with the definitions offered by the anatomical 
textbooks. Here, Written on the Body highlights not only the objectivity of knowledge, 
but also the limitations of its jurisdictions. There is never one all-encompassing account 
of “truth” upon which a stable identity can be established. Nonetheless, as I have already 
noted, the narrator unwittingly participates in the same prohibitive dynamics as Elgin — 
his/her reinscriptions only further inflict his/her version of meaning onto the beloved’s 
body, reifying her status as an object. Although it has been undercut, the dominant 
language has not been undone.  
The narrator does, however, differ from Elgin in the most significant of ways for 
although s/he does wish to possess Louise, s/he also wants to be possessed by her, 
subtending the division between subject and object. And when it comes to subverting the 
hierarchies inherent in the very structuring of the Symbolic, the narrator achieves the 
most success in his/her revisory descriptions of Louise’s skin, as we will soon see. 
Written on the Body’s third section, set in the narrator’s present time, also focuses more 
on skin, problematizing the conception of skin as mere surface by reconciling the ways in 
which skin becomes meaningful through the other’s writerly gaze. Although the novel, up 
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to this point, has succeeded in developing a strategy that forces readers to recognize how 
performative citations function, the narrator fails to overcome or exceed gender norms — 
more specifically, the gender norms of 1990s discourse. However, in its final stages, the 
plot becomes increasingly strange, and this is where identity categories really begin to 
unravel. Although the text throughout demands that readers acknowledge that culturally 
determined markings become materialized on and through the surface of the skin, it also 
presents different ways of thinking about skin as malleable, modifiable, permeable: 
qualities which call into question the apparent fixity of these inscriptions. The next aspect 
of my argument considers how Written on the Body breaks down materiality as a product 
of discourse — though never undermining the actuality of the body — by focusing on the 
virtuality of experience: that which is inexpressible in language and cannot be processed 
adequately from within the order of the signifier. 
 
V. The Skin We’re In and the Measure of Loss 
 Prior to beginning his/her project of rewriting anatomical textbooks, the narrator 
describes his/her initial perception of Louise’s body, now under the influence of cancer: 
“You are stretching slowly slowly, getting longer, your joints are slipping away from 
their usual places. There is no connection between your shoulder and your arm. You will 
break up bone by bone, fractured from who you are, you are drifting away now, the 
centre cannot hold” (100-1). Situated in direct relation to Louise, the narrator describes 
his/her own body as also “slither[ing] away” (101). S/he expresses a sense of 
disintegration that corresponds in tandem with Louise’s experience; even though their 
circumstances differ radically, the narrator’s psychic image of his/her own body is still 
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impacted by Louise’s rapidly transfiguring one. In his/her rewriting of the scientific 
definition of the epidermis, the narrator muses on his/her memory of the beloved: 
 
There’s a doctor’s textbook fallen open on the floor. To me it’s a book of 
spells. Skin, it says. Skin. 
 You were milk-white and fresh to drink. Will your skin discolour, its 
brightness blurring? Will your neck and spleen distend? Will the rigorous 
contours of your stomach swell under an infertile load? It may be so and the 
private drawing I keep of you will be a poor reproduction then. It may be so 
but if you are broken then so am I. (124-5) 
 
In this passage, Louise’s skin is the site upon which trauma is registered, where 
discoloration and dullness renders her cancer into visibility. At the same time, the disease 
also perceivably mutates the body’s surface: Louise begins to blur, distend, swell. The 
centre does not hold; there is nothing to anchor Louise back into herself, to keep her from 
slipping out. Simultaneously, there is nothing to keep the narrator from slipping in. That 
his/her own “broken” body reflects Louise’s current condition intimates a recognition of 
the other in the self.    
 As we have seen, the ambiguity of the narrator draws attention to the ways in 
which preexisting notions regarding the body and its desires are applied to the corporeal 
surface by the other, which in the case of Written on the Body is a role enacted not only 
by the characters in the text, but also by the reader. Rather than a biologically determined 
property, his/her skin becomes envisaged as a writing-pad upon which social codes are 
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imposed and policed. However, although skin may be the parchment upon which 
Symbolic regulations are imprinted, these inscriptions are subject to change depending on 
the “other’s” gaze; therefore, the body is never fixed rigidly into place, but recalibrates 
continually according to the other. As the narrator’s ultimate other, Louise draws herself 
onto the narrator’s skin. The narrator muses: 
 
Articulacy of fingers, the language of the deaf and dumb, signing on the body 
body longing. Who taught you to write in blood on my back? Who taught you 
to use your hands as branding irons? You have scored your name into my 
shoulders, referenced me with your mark. The pads of your fingers have 
become printing blocks, you tap a message on to my skin, tap meaning into my 
body. Your morse code interferes with my heart beat. I had a steady heart 
before I met you, I relied upon it, it had seen active service and grown strong. 
Now you alter its pace with your own rhythm, you play upon me, drumming 
me taut. (89) 
 
Here, the narrator’s flesh is also palimpsestic, and its inscriptions are resignified by the 
Louise’s touch, which taps not only messages onto the skin, but meaning into his/her 
body. Louise transgresses the boundaries of his/her body, becoming internalized. As 
Louise scores herself both onto and into the narrator, skin is no longer that which serves 
as the border separating the self from the not-self. In another passage, the narrator states: 
“Your hand prints are all over my body. Your flesh is my flesh. You deciphered me and 
now I am plain to read. The message is a simple one; my love for you” (106). Like 
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Written on the Body’s writerly reader, she has translated his/her body. However, she has 
also been given permission: the narrator invites her to cross his/her boundary so that they 
can make “one nation” (20). The binary logic of self/other as wholly separate entities is 
nullified by the dissolution of the border that distinguishes outside from in.  
 In her article, “‘Speculating Carnally’ or, Some Reflections on the Modernist 
Body,” Evelyn Ender posits that Written on the Body 
 
chooses to articulate the issue of otherness, of the other as body and as subject, 
in writing about skin and flesh. “SKIN” is one of the novel’s most poetic and 
metaphysical chapters (121-25): a meditation on death, an elegy to the beloved, 
a lyrical rendering of what it feels like to touch “the shell laid out before her” 
(123). The attention given to the skin or flesh as what separates the inner from 
the outer enables an epistemological shift in the understanding of the other. 
This epistemology determines a new semantics of the subject that undoes the 
old opposition between outside/inside [... and] self/other. (120) 
 
The body’s largest and most visible organ, skin encloses the subject’s interior depth, 
which is comprised of both conscious and unconscious material, within a corporeal 
container. As Ender notes, skin thus becomes established as the border that keeps the 
other “out” (120). For the potential intrusion of the other poses a threat to the architecture 
of what Didier Anzieu has called the subject’s “skin ego,” following Freud’s explicit 
naming of the ego as “surface” and “bodily” in The Ego and the Id (1923): as the 
psychoanalytic framework testifies, the subject can only exist in the Symbolic realm as an 
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entirely separate self. This separation is what instigates the narrator to wonder, more than 
once, why “the is measure of love loss?” (Winterson 9, 39). That the novel begins with 
this contemplation is significant: throughout the story, the narrator is being haunted by 
the self/other split that works to sever him/her from the love object Louise.  
The ability to perceive oneself as a distinct “I” differentiated from the other’s 
“you” relies upon the formation of this “skin ego,” in which the epidermis becomes the 
“sheet or interface” upon which the ego projects psychic material. In the Lacanian 
framework, the materialization of this ego coincides with the infant’s entry into the 
Symbolic order of language and culture, and the concurrent alienation that is experienced 
when the infant first cognizes its imago in the mirror.20 As Lacan explains, this reflection 
is “the other that the subject first identifies himself and even experiences himself” (Écrits 
148). Before this initiation transpires, the infant exists in a state of chora: what Julia 
Kristeva, in her 1985 work Revolution in Poetic Language, designates as a non-
expressive sense of wholeness, in which the child’s desires are satisfied by its union with 
                                               
 
20 The subject’s inauguration into the Symbolic occurs by way of what Lacan calls the 
Mirror Stage: the movement from this Imaginary realm to the order of the Symbolic is 
marked by the instance that an infant, typically anywhere from the age of six to eighteen 
months, “assumes” its “imago” in the mirror, a crucial stage in the initial development of 
the ego (Lacan 76). Although at this point the infant is still “trapped in his motor 
impotence and nursling dependence,” its “I” is precipitated in its image “in a primordial 
form, prior to being objectified in the dialectic of identification with the other, and before 
language restores to it, in the universal, its function as a subject” (76). In this way, the 
image works as a Gestalt: the infant identifies so strongly whatever seemingly coherent 
and functioning image it perceives (as the image may be something other than its own 
reflection), mobilizing an identity organized around this anticipated “maturation of 
power” (76). It is not really a misrecognition, rather than a “miscognition” as it is the 
infant’s first cognition. According to Lacan, the specular I becomes the social I (subject) 
(79); the original imago is preserved as the “Ideal-I” to which the subject will endlessly, 
though unconsciously, struggle to embody.  
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not only the mother but also the space that encircles it (26). As she delineates: “Although 
our theoretical description of the chora is itself part of the discourse of representation that 
offers it as evidence, the chora, as rupture and fruitlessly articulations (rhythm), precedes 
evidence, verisimilitude, spatiality and temporality” (26, emphasis in original). Although 
the chora remains an unconscious aspect of subjectivity, prior to ego formation the 
polymorphously perverse infant cannot differentiate between its own skin and the flesh 
belonging to the object; there is no separation between self/other, or to appropriate 
Written on the Body’s vernacular, I/you. Lacan designates this space the register of the 
Imaginary, in which the infant perceives its general surroundings as an extension of its 
own fragmented body — which appears for the infant to be a cacophony of limbs, a body 
in pieces (le corps morcelé) (Écrits 78). Therefore, exterior objects are infused with a 
sense of sameness for the undiscerning infant, most evident in the Freudian 
conceptualization of the oral phase during which the infant cannot distinguish between its 
sucking mouth and the mother’s breast (Freud Three Essays 65).21 In order to enter into 
the Symbolic realm, the infant must come to position itself as separate from the other. 
                                               
 
21 As Freud further clarifies, in the third edition of his 1906 work Three Essays on the 
Theory of Sexuality (translated by Dr. A.A. Brill in 2001), in the oral stage “sexual 
activity is not yet separated from the taking of nourishment, and the contrasts with the 
same not yet differentiated. The object of the one activity is also that of the other, the 
sexual aim consists in the incorporating into one’s own body of the object, it is the 
prototype of that which later plays such an important psychic role as identification” (65). 
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Concurrently, to become a speaking subject of the Symbolic (the big “o” Other), the 
infant has to acquire an identity recognizable within the grid of cultural intelligibility.22  
 To obtain this sense of self, the infant must first believe that it is now a stable and 
coordinated being; however, this “Ideal-I” that has no lack is a mere compensation for the 
loss of the unity that the now-subject once perceived with its exterior surroundings. The 
subject is able to conceal this painful loss through the creation of what Lacan terms its 
“armor of an alienating identity that will mark his entire mental development its rigid 
structures” (Écrits 78): one of which, of course, is the illusion that the subject’s psychic 
interiority is bounded by the skin, sealed in and protected. Although Lacan privileges 
language over the body and although Anzieu favoured the Freudian model, this 
conception of “armor” nonetheless bears resemblance to the skin ego, which Jay Prosser, 
in his Second Skins: the Body Narratives of Transsexuality (1998), further outlines as 
taking “the body’s physical skin as the primary organ underlying the formation of the 
ego, its handling, its touching, its holding — our experience of its feel — individualizing 
our psychic functioning, quite crucially making us who we are [...] It holds each of us 
together, quite literally contains us, protects us, keeps us discrete” (65). In the very 
moment that the boundaries separating interiority from exteriority become established, 
the binary between self and other is also erected; as the location of exposure and 
connection, skin is now where the ego meets and converges with the other (Ahmed et al 
2). Although the fluid immediacy of the Imaginary is relinquished in favour of mediation 
                                               
 
22 Although I have here described the mirror stage as a developmental “from-to” process, 
it is important to note that the relations between the Imaginary and the Symbolic are 
always interweaving. 
75 
by a Symbolic that will now govern and reconcile the child’s various experiences, its 
operations are nonetheless propelled by the Imaginary, for the inexpressible desire for the 
unity that was once experienced in a space that is now relegated to the “censored chapter” 
of unconscious drives (Écrits 215). It is the haunting of this original loss that instigates 
and drives our desire for the other, which Written on the Body’s narrator acknowledges 
with his/her reappearing observation, that love is measured by loss (9, 39). Importantly, 
however, the narrator is not only acknowledging this inclination, but asking “why” this is 
the case. 
Butler makes a provocative claim when she asserts that this repression or “loss” 
of the primordial desire is “an occasion for the consolidation of juridical structures; desire 
is manufactured and forbidden as a ritual Symbolic gesture whereby the juridical model 
exercises and consolidates its own power” (Gender Trouble 96). The “ritual” results in 
the normalization and subsequent concretization of hierarchically gendered orderings, 
orderings that are imbued with various power dynamics. In his reading of Lacanian 
psychoanalysis, Dean appears to hold a similar view, as his work Beyond Sexuality 
explores how language impacts not only the body, but also the ways in which the subject 
will process its desires: 
 
Broadly speaking, when language hits the body its impact produces not merely 
the subject of the signifier but also the subject of desire. The symbolic order 
has a ripple-like effect on human subjects. Think of the symbolic order as a net 
setting over the corporeal form, penetrating the body, [...] and slicing the body 
into erotogenic zones by drawing bodily jouissance into pools at its corporeal 
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borders. This process does not happen in a uniform way because there is no 
single symbolic order that we all inhabit. We move though different, 
interwoven discourse networks that affect people’s bodies unevenly; 
nevertheless, it should be borne in mind that this process of creating desire 
begins very early in life, well before anatomical maturation, and usually within 
familial discourse networks. (197) 
 
Here, Dean conceivably aligns himself with Butler’s central argument, that preexisting 
social frameworks shape the body’s materialization in ways that depend upon varying 
historical and cultural contexts. As he states, “the process of disembodiment that 
produces the subject and its cause of desire effectively splits (i) the body and subject; (ii) 
subject and object, thereby constituting desire and the impossibility of satisfaction; (iii) 
subject against itself as a consequence of the multiple object-causes of desire that support 
or contingently ground the subject” (201). However, when it comes to the multiple 
object-causes of desire, Dean departs from Butler with his insistence that it is not quite so 
“manufactured” as she believes it to be.  
 In fact, he argues that her theorization of desire is essentially founded upon a 
misreading of one of Lacan’s most important contentions: that “desire is the mark of the 
iron on the shoulder of the speaking subject” (Écrits 265). According to Dean, this 
statement does not suggest that desire is a mere product or effect of preexisting social 
mores, as Butler argues. Indeed, while Lacan does affirm that it is impossible for a 
subject to express or conceptualize desire without language, he did not view desire itself 
as wholly linguistic. Although its expressions are indeed routed through (and inhibited 
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by) discursive constructions, as illustrated in Written on the Body by the narrator’s 
inability to convey his/her desire for Louise outside of preexisting discourses on desire, 
desire is actually much more than the language that attempts to describe it: it is also “the 
excess resulting from the articulation of need in symbolic form” — which is, in other 
words, the jouissance that is drawn into pools at the corporeal surface by the Symbolic 
(Dean Beyond Sexuality 197).  
 Dean thus takes issue with Butler’s articulation of the relationship between 
bodies, language and desire; as he maintains, the problem that arises as a result of 
Butler’s attempts to merge Foucauldian thought with Lacanian psychoanalysis is that 
bodies become “so completely rhetoricalized that paradoxically they are devoid of 
desire” (187). In his opinion, Butler conflates the ego with the formation of subjectivity, 
and in doing so, misinterprets the crux of Lacan’s theorizations, which “recogniz[es] in 
the ego a dangerously aggressive façade (‘the projection of a surface’) that obscures the 
subject of desire and his or her suffering” (31). For Dean, the origins of desire have very 
little to do with the ego at all, but is instead activated — and simultaneously sustained — 
by what Lacan calls the objet petit a (a = autre), which is “a term intended to designate 
the remainder or excess that keeps self-identity forever out of reach, thus maintaining 
desire” (250).   
 The objet petit a is the result of the first internal cut, which Dean is careful to 
separate from a theory of castration anxiety that links subject formation to the 
phallocentric hierarchy of sexed bodies. Rather, objet petit a is “produced by cutting 
something from the subject [...] the ‘extraction’ of some element from a domain that 
thereby constitutes that domain and indeed, ‘gives it its frame’” (58). Objet petit a has no 
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relation to gender at all, as its impact on the body arrives before the foundation of ego 
and the Symbolic inscriptions of sexual difference: it is the loss that measures love, for 
the narrator — the loss of unity, the desire to return to oneness. The cause of desire rather 
than its aim, objet petit a is located in the “excess of meaning called the unconscious,” in 
the jouissance of what remains unspeakable (194, 250). That the subject will come to 
experience what Dean calls “body mutters” — unsignifiable symptoms that “obliquely 
indicate desire in the form a failure in the Other’s discourse” — is indicative of a lack, 
not just in the subject but in the Other as well (202). Body mutters vocalize desire “as 
something in language but not itself linguistic” (203). As it stands, it is the subject’s 
inability to negotiate or satisfy these mutters in culturally legible ways that incites and 
spurs on desire, which means that desire is therefore “predicated on the 
incommensurability of the body and subject” (200, emphasis in original).  
 Although Butler’s contribution to queer theory cannot be denied, Dean’s appraisal 
of her work reveals a critical oversight on her part. A distinction needs to be made: 
signifiable expressions of desire come to be prompted or shaped by the regulatory 
imperatives of the dominant discourses, through the manufacturing of culturally 
recognizable forms of sexual identity. That said, sexual identity does not fully encompass 
desire but instead attempts to bracket or corral desire into recognizable or familiar 
categories. Dean argues that Butler fails to distinguish the other from Other, or the objet 
petit a from the realm of the Symbolic. However, this is where I would like to partly 
reconcile their diverging arguments: for when desire emerges, it is mediated from within 
the realm of cultural intelligibility. That is not to say that there are not forms of desire 
that are not subjectively intelligible; however, once desire achieves a signifier, the subject 
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recognizes that signifier from their position within the Symbolic. For instance, although 
Written on the Body’s reader is not granted access to the economy of visibility that the 
self/other binary requires, the narrator’s various body mutters still would manifest 
themselves visibly on the surface of the body: these are, in large part, still processed by 
the other according to the cultural predicts set in place — which is precisely why the 
reader is so keen to glean the reaction of other characters to the narrator’s appearance. 
The only way to alter the preexisting normative connotations through which these body 
mutters are conceived is through the process of resignification, a process that Dean will 
label “psychotic” (206).  
 To be clear, Lacanian psychoanalysis — and by proxy, Dean himself — does not 
view psychosis in the same negative or pejorative sense as the mainstream medical 
discourses on mental health. Rather, psychosis is depicted as the “foreclosure” of the 
anchoring signifier designated by Lacan as the Name-of-the-Father: either the inability to 
attach the proper meaning to a sign, or fix the meaning far too stringently.23 In such an 
instance, the Symbolic not only loses its grip on the subject but also on the way the 
subject perceives its materiality: as bounding its ego in a casing of skin. 
 
 
 
                                               
 
23 Name-of-the-Father translates to Nom du Père, which also refers to the “No” of the 
Father and thus connects entry into language/culture to the Oedipal complex. The infant’s 
initial fantasies for the mother are symbolically castrated, as it must submit to the 
authority represented by the father’s prohibitive function. In this way, the Name-of-the-
Father holds at least the functions of Freud’s superego.    
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VI. Producing Desire: Psychotic, Melancholic Fantasy 
As Lacan explains in his seminar “Presentations on Psychical Causality,” in 
normative cases of ego development, “[h]abit and forgetting are signs of the integration 
of a psychical relation into the organism; an entire situation, having become both 
unknown to the subject and as essential as his body to him, is normally manifested in 
effects that are consistent with the sense he has of his body” (Écrits 148-9). In addition to 
the largely unconscious actions of habit and repression, there are a host of complex 
defense mechanisms that are designed to protect the subject from psychotic collapse, that 
function to redeposit the ego back into the body-container. Elgin, for instance, displays 
masochistic tendencies in the early years of his marriage to Louise, begging her to 
“scaffold his penis with bulldog clips” (Winterson 34). As Bersani notes, masochists 
exhibit a “potentially dysfunctional rejection of pain. For pain may be a signal that tells 
us to flee a stimulus threatening to the body’s or the ego’s integrity — to their coherence 
as securely delimited, individuating entities. Pain is the organism’s protection against 
self-dissolution” (Bersani 94). For Elgin, the experience of pain, when situated under his 
direction and control, presents a safe way to reinsert the ego back into the corporeal 
envelope of his body. His skin proves a barrier that protects him from the contaminating 
threat of his wife, a threat that also extends to physical contact with his patients.  
Elgin’s masochism extends to other perversities, as he engages in acts that fall 
outside of the realm of sexually normative behaviour. For instance, Louise tells the 
narrator of his present hobby: to “fly up to Scotland and be sunk in a bath of porridge 
while a couple of Celtic geishas rubber-gloved his prick” (Winterson 68). What makes 
Elgin perverse in the Lacanian sense — and it should be noted here that like psychosis, 
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the term perversity is not derogatory or pathologized in Lacanian psychoanalysis — is 
not Elgin’s conduct but rather the ways in which he locates himself in relation to the 
other’s desire as the object or instrument of their jouissance: for when perverts invent a 
fantasy to play out, such as Elgin’s elaborate Scottish oatmeal operation, they are actually 
creating an alternative Symbolic order in which the other pronounces the law of desire for 
them, thus becoming the objet petit a of this law (Miller 213). According to Lacan’s 
Seminar XI (1964), the structure of perversion, “strictly speaking, is an inverted effect of 
fantasy” (185). What the pervert is really after is the authoritative “no!” of the Name-of-
the-Father that initiates the subject’s symbolic castration and consequent severing from 
the m(other). Elgin’s scenarios recreate castration anxiety in order to re-establish his 
separation, while at the same time, disavowing the act of castration itself. 24  
As it happens, Elgin is the only character in Written on the Body whose past 
receives significant attention. He is the son of orthodox Jews named Esau and Sarah, who 
                                               
 
24 In his Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality (1905), Freud makes the claim that 
“neuroses are, so to say, the negative of perversions” (165, emphasis in original). 
Following this logic, Lacan states that perversion is structured much the same way as 
neurosis, but inverted: unlike the neurotic, the pervert does not feel the need to ask 
questions about his behaviour, does not feel himself to be lacking, and is therefore 
unlikely to become an analysand. In his article “The Frozen Countenance of Perversion” 
(2008), Dean points out that this produces a hitch in the Lacanian discourse on perversion 
— namely, there weren’t any perverts to be found in analysis. Most of the evidence about 
perversions was collected from literary sources. Dean criticizes this move away from the 
clinic: “Applied psychoanalysis, that more or less reductive practice of interpreting 
writers and their literary characters as if they were patients on the couch, is problematic 
enough. But when it comes to deriving specifically clinical categories primarily from 
literary texts, such problems are compounded to the point of epistemological crisis. […] 
The absence of perverts in analysis allows one to say whatever s/he wishes about them” 
(102). While Lacanian psychoanalysis argues that technically, all human desire is 
perverse in nature, that there is no one “normal” sexual act, there is still a stigma around 
certain behaviours — such as Elgin’s involvement with rubber-gloved Celtic geishas.   
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owned their own chemist’s shop. The narrator describes his birth, and his lonely, 
ambitious childhood as recounted to him/her by Louise. When he was still a small boy, 
Sarah taught Elgin “the world ought to serve him”; her own servitude caused him to 
believe that she derived her jouissance from his existence, which could be responsible for 
inspiring his future perversions. Esau, on the other hand, told Elgin that he was nothing 
but dust, that he had to raise himself up “and be a man” (Winterson 33). His masculinity 
is shaped from an early age by his father’s authority, demonstrating once again Butler’s 
depiction of the normative frameworks of cultural intelligibility that enabled Elgin to 
become recognizable as a legitimate subject. That Elgin surpasses his father in terms of 
power and prestige is indicated by the now tattered sign on the door of Esau’s pharmacy; 
Rosenthal is still there, in tiny gold letters etched on the glass, but Chemist has lost a 
letter and now reads “he mist” (65).  
 While we find traits of perversion in not only Elgin’s sexual proclivities but also 
his overtly masculine reaction to Louise’s affair, the narrator exhibits signs of psychosis. 
Firstly, s/he has no gender. This might not be just a strategy developed for the purposes 
of confounding readers and forcing them to confront stereotypes: the narrator is the one 
relaying the story, from the point of his/her breakdown, and s/he might very well be 
under the impression that s/he does not actually possess a sexed body at all. 
Notwithstanding that possibility, other hints that the narrator experiences a psychotic 
break emerge in his/her disrupted sense of bodily boundaries throughout the novel and 
particularly by its conclusion — in complete contradistinction to his/her romantic foe, 
Elgin. For instance, when the narrator peers into the mirror, it is Louise that gazes back: 
“You are still the colour of my blood. You are my blood. When I look in the mirror it’s 
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not my own face I see. Your body is twice. Once you once me. Can I be sure which is 
which?” (98-99). Although psychoanalysis contemplates “how the outside — an alien 
alterity — inhabits the subject’s most intimate inwardness,” the skin ego still separates 
the subject from its exterior surroundings (Dean Beyond Sexuality 53).  
 However, that the narrator cannot recognize his/her image in the mirror’s 
reflection suggests a disintegration of all surface boundaries; s/he no longer possesses a 
self that is separate from Louise. In the absence of clearly defined borders, the narrator’s 
skin appears to him/her to be permeable; even when Louise disappears, the narrator is 
able to locate her in his/her own body. It has become a map of Louise’s past imprints: “It 
was a game, fitting bone on bone. I thought difference was rated to be the largest part of 
sexual attraction but there are so many things about us that are the same. Bone of my 
bone. Flesh of my flesh. To remember you it’s my own body I touch. There she was, here 
and here” (Winterson 129-130). Near the end of the novel, the narrator touches again on 
the lack of boundaries between them: “Skin is waterproof but my skin was not waterproof 
against Louise. She flooded me and has not drained away. I am still wading through her, 
she beats upon my doors and threatens my innermost safety” (163).25 
 Dean’s discussion of psychosis borrows from Gille Deleuze and Félix Guattari’s 
Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia (1972), which states that “it would never 
                                               
 
25  The narrator identifies Louise as a threat to his/her skin ego, to his/her bodily 
boundaries and it is this sense of exigency that accounts for what Dean calls the 
“tendency to flee in the other direction” — as demonstrated by Elgin’s investment in 
policing and controlling the boundaries of his body (Beyond Sexuality 63). Perhaps we 
have here another incentive, albeit an unconscious one, driving the narrator’s decision to 
leave Louise behind. 
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occur to a neurotic to grasp the skin erotically as a multiplicity of pores, little spots, little 
scars or black holes [...] [but] the psychotic can” (27). And certainly, the images of 
Louise and the narrator recall Lacan’s description of the body as covered in mouths, 
which Dean views in terms of the body’s various cuts: the multiplicity of points, of 
bodily openings where inside and outside converge. As Dean wonders, “why not think of 
the pores in our skin — which also breathe, absorb, and excrete — as mouths?” (Beyond 
Sexuality 256). Although I find this image compelling when situated in relation to Written 
on the Body, the narrator does remain intrinsically separate from Louise: s/he never 
succeeds in overcoming language, and the binarization of self/other that it both produces 
and necessitates. As Paul Verhaeghe notes in his article “Phallacies of Binary 
Reasoning,” the subject cannot fuse with the other and remain a subject, as “the price to 
be paid for this fusion would be the disappearance of the ‘I’” (63). As a speaking “I” the 
narrator remains registered in the Symbolic and thus, s/he never escapes its constructed 
cultural codes and meanings. However, such psychotic ruptures as the ones experienced 
here by the narrator can nonetheless be productive: they allow the subject’s desires, often 
left repressed in the register of the Imaginary, to materialize symbolically and in doing 
so, reconfigure the discourses that form the subject’s sense of self. 
 Several critics (the aforementioned Gustar and Nunn, for instance) have 
developed a connection between the narrator’s incorporation of Louise into his/her self 
and melancholia, focusing particularly on the novel’s emphasis on love as a form of 
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loss.26 As Butler observes, melancholy is a response that “refuses to acknowledge loss, 
and in this sense preserves its lost objects as psychic effects” (Psychic Life 183). 
Melancholic identification is not only the repercussion of a predetermined domain of 
cultural intelligibility that has already sanctioned the heterosexual matrix, but it actually 
functions to further facilitate the sex/gender/desire triad: 
 
The disavowed homosexuality at the base of melancholic heterosexuality 
reemerges as the self-evident anatomical facticity of sex, where “sex” 
designates the blurred unity of anatomy, “natural identity” and “natural desire.” 
The loss is denied and incorporated, and the genealogy of that transmutation 
fully forgotten and repressed. The sexed surface of the body thus emerges as 
the necessary sign of a natural(ized) identity and desire. The loss of 
homosexuality is refused and the love sustained or encrypted in the parts of the 
body itself, literalized in the ostensible anatomical facticity of sex. Here we see 
the general strategy of literalization as a form of forgetfulness, which in the 
case of a literalized sexual anatomy, “forgets” the imaginary and, with it, an 
imaginable homosexuality. (Gender Trouble 71) 
 
The socially constructed gendered codes that are written on the body conceal their own 
origins under the guise of naturalness; however, sex is not a referent but another signifier 
                                               
 
26 See Jennifer Gustar’s “The Body of Romance: Citation and Mourning in Written on the 
Body,” and Heather Nunn’s “Written on the Body: An Anatomy of Horror, Melancholy 
and Love” for more examples.  
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of gender that masquerades as its referent. As Butler further predicates, “incorporation 
literalizes the loss [of desire for the same sex parent] on or in the body and so appears as 
the facticity of the body, the means by which the body comes to bear ‘sex’ as its literal 
truth” (68, emphasis in original). In Second Skins, Prosser indicates that the 
interchangeability of the words “on or in the body” in Butler’s phrasing suggests a crucial 
parity between corporeal surfaces and psychic interiors: subjects come to (mis)recognize 
these external power structures, inscribed upon the body through the process of 
melancholic identification, as interior, or innate properties (38). Butler later proposes in 
The Psychic Life of Power: Theories in Subjection (1997) that the “melancholic turn 
[engenders] a variable boundary between the psychic and the social, a boundary [...] that 
distributes and regulates the psychic sphere in relationship to prevailing norms of social 
regulations” (171). 
 However, although Louise is indeed incorporated into the narrator as a kind of 
psychic effect, the narrator does repeatedly acknowledge her physical loss: for instance, 
when s/he wonders why Louise’s sweater “senselessly smell[s]” of her, and keeps her 
shape even “when [she is] not there to wear it” (Winterson 180). Moreover, Louise 
manifests as far more than a passive lost object. The narrator does not merely incorporate 
Louise as Louise has agency in her own right, “flooding” past the borders meant to keep 
them separated. I do find the arguments concerning melancholia persuasive, for there is 
certainly a parallel to be made between the narrator’s conduct and Freud’s articulation of 
the mechanism from “Mourning and Melancholia” (1963), as behaving “like an open 
wound, drawing to itself cachectic energy from all sides [...] and draining the ego until it 
is depleted” (116). Freud offers other views of melancholia as never depleting the ego, 
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but rather, engaged in an unending process of depletion. However, I find myself aligning 
more with Rosi Braidotti’s conception of nomadism, which rejects melancholy “in favour 
of the politics of affirmation and mutual specification of the self and others in sets of 
relations or assemblages” (Nomadic Theory 6). Here, we begin to see Winterson’s 
movement away from Butler’s appropriation of Lacan into a more Deleuzian mode of 
representation; it is a movement that becomes far more pronounced in Gut Symmetries 
(1997), her next novel. 
 At the same time, I am nonetheless intrigued by Freud’s description of the open 
wound, which correlates with Lacan’s representation of the skin as comprised of open 
mouths. Written on the Body, by the end, also depicts skin as open, rather than sealed and 
impenetrable. However, rather than psychosis or melancholia, the narrator’s relationship 
with Louise is rooted in fantasy — albeit a fantasy which appears to employ elements of 
both psychosis and melancholia. In Beyond Sexuality, Dean provides an interesting 
summation of fantasy, and the ways in which through the function of the skin ego, the 
body’s surface “loses its permeability, its porosity, and thence its potential for 
multiplicity” (257). Destabilizing corporeal boundaries through fantasy succeeds in 
multiplying potential outlets for desire. As he contends, its possibilities “proliferate only 
when one detotalizes the bodily form on which the ego depends. [...] [F]antasy involves a 
strategy of de-ego-ization or impersonalization that needn’t entail chaos or schizophrenic 
fragmentation, since it follows a certain logic” (257). In her essay “Fantastic Language: 
Jeanette Winterson’s Recovery of the Postmodern Word,” Christy L. Burns argues that 
“Winterson pushes fantasy to the extreme implication of its use and [...] refuses to turn 
back from the madness it invokes” (301). The final section of Written on the Body in 
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particular is reflective of a dream-like state. Becoming increasingly disorienting as it 
circles toward its conclusion, the novel reaches a feverish, phantasmagoric pitch during 
the narrator’s search for Louise in London, a period during which s/he begins to “slide 
into craziness”; by the time the narrator returns to Yorkshire in the final pages of the text, 
s/he admits to “becoming less present every day” (Winterson 174, 188).   
 According to Jean Laplanche and Jean-Betrand Pontalis’s essay “Fantasy and the 
Origins of Sexuality,” the fantasizing subject “does not pursue the object or its sign: he 
appears caught up himself in the sequence of images... [T]he subject, although always 
present in the fantasy, may be so in a desubjectivized form” (26). As the narrator’s grasp 
on reality begins to deteriorate, s/he becomes increasingly inundated with visions of 
Louise; in fact, his/her days are filled with them, always positioned in relation to his/her 
own self. For instance, after visiting a cemetery, the narrator imagines what might happen 
(or is happening) to Louise’s decomposing body, experiencing the process through 
his/her own body: “The worms that will eat you are first eating me. You won’t feel the 
blunt head burrowing into your collapsing tissue” (Winterson 180). Dean affirms that 
such fantasies impersonalize the subject, temporarily 
 
decomposing his or her ego in the mise-en-scene of desire. Thus it is owing to 
the subject’s mercurial positioning in a sequence of mutating terms that fantasy 
permits identification across a number of socially regulated boundaries — 
between active and passive, masculine and feminine, gay and straight, black 
and white, perhaps even the boundary between the living and the dead. 
(Beyond Sexuality 261) 
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Fantasy allows for a relatively “safe” space, still located within the bounds of the 
Symbolic, to think about ways in which the body can be resignified. According to Butler, 
it is therefore never free from relations of social power; nevertheless, what fantasy “can 
do, in its various rehearsals of the scenes of social power, is to expose the tenuousness, 
moments of inversion, and the emotional valence — anxiety, fear, desire — that get 
occluded in the description of ‘structures’” (Kotz 8-9). While psychosis and melancholia 
are affixed to narratives of loss, fantasy is very much about producing. 
 Dean himself actually resists the Butlerian process of resignification; he argues 
that it is far too simplistic to be politically effective. However, Butler clarifies that 
resignification is not, in fact, about liberation; for her, it “does not engage the fantasy of 
transcending power altogether, although it does work within the hope and the practice of 
replaying power, of restaging it again and again in new ways” (Olson and Worsham 741). 
The dominant narratives cannot simply become displaced; nonetheless, the body does 
need to be continually restaged, to move beyond the enclosures of conventional 
knowledge as dictated by the domain of cultural intelligibility. It is here that the novel’s 
central image of the palimpsest becomes most crucial. In one of the most quoted — and 
its eponymous — passages, the narrator states: “Written on the body is a secret code only 
visible in certain lights; the accumulations of a lifetime gather there. In places the 
palimpsest is so heavily worked that the letters feel like braille” (Winterson 89). 
Palimpsests are comprised of layers of text upon text, superimposing these mutating 
terms over the ones that came before in ways that suggest a topography of meaning, 
rather than an effacement.   
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 In the same passage, the narrator declares: “I didn’t know Louise would have 
reading hands.  She translated me into her own book” (89). Here, we return to the idea of 
the narrator’s body as textual, a parchment to be interpreted and conceived by the other’s 
gaze. Conceptions of his/her body are therefore not fixed, but continually open to 
resignification, and although it is impossible to read the narrator in terms other than 
through the categories — i.e.; gender, sex, sexual identity — that preexist the body, this 
does not mean that our ideas of these categories will not eventually change. But no one 
can be certain about where all of this will lead. This resulting sense of ambivalence is 
echoed in Written on the Body. As the narrator surmises in the final sentence of the novel: 
“I don’t know if it’s a happy ending but here we are let loose in open fields” (190). The 
clause “let loose in open fields” signifies the lack of restrictions inherent in the absence 
of rigid bodily boundaries; and yet, there is also the disquieting sense of the unknown as 
the narrator admits s/he is uncertain if this narrative ending will bring happiness. Not 
only does the novel undercut the clichéd “and they all lived happily ever after” 
denouement of the romance genre, but it also refuses to make any promises to its hopeful 
reader. This is but a fantasy, after all, related by an ambiguous narrator, a narrator that 
describes him/herself as untrustworthy, a narrator that has been accused more than once 
of “telling stories” (60).   
 
VII. Conclusion 
 Although Written on the Body acknowledges the impossibility of fulfilling desire 
or achieving wholeness from within the Symbolic, it nonetheless creates a space for 
resignification within the psychotic-melancholic fantasy of collapsing the boundaries of 
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the body. Ultimately, it does not really matter if the narrator and Louise are reunited in 
reality or in fantasy in the novel’s penultimate scene, as Louise (the outside other/object) 
has materialized from within the narrator’s understanding of his/her self. His/her (skin) 
ego, formed from within the grid of cultural intelligibility and its heavily gendered 
regime of subject/object, has been destabilized, leading to productive new encounters 
with the beloved. When this border is ruptured, there is nothing to keep the self from 
bleeding into the other/Other — into the beloved, into space, into time. Written on the 
Body’s last section places emphasis on the virtual — or more precisely, the relations 
between the virtual and the material — as the narrator’s sense of his/her bodily 
distinctions begins to unravel.  
 The novel’s open-ended conclusion also marks a new beginning, as Winterson’s 
succeeding novels Gut Symmetries, The.PowerBook (2000), and The Stone Gods (2007), 
all express an interest in the virtual nomadism of human experience instead of continuing 
the tradition of giving importance to materiality: or rather, what we perceive as the 
concrete, tangible surfaces upon which we inscribe our gendering gaze.  
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CHAPTER TWO 
Space-time, Energy and the Virtual Star-dust Body: Exploding the Myths of 
Materiality in Gut Symmetries 
 
“It may well be that nothing solid actually exists, but what might exist is 
energy, space.” — Jeanette Winterson, Art Objects: Essays on Ecstasy 
and Effrontery 
 
“As above, so below.” — Paracelsus  
 
I. Introduction 
 Jeanette Winterson’s 1992 novel, Written on the Body, draws the reader’s 
attention to the textual properties of corporeality, thus unveiling the gendered body as a 
product of a preexisting cultural realm rather than a purely biological entity. My first 
chapter surveyed the novel’s phantasmic dissolution of the skin border, exploring what 
might happen when the surface breaks away, when the subjective “I” and the “other” 
begin to bleed into one another in ways that are both messy and transformative. 
Winterson’s next novel, Gut Symmetries (1997), shares some narratological similarities 
with its predecessor, as its plot is also anchored by an extramarital love affair — although 
unlike Written on the Body, this one concerns a relationship that is definitively lesbian. 
Another concordance emerges in the novel’s interrogation of desire: chiefly, the capacity 
of desire to collapse bodily boundaries and the self/other dichotomy that such boundaries 
bring into effect. However, Gut Symmetries departs from Written on the Body in its much 
more concerted consideration of another binary implicated in the social construction of 
the body: inside/outside. The novel explores what is happening on the other side of the 
skin, turning the binary inside out to examine the forces which enfold or encircle human 
bodies: the sub-atomic outside of space and time. Although quantum physics is central to 
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this consideration, Gut Symmetries also appropriates discourses of astronomy, alchemy, 
poetry, and the Kabbalistic tradition of Jewish mysticism, in order to shift the importance 
invested in materiality (and the social inscriptions that come with it) to the unperceivable 
virtual energies that comprise us, that comprise the whole of the universe.  
 While the novel largely employs scientific discourse in its depiction of the 
romantic entanglement of its three central characters, that each chapter is named after a 
Tarot card is suggestive of Winterson’s strategic avoidance of master narratives.27 My 
reading engages with this multi-faceted composition, as I work to peel back and critically 
assess each layer (“Time, Universe, Love Affair, New York, Ship of Fools, Jew, 
Diamond, Dream, Working-Class Boy, Baby, River, Matter”) in isolation and in 
conversation with other textual elements (Winterson 6).28  I begin with the influence of 
the Einsteinian model of space-time on the actual structure of the narrative, as indicated 
by its anti-linear composition and various time-slips. My analysis then unpacks the 
novel’s illustration of the ways in which heteronormative regimes — which operate using 
the binary of gender — attempt to harness both time and space to sediment corporeal 
inscriptions. In the process, bodies become “insinuate[d] to desire what they do not 
desire,” to recall, briefly, Winterson’s central concern in her essay “The Semiotics of 
Sex” (115). The following sections of my chapter examine Gut Symmetries’ 
consideration of how other various schools of thought might also be re-appropriated in 
                                               
 
27 For a thorough analysis of Winterson’s use of Tarot cards in Gut Symmetries, see 
Susana Onega Jaén’s Jeanette Winterson (2006), p. 111-5. 
28  Unless indicated otherwise, all references to Winterson’s work are from Gut 
Symmetries (1997).  
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order to disrupt the dominant conceptualization that the borders of the body are stable, 
fixed and impermeable — a determination which, as we will see, the novel deems (both 
metaphorically and literally) cannibalistic. 
 The work of Elizabeth Grosz proves a useful companion in my textual analysis of 
Gut Symmetries. Found early in her canon, both Jacques Lacan: A Feminist Introduction 
(1990) and Volatile Bodies: Towards a Corporeal Feminism (1994) include a 
psychoanalytic consideration of space and time as active agents in the shaping of 
normative — or conversely, abject — sexual subjectivity, which is realized in Gut 
Symmetries’ hyper-gendered depiction of heterosexual relations. Sections of Volatile 
Bodies, in addition to Space, Time, and Perversions (1995), The Nick of Time: Politics, 
Evolution, and the Untimely (2004), Time Travels: Feminism, Nature and Power (2005), 
and Chaos, Territory, Art: Deleuze and the Framing of the Earth (2008) move to a 
Deleuzian focus on the “pre-personal forces at work in the activities of sexed bodies, 
institutions and social practices” (Space, Time 195 emphasis my own). I argue that these 
pre-personal forces are what appears to be activating the de-centering of heteronormative 
narratives in Gut Symmetries; the novel takes up the early teachings of “physician, 
magician, alchemist, urge, demiurge, dues et omnia” Paracelsus, coupling his assertion 
that the “galaxa goes through the belly” with the Big Bang Theory in ways that ultimately 
serve to present an alternative to the dominant binary models of understanding 
(Winterson 1-2).  
 Deleuzian nomadism enters into dialogue with the novel’s focus on the 
relationship between pre-personal forces, the body, and desire. However, much like 
Grosz, who recognizes that Deleuze’s oeuvre is far too vast to perform a comprehensive 
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or entirely faithful reading, I consider only the concepts that I find engage with Gut 
Symmetries’ proposed challenge to the imaginary of concrete bodies. Thus, my reading of 
his work is primarily limited to the BwO (Body without Organs) and the desiring-
machines that assemble to make the BwO become. I position the BwO in relation to the 
novel’s repeated assertion that “energy precedes matter” (19, 83), a notion that I believe 
has the potential to overturn normative perceptions of the body. By focusing attention on 
the often overlooked immaterial forces that precondition (and continue to condition) our 
existence, the novel works to undermine the legitimizing agents of patriarchal, 
heterosexist narratives: so-called “concrete” flesh-and-blood bodies.  
 In many ways, Gut Symmetries continues the Butlerian project started in Written 
on the Body, to recast “the matter of bodies as the effect of a dynamic of power, such that 
the matter of bodies will be indissociable from the regulatory norms that govern their 
materialization and the signification of those material effects” (Butler Bodies That Matter 
2). However, as Karen Barad points out in her work Meeting the Universe Halfway: 
Quantum Physics and the Meaning of Matter (2007), Butler’s theories are limited to “an 
account of the materialization of human bodies (or more accurately, to the construction of 
the surface of the human body, which most certainly is not all there is to human bodies) 
through the regulatory action of social forces (which are not the only forces relevant to 
the production of bodies)” (209). Without diminishing the importance of Butler’s 
contribution to the understanding of how bodies come to matter in social, regulatory and 
exclusionary contexts, I explore the potential (and often overlooked) impact of the 
unseeable intensities that makes up bodies that matter.  
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II. Riverrun Narratives and Einstein’s Space-time 
 In Space, Time, and Perversion, Grosz suggests that a thorough reconsideration of 
space and time is where the work of re-inscribing the materiality of the body really 
begins, as destabilizing preexisting scripts about how bodies negotiate “their environment 
and spatio-temporal location” will ultimately serve to disable the very corporeal 
inscriptions that insinuate bodies to desire what they do not desire (84). Winterson’s 
explorations into the forces of space and time surface in the final paragraph of Written on 
the Body, which imagines the reunited lovers in a “threadbare room” that has burst wide 
open: the narrator and Louise are both inside and outside simultaneously, and this is, in 
fact, “where the story starts” (190). As the narrator explains: 
 
The walls are exploding. The windows have turned into telescopes. Moon and 
stars are magnified in this room. The sun hangs over the mantelpiece. I stretch 
out my hand and reach the corners of the world. The world is bundled up in 
this room. Beyond the door, where the river is, where the roads are, we shall 
be. We can take the world with us when we go and sling the sun under your 
arm. (190) 
 
The pervasive river images that recur throughout Gut Symmetries recall this passage, 
which figures the river as part of the beyond: beyond the structure of the room, the door, 
the enclosed social structures that Louise’s home with Elgin represents. This particular 
scene accords with one presented earlier in the novel, in which the narrator and Louise 
make love for the first time. Louise leads the narrator up one flight of stairs after another, 
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and it seems as though “the house would not end, that the stairs in their twisting shape 
took us higher and out of the house altogether” (51). They finally arrive in an attic room 
where the distempered walls are “breathing,” moving under their touch. The narrator 
observes that here within this space, s/he and Louise “could reach the ceiling and the 
floor and every side of our loving cell” (51). Here, the novel not only presents a symbolic 
breakdown of the subject’s body, but also a breakdown of the ways in which the spatio-
temporal location that envelops the corporeal surface is conceived. The room breathes, 
moves, explodes under the presence of an energy that both produces and is produced by 
desire.  
 While Written on the Body provides the starting point, Gut Symmetries offers a 
more in-depth exploration of the complexities inherent in the relationship between space, 
time, materiality, and energy. The novel begins with a prologue that outlines the story’s 
main components stripped down: “Here follows a story of time, universe, love affair and 
New York. The Ship of Fools, a Jew, a diamond, a dream, a working-class boy, a baby, a 
river, the subatomic joke of unstable matter” (6). The structurally fragmented, time-
jumping plot loosely revolves around a three-way love triangle between New Physicist 
Alice Fairfax, her successful middle-aged colleague Jove Rossetti, and Jove’s poet-
mystic wife Stella. A shifting perspective between the three characters allows them to 
each impart their own reflections, ultimately providing a collection of differing 
meditations — although predominantly scientific — on the nature of desire and the 
“intelligence of the universe” from which this desire springs forth (11). 
 Alice and Jove meet aboard the cruise ship QE2, where they have both been asked 
to deliver lectures; Alice speaks about Paracelsus and the Big Bang Theory (a talk which 
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comprises the basis of the prologue), while an Armani-clad Jove teases the predominantly 
grey-haired guests with the possibility of time travel. He himself has apparently 
discovered a way to deceive time, for although Alice is nearly twenty years younger, the 
two soon embark upon a clandestine affair. After some months pass, Jove arranges for 
Stella to uncover the infidelity, at which point she asks to meet her much younger rival. 
To the surprise of everyone involved, the encounter turns sexual and the two women 
begin an intense affair of their own. Alice describes this triangulation in terms of 
Euclidian algorithms. However, she is quick to discover that this mathematical equation 
does not actually function in a space that is curved:  
 
I said there was a love affair. In fact there are two. Male and female God 
created them and I fell in love with them both. If you want to know how a 
mistress marriage works, ask a triangle. In Euclidian geometry the angles of a 
triangle add up to 180 degrees and parallel lines never meet. Everyone knows 
the score, and the women are held in tension away from one another. The 
shape is beguiling and it could be understood as a new geometry of family life. 
Unfortunately, Euclidean theorems only work if space is flat. In curved space, 
the angles over-add themselves and parallel lines always meet. His wife, his 
mistress, met. (16-17) 
 
That space is curved rather than straight, and that the parallel lines come to converge 
together, is symbolic of Alice and Stella’s sexual relationship. Like space, their own 
bodies are made up of curves that over-add and meet: “Pitch of her body under me” (17). 
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The novel takes the concept of curved space even farther; lesbianism is an identity 
category for women who desire the same sex, and Gut Symmetries is far more interested 
in the potential connections that lie beneath such discursive constructions, ones that could 
end up disrupting normalized ideas about the ways in which desiring bodies negotiate 
space and time. In addition to his conception of curved space, Alice also adopts 
Einstein’s conflation of space and time into “space-time.” Space-time suggests that the 
two seemingly separate categories cannot be disentangled from one another, since both 
are inner conditions of the other and present two different ways of looking at the same 
thing. Indeed, in Einstein’s theory, the speed at which light transmits information to the 
eye depends entirely upon the amount of space between them; thus, the amount of time 
that transpires between the subject and the event is caused by the passage of space 
through which light must travel.29 In Gut Symmetries, this theory is encapsulated by the 
act of star-gazing, as Alice directs the readers to “[l]ook up at the galaxy. What you see is 
thousands, sometimes tens of thousands of years past, drama of the nebula only visible 
when it reaches us, efforts of light. 186,000 miles per second, crossing centuries of 
history, still dark to us” (200). However, this “darkness” does not necessarily imply that 
the former event is passive, existing only to be gazed upon but rather, still always present, 
                                               
 
29  In his Special Theory of Relativity, introduced in his 1905 paper “On the 
Electrodynamics of Moving Bodies,” Einstein makes the claim that the speed of light 
(moving at approximately 300,000,000 meters per second) in a vacuum is the same for 
each observer, regardless of both the velocity of the observer and the velocity of the light 
source. For Einstein, this means that space and time are relative. An object in motion 
experiences time at a slower rate than an object that is still. As Alice remarks in Gut 
Symmetries, the idea marked “the beginnings of quantum physics and the end of the 
mechanistic, deterministic, mind/matter of cosmic reality” (11).   
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still happening somewhere, with its light positioned at a certain distance relative to the 
perceiving body. 
 It is this specific version of space-time that Winterson writes into Gut Symmetries 
by weaving in the familial histories of each character, with a narrowed focus on their 
direct ascendants. As Alice is the novel’s primary narrator, her family is given the most 
attention, largely focusing on her father David — with whom she felt she had the most in 
common. He was born a “Liverpool limey”; his own family had always worked the docks 
(52).30 Under the influence of his eccentric but domineering mother, who chanted in his 
ear, relentlessly, that he would “be someone, be someone” (147), David rose up the ranks 
of the shipping company where he had started when he was fifteen as an office boy. He 
then married Alice’s mother, the well-to-do Irish daughter of a partner in his firm. It was 
no great romance, but a move calculated to further secure his new position at work and 
amongst upper-class society. Their matrimonial life together was often disrupted by his 
ambitious career trajectory, which included a hiatus in their first year of marriage that 
lasted several months, one that saw David traveling to New York City to earn a much-
coveted promotion.  
 Jove’s history is given less consideration, although Stella explains that he is the 
son of Italian immigrants who found success opening Rossetti’s diner, “the most famous 
little trat” in Manhattan (89). The restaurant becomes the site of Jove and Stella’s first 
encounter when she was but an infant; Stella later takes Alice there on the night they first 
                                               
 
30 “Limey” is a slang word for a person of English descent. The nickname originated in 
the eighteenth century, when British sailors would suck the juice from limes to prevent 
scurvy. 
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meet. Like Jove, Stella’s parents were also foreign to New York. Originally from Austria, 
Ishmael, a holistic Jewish book dealer, fled to America to escape the Nazi regime. Prior 
to his departure, his German wife Uta had actually been considering leaving their 
marriage. However, she ended up risking her life to help him, flirting with a high-ranking 
Nazi officer who allowed her to sell off as much of Ishmael’s property as was possible. 
She smelted the profits into gold ingots, which she then smuggled to New York where 
Ishmael was awaiting her arrival. Despite the romantic gesture, their story’s ending is not 
a happy one. Even after her safe arrival in New York, pragmatic Uta remained unhappy 
with Ishmael, growing more and more fed-up with his increasingly strange mystical 
beliefs, his “mutterings and singing, of prayer and meditation, of jewels and dusty books” 
(168).   
Late in the novel, Alice discovers that Uta had not only worked for David as his 
secretary during the time that he was in New York, but the two had also enjoyed a brief 
but meaningful affair; Stella was a young girl at the time; Alice had not yet been 
conceived. The adulterous couple would rendezvous in the Algonquin hotel, where Alice 
and Stella would later have their first contact and become unfaithful themselves. Some 
reviewers have found this particular plot-twist too implausible to succeed, but it is only 
one of many coincidences incorporated throughout the novel. For instance, Alice and 
Stella are further connected by Paracelsus, the subject of Alice’s cruise ship lecture; he is 
born on November 10th 1493, and Stella on November 10th, 1947 (1, 75). On the last page 
of the novel, reunited with Stella after she is lost at sea, Alice describes the “red digital 
flash of date and time: November 10 19:47 (Sun in Scorpio. City of New York)” (219). 
These analogous details are not just happenstance, but rather serve to demonstrate the 
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complementarities between Alice and Stella that run throughout the novel: both are born 
under extremely unusual circumstances (Alice on a tugboat, Stella on a sled during a 
snowstorm in downtown Manhattan), both have strong childhood attachments to their 
fathers, and most importantly for my purposes, both believe that “energy precedes 
matter” (19, 83).  
In their article “Grand (Dis)Unified Theories?: Dislocated Discourses in Gut 
Symmetries,” Tim Woods and Helena Grice treat the novel’s many coincidences 
somewhat dismissively: according to them, Winterson is too caught up in her own 
“conceptual linguistic game[s]” and as a result, Gut Symmetries “sometimes loses itself in 
the trickeries of its playful parallels, and ultimately produces a narrative which falls apart 
rather than falls together” (118). However, in her chapter, entitled “Multiple Words and 
Selves” from her book on Winterson’s fiction, Susana Onega Jaén disagrees, stating that 
it is exactly these kinds of happenstances that pin the lives of the Gut Symmetries’ 
characters not only to each other but also to their ancestors. As Jaén contends, the “whole 
novel is structured by means of [...] random coincidences into a complex web of 
‘symmetries’ comparable to the chaotic arrangement of elements in fractals” (Jaén 156). 
She arrives at the conclusion that “the individual forms part of a vast system, or huge 
family, each one constituting a link in a chain reaching back to the beginning and 
projecting itself into the future” (178). I come to a similar interpretation, but from a 
different position: Jaén reads the novel through a Jungian lens, while I am more 
interested in how these various coincidences operate to reveal symmetries as something 
that move beyond the characters themselves, beyond their past, present, and future, 
beyond their “thinking guts”: the implications of these ruptures in time and space means 
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that subjects are also beyond their bodies, as they exist seemingly solid in the seeming 
present. These symmetries suggest a correspondence that is inherent at a sub-atomic 
level, within the vast and virtual realm of space-time: predating the categories through 
which we have come to understand ourselves and others. 
 Gut Symmetries compares Einstein’s framework of space-time to a flowing river: 
“[M]oving forward, forceful, directed but also bowed, curved and sometimes 
subterranean, not ending but pouring itself into a greater sea. A river cannot flow against 
its current. The riverrun is maverick, there is a high chance of cross-current, a snag of 
time that returns us without warning to a place we thought we had sailed through long 
since” (104). Alice personally views former events as coming “with us, like a drag-net of 
fishes. We tow it down river, people and things, emotions, time’s inhabitants, not left on 
shore way back, but still swimming close by” (105). Stella holds a similar account of the 
past, as a “tunnel of energy” (122). The histories of their families, of famous astronomers 
and physicists, of the expanding universe: it is all here and there simultaneously — and 
indeed, all of these elements come into play in the novel, overlapping as curved space, 
still mattering. Towards the novel’s conclusion, Jove, Stella and Alice agree to take a 
vacation together, a boating trip; at the last minute, Alice discovers that David is dying 
and stays behind to make the appropriate arrangements. He passes away, and Jove and 
Stella’s yacht goes missing. It is at this time that Alice discovers her father’s affair with 
Uta. In the half awake, half asleep fluid state of her grief, she notes: “I could not fully 
distinguish which was my father/myself, Stella/Uta, whether the distance we imagine 
separates one event from another folded up, leaving the two clock faces to slide together, 
plates of time, synchronous” (199).  
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 In The Nick of Time, Grosz makes the claim that space-time “is in principle 
outside, before, beyond matter, a precondition of matter’s emergence, and the force that, 
surprisingly, without predictability, rends life from its more unstable interactions” (245). 
Alice mirrors this statement with her own observation, in the novel’s final passage: “The 
universe hangs here, in this narrow strait, infinity and compression caught in the hour. 
Space and time cannot be separated. History and futurity are now. What you remember. 
What you invent. The universe curving in your gut” (Winterson 219). This image of “the 
universe curving in your gut” proves central to the novel’s ultimate revision of bodies. 
Like Written on the Body before it, the novel’s primary focus still lies within the 
transformative power of resignification; however, it is not limited to the body alone but to 
the virtual forces that exist beyond and move within the body, not always readily 
discernible to the senses. Although these forces cannot be contained by language, various 
discourses have indeed attempted to regulate our understanding of how bodies receive 
and process spatio-temporality. Indeed, the chaos inherent in the riverrun of space-time 
— its messiness, its inexhaustibility, and most of all, its boundless and uncontainable 
energy — necessitates some kind of intervening containment. Alice herself recognizes 
that the divisions erected between past, present, and future are vital “for safety, for 
sanity”; if we were to let these distinctions disintegrate, then we can “no longer [be] sure 
who we are, or perhaps we can no longer pretend to be who we are” (105). 
 Much of Grosz’s work finds fault with the generally held conception that the 
spatio-temporal site of subjectivity is little more than an impassive backdrop, serving 
only the perfunctory role of framing one’s existence; space and time are most often 
perceived to be, quite simply, “passed” through. However, as with the various bodies in 
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Written on the Body, space-time has also been inscribed with meaning: it has been 
organized in relation to a heavily gendered, heterosexist paradigm. Indeed, the riverrun of 
space-time plays an active and even primary role, not only in the formation of 
subjectivity through its contouring of the body’s shape, but also the production of sexual 
difference — and alongside sexual difference arrives the violent hierarchies of the 
prevailing social structure. Gut Symmetries works to highlight the surreptitiousness of 
these binaries, for as Grosz maintains, space and time should not be conceived as “neutral 
or transparent media whose passivity enables the specificity of matter to reveal itself: 
rather they are active ingredients in the making of matter, and thus the constitution of 
objects and subjects” (Time Travels 173-4).  
 
III. The Spatio-Temporal Cordoning of the Body 
 Although Gut Symmetries hosts multiple speakers, Alice is positioned as the 
protagonist; with seven chapters, she also narrates the greater part of the novel, although 
she shares one, aptly named after the Tarot card “The Lovers,” with Stella — again 
pointing to their interconnection as their voices blend into one narrative voice. Aside 
from “The Lovers,” Stella narrates three other chapters and Jove only one. It is through 
Alice’s perspective that Jove is introduced. An established peer in the Department of 
Physics at Princeton University, his theories on “the cosmos, dimensionality of 
hyperspace, ghost universes symmetrical with ours” represent the “future” of physics, at 
least in his own opinion (Winterson 15). His erudite, self-assured demeanour is 
juxtaposed against Alice’s ambivalence, as she is constantly questioning the universe and 
her role in it: “What was the true nature of the world? What was the true nature of myself 
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in it?” (12). Her acquiescence to his domineering behaviour is demonstrative of the 
ubiquity of the masculine/feminine gender binary, which as we saw in my first chapter, is 
not only imprinted upon the corporeal surface, but rather comes to be internalized by the 
subject both through the passage of time and through the patriarchal taking up of space.31  
 According to Pierre Bourdieu, rather than enacting this gendered performance, 
subjects are possessed by it, “because it acts within them as the organizing principle of 
their actions, and because this modus operandi informing all thought and action 
(including thought of action) reveals itself only in the opus operatum (practice)” (Outline 
18). As Bourdieu states in his 1979 work “Classes and Classifications,” time and space 
are crucial mobilizers in the organizing principle of gender:  
 
Everything takes place as if the social conditionings linked to a social 
condition tended to inscribe the relation to the social world in a lasting, 
generalized relation to one’s own body, a way of bearing one’s body, 
presenting it to others, moving it, making space for it, which gives the body its 
social physiognomy. Bodily hexis, a basic dimension of the sense of social 
orientation, is a practical way of experiencing and expressing one’s own sense 
of social value. One’s relationship to the social world and to one’s proper place 
in it is never more clearly expressed than in the space and time one feels 
                                               
 
31 In the psychoanalytic framework, this patriarchal “taking up” of space is explained by 
the primacy invested in male sex organ, which is physically present, taking up space. The 
female sex organ, on the other hand, is viewed as lacking — it is negative space, a hole 
with nothing there. 
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entitled to take from others; more precisely, in the space one claims with one’s 
body in physical space, through a bearing and gestures that are self-assured or 
reserved, expansive or constricted (‘presence’ or ‘insignificance’) and with 
one’s speech in time, through the interaction time one appropriates and the 
self-assured or aggressive, careless or unconscious way one appropriates it. 
(477) 
 
In ways that evoke Written on the Body’s likening of romantic discourse to a “saggy 
armchair of clichés,” Bourdieu goes on to state that the logic of socialization treats the 
body as a “memory-jogger”: there is a complex of gestures, postures, words, that “only 
have to be slipped into, like a theatrical costume, to awaken, by the evocative power of 
bodily mimesis, a universe of ready-made feelings and experiences” (478). 
 Bourdieu thus establishes a link between gender and what he calls “habitus,” a 
term that Elizabeth Freeman elaborates upon as “individual dispositions and collective 
modes of belonging sedimented by rituals of timing that accrete over time” in her work 
Time Binds: Queer Temporalities, Queer Histories (2010) (xx). Freeman relates 
Bourdieu’s conceptualization of habitus to what she calls chrono-normativity: “the 
interlocking temporal schemes necessary for genealogies of descent and for the mundane 
workings of domestic life” (xxii). What can be considered normative behaviour is 
solidified by the subject’s submission to social expectations concerning chronology: the 
flow of time has been pre-mapped before the subject has even arrived on the scene. 
Acceptance of the standard linear, teleological narrative (birth, childhood/adolescence, 
marriage, reproduction, death) renders the subject culturally legible, since this particular 
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temporal order has already been invested with conventionalized meaning; and so the 
subject inhabits the rhythms of normalized straight time, positioning its experience in 
relation to what is expected. As Alice herself maintains, her entire life has already been 
pre-determined by what she calls “well-built trig points”: cultural markings that serve to 
measure one’s progression through space-time (Winterson 10). 
 Judith Halberstam’s In a Queer Time and Place (2005) is interested in this same 
concept, but goes one step further by compartmentalizing normative time into three 
different but mutually interdependent areas: reproductive time (the female biological 
clock), family time (scheduling the routine of daily life), and generational time (the 
inheritance of values). According to Halberstam, “hegemonic constructions of time and 
space are uniquely gendered and sexualized”: every aspect of time in particular coalesces 
to produce and sustain heteronormative ideologies (Queer Time 8). In No Future: Queer 
Theory and the Death Drive (2004), Lee Edelman speaks to the first category of 
reproductive time, positioning the all-encompassing figure of the Child — and by 
extension, heterosexual sex and reproduction — as central to the concretization of 
normative time. As the sustenance of the Child relies wholly on the continued 
propagation of the species, those who fail to participate in the heterosexist logic are 
“future-negating” and are therefore abject subjects (Edelman 26). To reject “reproductive 
futurism” is not only to refuse linear progression, but also to align oneself with the death 
drive, which seeks to rupture the ego’s imagined sense of cohesion and self-sufficiency. 
There is a connection then, between reproductive time and the foundation of corporeal 
boundaries as the subject’s “I” is spatially formulated as bound by the container of its 
“whole” body. To disengage from reproductive time is to trouble the borders of 
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subjectivity — which is precisely, as we will see, what Gut Symmetries ends up doing in 
its own inconclusive sort of way, once all of its various layers are realized; however, its 
early sections are more representative of Halberstam’s subsequent category, as they 
explore the ways in which “family time” was thoroughly gendered in the Liverpool of the 
1950s and 60s, the setting of the betrothal of Alice’s parents, her lonely childhood, and 
“anorexic and hollow eyed” adolescence (Winterson 21).   
 If reproductive time happens at the primordial site of the “I”’s formation, then 
family time is the place where sexed binaries begin to take root. Halberstam describes 
“family time” as a “heteronormative time/space construct,” one that is informed entirely 
by preexisting sexual politics (Queer Time 10). And certainly, in Gut Symmetries, Alice’s 
own sense of gender dynamics is structured entirely around her father’s work schedule 
and the “demands of his pocketwatch” (22). While he measures his time carefully in 
quarter-hours, Alice’s mother had “never learned to be punctual and always has been 
vague about any appointment not directly connected” to David (22). As Alice explains, 
her mother used David as her timepiece, regulating her own life through his. When she 
brings Alice to the dentist on the wrong date, the dentist, who makes a point of speaking 
directly to David and not his wife, comments that “women are like that” (22). 
 Halberstam draws largely upon David Harvey’s The Condition of Postmodernism 
(1989), which asserts that time is “organized according to the logic of capital 
accumulation” (Harvey 7); however, she finds fault with the general omission of gender 
and sexuality from his analysis. Taking up the work of Kathleen McHugh and Lisa 
Duggan, she indicates how feminist historians have claimed that “in the eighteenth and 
nineteenth centuries, as the European bourgeoisie assumed class dominance over the 
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aristocracy and proletariat, a separation of spheres graphically represented the gendered 
logic of the public/private binary and annexed middle-class women to the home, leaving 
the realm of politics and commerce of white men” (Queer Time 8). According to Marx 
and Engels’s The Communist Manifesto, the bourgeois male “sees in his wife a mere 
instrument of production”: her domestic labour is unpaid and therefore, she must rely on 
her husband for financial security (1866). David’s pocketwatch is a symbol of 
patriarchal-capitalist authority, tracking the hours spent at work and the hours spent not at 
work. As the aphorism goes, “time is money”: and the more time he spends making 
money, the more his social power grows.  
 His wife, on the other hand, remains powerless outside the domain of domesticity. 
According to Adrienne Rich’s 1980 essay “Compulsory Heterosexuality and Lesbian 
Existence,” women have married in part for economic survival; they are taught how to be 
passive in order to attract male partners, to be granted the safety of the social contract: a 
social contract disguised by the representation of heterosexual romance as “the great 
female adventure, duty, and fulfillment” (242). David’s wife plays her part (for what 
other choice does she know?), as illustrated by the overlong description of her 
excessively feminine appearance and attributes:  
 
She was pretty, she was charming, she was clever enough but not too, she 
smiled at the men and gave the women that quizzical bewildered look, as if to 
say, ‘What, am I not the only one then?’ Her stockings were straight, her hair 
was curled, her back was upright, her waist was curved, her legs were long, her 
breasts round, her stomach was flat, her bottom was not. Black hair, blue eyes, 
111 
red mouth, pale skin, and all this packed as neatly as a picnic Tupperware. 
There was nothing of the whore about her and this my father liked. (Winterson 
58)  
 
As newlyweds, David refuses to consummate the marriage until he had obtained the 
highest position at the shipping company where he was employed, and so he temporarily 
abandons his new bride to “find gold” (and Uta, as readers will later discover) in New 
York City (54). He eventually receives a promotion that cannot be surpassed: Director of 
the Line. With haste, David returns to England, for he “had risen in the world and now he 
was going to prove it”: by yanking his wife out of the bathtub where she had been 
soaking, and “spear[ing her] on his manhood” (56). For her part, Alice’s mother 
continually submits; he acts on her, she is acted upon. Although she is “well educated,” 
she had also been “taught to conceal it” (23). Her voice is not important, nor evidently is 
her name: while David’s own alludes to the powerful biblical King, Alice’s mother is 
labeled only in relation to her role as David’s wife, and bearer of his children. 
 Although as an infant through to her adolescence Alice identifies far more with 
her father than her mother, she is nonetheless expected to perform the gender role 
assigned to her sex. When she wins a much-coveted scholarship to Cambridge to study 
physics, a field notorious for its lack of female employment, her parents are mostly 
unsupportive. David would much rather she adopt the traditionally feminine role and get 
married than pursue a career while her mother hopes she will view her time at the 
University as an opportunity to procure a suitable husband:   
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I know that my father feared for me a lonely old age and a lonely young one 
too. He did not say so, but the words behind the words told that he would 
rather have launched me into a good marriage than watch me row against the 
tide of my own work. It remains that a woman with an incomplete emotional 
life has herself to blame, while a man with no time for his heart just needs a 
wife.   
 When I went up to Cambridge, my mother said to me, ‘Alice, when you 
are at dinner with a man, never look at your watch.’ 
 Like many women of her generation she expected to let time run its course 
through her without attempting to alter it. (22) 
 
The dating advice Alice receives from her mother further speaks to the naturalization of 
discourses on time, and while at Cambridge, Alice begins to dream about a gold 
pocketwatch, similar to the one owned by her father: “[It] is there, ticking time away, and 
I have often tried to climb inside it and jam the mechanism with my body.  If I succeed, I 
go to sleep within my sleep, only to wake up violently because the watch is no longer 
ticking but I am” (21). Here we see how generational time ticks in and through Alice’s 
body, in spite of her own desires — desires which run counter to the social demands of 
her sex. 
 Indeed, it is Halberstam’s third category that comes to bear the most significance, 
as without generational time, conceptualizations of what reproductive and family time 
contain would fail to become sedimented. For instance, within the category of family 
time, David’s children also depend on his pocketwatch to provide structure their daily 
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lives. According to Alice: “[W]e ate, slept, drew, played, world without end, waiting 
without knowing we were waiting for my father to come home and snap his fingers and 
whisk us into the golden hour. We became aware, though I can’t say how, that he was 
giving us four whole quarters of an hour” (23). The authority granted to the father figure 
shapes how their days are temporally organized; this naturalized regiment becomes 
reinstated when the children grow up and start their own families, as they take on the 
roles once enacted by their parents. Social norms are passed down through familial ties; 
as the psychoanalytic framework insists, children will psychically incorporate the 
behaviour of their parental figures in the formation of their own identities, through the 
coercive mechanism of the Oedipal structure that sees young girls pass into adulthood 
with an acceptance of their socially designated role as inferior or lacking — an 
enveloping identity which simultaneously establishes space and time for her. It is a 
course of action that occurs within a certain passage of time, and as Halberstam notes, 
“because we experience time as some form of natural progression, we fail to realize or 
notice its construction” (Queer Time 7). Alice’s name is short form for Alluvia, which 
means “the deposits collected and jettied by the river” (Winterson 123); she is formed by 
riverrun forces that move around her, just as she witnesses time run through her mother. 
 For her part, Alice grew up admiring her father’s strength, his ambition, his 
prowess; she even confesses that she loved her father incestuously (126). She fits the 
mold of what Grosz recognizes as Lacan’s “dutiful daughter,” the “one who submits to 
the Father’s Law”; although this deference can take many forms, Alice adheres to what 
Grosz calls the Oedipalization “of desire, to the patriarchal denigration of her 
corporeality and pleasure, to a femininity defined as passive” (Volatile Bodies 150). It 
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comes as no surprise, then, that Alice chooses a partner so similar to her father: Jove, a 
man whose own name comes from the opera Don Giovanni, featuring the fictional legend 
of libertine and lothario Don Juan. Gut Symmetries further utilizes systems of 
nomenclature to underscore Jove’s patriarchal kinship to David: his mother nicknamed 
him after the “King of the Gods” and naturally, Jove likes this even more than his given 
name — for as Alice observes, he has “two reputations he wanted to protect: his primacy 
and his potency” (Winterson 99, 100). As his beautiful and much younger mistress, 
Alice-as-object augments Jove’s stature. She discerns: “At his side I was access and envy 
(What a showpiece.  Where did you find her?). At my side he was young and sexy (Will 
you marry him?)” (104).  
In both cases, Jove is the only one to benefit from their involvement. Others want 
what he has, and Alice is defined only by her relation to him. Like the arrangement 
between her mother and father, the timing of their romance is controlled by Jove: “His 
interest in me pendulumed from hot intensity to cool indifference. Weeks together would 
be followed by months apart. Then he would woo me again and each time I was 
determined to resist” (105). Her continued complicity (each time, she does not end up 
resisting) testifies to the dominance of the heteronormative narrative: she believes that 
she is “completed” by Jove, that they are two halves that come together to form a perfect 
whole. In the early origins of their affair, she admits to being captivated by their 
reflection in the mirror, for their perfectly matched oppositions made “an elegant pair: 
dark/fair, older/younger, assured/uncertain” (18). This gender-inscribed binary provides 
an excellent example of the myth of heterosexuality complementarity. According to 
Christine Downing, “when the categories ‘male’ and ‘female’ are seen as representing an 
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absolute and complementary division the opposite sex becomes ‘the Other,’ comes to 
stand mythically and exclusively, for that which brings satisfaction and completion” 
(Downing 34). However, this notion is a social construction, and in the heterosexist 
regime, these two opposing halves are not at all balanced, but reflective of a hierarchy in 
which the passive object is swallowed up by the more dominant partner.  
For instance, as Alice herself notes, her mother “manifested [David] at another 
level. He absorbed her while she failed to absorb him” (Winterson 58). Alice likewise 
allows herself to be absorbed by Jove. As she explains: “I had found relief with Jove and 
did not question it [...] Here was a recognized pattern with room in it for my piece. My 
gaps and angles now fitted somewhere” (106). However, her gaps and angles have not 
been neatly slotted into Jove’s corresponding gaps and angles, but have merely been 
consolidated; she herself is “displaced” by this immersion, “as a heavy solid displaces 
water” (139). As time goes on, Alice becomes conscious of her amenability: “I had been 
annexed by Jove. What had begun as a comity of sovereign states had ended in invasion” 
(108). As she comes to recognize, she was never completed by Jove’s accompanying half 
to her binary, but rather consumed by him. This consumption foreshadows the novel’s 
gruesome climax when Jove literally “guts” and cannibalizes his wife to ensure his own 
survival.  
That Alice finds herself absorbed by Jove suggests that she has been supplanted 
spatially, and as Halberstam points out, “all of the time cycles that we have naturalized 
and internalized (leisure, inertia, recreation, work/industrial, family/domesticity) are also 
spatial practices”; the construction of such spatial practices are “obscured” by this 
naturalization (7-8). As a physicist, Alice acknowledges that space is in fact curved; 
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nonetheless, she feels she has “been cordoned by habit to grow in a straight line” (11-12). 
To be “cordoned” suggests the imposition of an enclosure that is regulated with military 
precision, to prevent movement in or out. Alice being cordoned to grow straight is 
indicative of the ways in which the signification of the Oedipalizing binary has formed 
the corporeal boundaries that mitigate her experience of the outside world, both 
temporally and spatially. And that her brain is cordoned by habit further implies the ways 
in which dominant ideologies are legitimized by reiterative chains of discursive 
production, indicated by the “recognized pattern” described by Alice earlier — and 
recalling, once again, Freeman’s depiction of chrono-normativity. It is a pattern based in 
dualisms: “Husband and wife. Man and rib. What could be more normal than that?” (59). 
The dominion of Alice’s father over her mother was in fact “so normal that nobody 
noticed it,” demonstrating the extent to which behaviours or practices become ossified 
over any given period of time through the repetitive practice of performativity (59). Like 
her mother before her, Alice does “not question” the oppressive dynamics that structure 
her relationship with Jove (106). Any attempt to disentangle desire from this hetero-
matrix is complicated by the very body that produces and processes libidinal instincts, a 
body that has already been impelled into a linear or “straight” temporality. 
For her part, Grosz does not argue that space-time requires order and regulation, 
but what interests her most are the kinds of structures implemented to carry out this order 
and regulation; as she asserts, they are ones rooted in heteronormative principles. She 
makes the crucial point that these ideologies rely not only on the perceived stability of the 
corporeal surface, but also the type of environment that we perceive as holding and 
containing the body and drawing the borders of its materiality. As she states in Volatile 
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Bodies, “modes of representation privilege the solid and determinate over the fluid” 
(205); however, as Written on the Body makes evident, these socially constructed 
corporeal borders are never stable or concrete, and herein lies the potential for 
subversion. Although Alice has been shoved into a certain contextual location in space 
and time according to her sex and familial patterns, she fails to stay there; in ways that 
parallel the experience of the “psychotic” narrator in Written on the Body, she never feels 
like she is positioned securely within her own skin. For instance, when she describes her 
affair with Jove, Alice is unable to differentiate “between carefully separated” objects: 
everything collapses into one another (Winterson 102). Comparing herself to her new 
lover, who seems so solid and sure of himself, she observes: “I could not define myself in 
relation to the shifting poles of certainty that seemed so reliable” (12). Even her own 
reflection evades her, as she cannot find herself “in the looking glasses offered” (12). She 
can only see herself in relation to Jove’s reflection: young, fair, uncertain.  
 Here, Alice displays mild symptoms of psychasthenia, a kind of schizophrenic 
schism between the subject’s experience of its surroundings and its actual lived spatio-
temporal location. In Volatile Bodies, Grosz provides an account of the disturbance 
through her study of Roger Caillois’s “Mimicry and Legendary Psychasthenia,” a paper 
that strongly influenced Lacan’s own conceptualization of the mirror stage. Central to 
Caillois’s argument is his assertion that psychasthenia occurs when space, which for 
Alice is contained by a straight temporality even when she knows it to be curved, appears 
to become “a devouring force” for the subject (Caillois 30). Most importantly, it is with  
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represented space that the drama becomes specific since the living creature, the 
organism, is no longer the origin of the coordinates, but one point among 
others; it is dispossessed of its privilege and literally no longer knows where to 
place itself [...] The feeling of personality, considered as the organism’s feeling 
of distinction from its surroundings, of the connections between consciousness 
and a particular point in space, cannot fail under these conditions to be 
seriously undermined. (29, emphasis my own) 
 
Caillois’s use of the term “represented space” in his rendering of the disturbance is 
crucial, as it suggests that even elements of the metaphysical have been shaped by 
discourse (patriarchal and heteronormative, in this case), transformed into a social 
product, rather than something organic, untouched by culture. That does not mean that 
there is nothing outside of represented space, or that all sensations can be wrapped up 
into “knowable” feelings. However, represented space does impact the ways in which 
subjects come to recognize their bodies. That Caillois also calls it a “devouring force” 
calls to mind Jove’s own consumption of both Alice and Stella, both figuratively and 
literally. 
 Caillois figures prominently in Volatile Bodies, as the work as a whole is an 
examination of the ways in which space-time shapes the borders of corporeality, that thus 
comes to inform subjectivity. As Grosz affirms, in order to possess a conceivable 
identity, one’s subjectivity must first be positioned firmly with the physical location of its 
body: 
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A stabilized body image or imaginary anatomy, a consistent and abiding sense 
of self and bodily boundaries, requires and entails understanding one’s position 
vis-à-vis others, one’s place at the apex or organizing point in the perception of 
space (which in turn, implies a knowledge that one could also be an object in 
the spatial fields of others), as well as a set of clear-cut distinctions between the 
inside and the outside of the body, the active and passive positions, and [...] a 
position as a sexually determinate subject. (Volatile Bodies 48) 
 
Alice does not possess a stabilized body image, nor does she have a consistent and 
abiding sense of self and her bodily boundaries. This is due in part to her confused gender 
role: she identified more strongly with her ambitious father as a child, born “Athene from 
Zeus’s head” — an identification further complicated by David’s incorporation of her, as 
he held Alice in front of the mirror as an infant and absorbed her reflection into his own 
(Winterson 59). That she models herself after both her father and mother is a failure of 
the Oedipal structure: although she does eventually allow herself to be consumed by the 
preexisting heteronormative economy with her adoption of the docile role, her collusion 
is a response to the trauma of her subjective displacement. She responds by attempting to 
anchor herself to Jove, a partner who seems secure and firmly established in his own 
body. 
 And yet, it is Alice’s condition, certainly similar in nature to psychasthenia, which 
allows her to “depersonalize” and thus, transgress the trappings of conventional 
femininity. As Alice acknowledges, space-time for her appears to lapse in spite of the 
cultural inscriptions which attempt to contain it; those well-built trig points that she 
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describes earlier “are themselves as much in motion as I am. What should be stable, 
shifts. What I am told is solid, slips” (10). Her life may be divided into the ordered 
categories of past, present and future, but Alice cannot ignore her “gut” feeling: that 
always lingering “underneath, in dreams, in recollections, in the moment of hesitation on 
a busy street, the hunch that life is not rational, not divided. That the mirrored 
compartments could break” (20). Her lack of a solid position allows her to see 
possibilities that others, perhaps more fixed within their materiality, are less capable of 
perceiving. This accounts for her academic pursuits, which are entirely motivated by her 
interest in the something else of it all, what might be lurking in the “underneath.”  
 At thirteen years old, she joins her father on her first cruise voyage, a three-day 
journey to chase the comet Kohoutek — and a trip which foreshadows both her future 
meeting with Jove and the boating trip upon which Jove and Stella disappear. Here on the 
ship she makes her first discovery, a “thin silver line” in the sky that for Alice, represents 
the legend of the Ship of Fools, which sought the Holy Grail and ended up sailing off the 
edge of world: “At particular conjunctions of time and timelessness, it appears again as a 
bright light, shooting its course through the unfathomable universe, chasing that which 
has neither beginning nor end” (74). Alice, named after the Tarot card “The Fool” in the 
first chapter, now joins the “band of pilgrims uncenturied, unquantified, who, call it art, 
call it alchemy, call it science, call it god, are driven by a light that will not stay” (74).  
 Alice tackles the question of the “unfathomable universe” from a scientific-
alchemical standpoint. As an adult, her research encompasses current strains of 
theoretical physics, ranging from Einstein to Oppenheimer to GUTs (Grand Unified 
Theories), from which the novel in part obtains its name, in addition to the fifteenth-
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century philosophies of Paracelsus who believed in alchemy: the possibility of 
deconstructing and reconstructing matter into different forms. In accentuating the minute, 
the invisible, the infinitesimal, Alice’s version of science — which as we will see, 
include pre-personal forces, rhizomes, energy — offers a metaphysical alternative to the 
current sex/gender/desire regime, by re-examining the ways in which space-time operates 
in and through the subject, or rather, “the expanding universe opening in your gut” (2). 
Although the space-time that Alice appears to occupy has been organized according to 
historically and culturally contingent discourses, she also acknowledges that there might 
be a bigger realm beyond the space-time that is inhabited socially. Unhinging space-time 
from the inscriptions that have long formed subjectivity might allow us to re-think the 
origins of its ideologies. As Alice warns the audience of her cruise ship lecture, the 
“sensible strong ordinary world of fixity” might be nothing but “folklore” after all… (10). 
Here, the QE2 stands in for the Ship of Fools, which stands in for the novel itself — and 
“all of us are aboard” (9). 
 
IV. “As above, so below”: Star-dust Bodies, Grosz’s Pre-personal Forces and the 
Deleuzian BwO 
Alice’s lecture, entitled “Paracelsus and the new physics,” looks to the Big Bang 
Theory to explore Paracelsus’s belief that the universe is “curving in your gut” (219). 
According to superstring theory, the universe was once comprised of ten dimensions and 
was eventually split into two separate pieces; ours contains three spatial dimensions and 
“the oddity of time,” while the other half (with its six unknown dimensions), was lost 
forever (4). The prevailing system of Cartesian dualisms allows for the reenactment of 
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this originating loss, “that here in our provisional world of dualities and oppositional 
pairs: black/white, good/evil, male/female, conscious/unconscious, Heaven/hell, 
predatory/prey, we compulsively act out the drama of our beginning, when what was 
whole, halved, and seeks again its wholeness” (4-5). As the prologue states, male and 
female represents “the uniting mystery of one flesh” (4); however, this dichotomy — and 
its proximate active/passive temporal positionings within the Symbolic order — is 
negated as little more than a rather creative narrative, originally devised to compensate 
for this original loss.  
 The ultimate objective — or in temporal terms, end-result — of the gendered 
male/female binary is to eventually unite it, to become whole again in the fusion of 
opposite but complementary sexes through the act of heterosexual intercourse. 
Paradoxically, however, this supposed merging of bodies is irreconcilable with the goal 
of “fixing” fragmentation. In his article “Phallacies of Binary Reasoning,” Paul 
Verhaeghe points to the redundancy of this self-reproducing structure:   
 
The differentiation into two different genders is precisely the cause of the 
problem. Trying to solve it through this differentiation is nothing but a 
repetition of the original loss. The net result is a never-ending repetition, 
because each phallic act repeats the loss and makes another attempt necessary 
[...] One can even say that phallic sexuality in itself is aim-inhibited because it 
can never reach the original aim of enduring fusion [...] Regardless of the 
masculine subject’s efforts to fuse with woman by way of the phallic 
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relationship, he will never succeed, because the gap is due precisely to the 
phallic signifier. (61, 64) 
 
Indeed, as Juliet Mitchell points out in Feminine Sexuality: Jacques Lacan and the École 
Freudienne (1982), to be human is to be subjected to a language that “decentres and 
divides”: “sexuality is created in a division, the subject is split; but an ideological world 
conceals this from the conscious self who is supposed to feel whole and certain of sexual 
identity” (26). Heterosexuality is, according to Ellie Ragland, an unconsciously enacted 
masquerade, embedded within a social structure that both produces and requires the 
Oedipal triangulation of father-mother-child in order to direct sexed bodies into the 
hierarchy of gender (Ragland 59-60).  
 However, if this model is, in fact, so inadequate at overcoming fragmentation, and 
if it is, as the prologue proposes, rooted in a fiction anyway, then there should be no 
reason to maintain the binaries of sexual difference, and the consequent generation of 
masculine/feminine, active/passive structuring of desire. Alice’s lecture identifies the 
entire system of heteronormativity as a myth orchestrated to “crouch [...] underneath [...] 
the physical presence of something split off” (4). Instead of being connected to castration 
anxiety, as with the phallocentric model, this “lack” emerges rather in “the moment of 
Creation [...] our torn-off universe recorded in the star-dust of our bodies [...] The atoms 
that you are were shook out of a star-burst ante-dating the Solar System. We are the 
beginning. We are before time” (4). Here, the body and its peripheral surroundings are 
mutually interdependent, inciting a blurring of the corporeal boundary between inside and 
outside.  
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 The resulting image reflects theoretical physicist and cosmologist Lawrence 
Krauss’s argument from his work A Universe from Nothing: Why There is Something 
Rather than Nothing (2012), that bodies are comprised of star-dust: “Happily for us, stars 
don’t explode that often, about once per hundred years per galaxy. But we are lucky that 
they do, because if they didn’t, we wouldn’t be here. One of the most poetic facts I know 
about the universe is that essentially every atom in your body was once inside a star that 
exploded” (17). As he goes on to explain, carbon, nitrogen, oxygen, and iron can only be 
found “in the fiery cores of stars. And the only way they could get into your body today 
is if these stars were kind enough to have exploded, spewing their products into the 
cosmos so that they could one day coalesce in and around a small blue planet located near 
the star we call the Sun” (18-19).  
 For Paracelsus, the body does not just contain star-dust; rather, the body is star-
dust and star-dust is the body. As Alice observes in her lecture, “[he] was a student of 
Correspondences: ‘As above, so below.’ The zodiac in the sky is imprinted in the body. 
‘The galaxa goes through the belly’” (Winterson 2). It is not just star-dust that actualizes 
the body, but “[t]he Dead. Time. Light patterns of millennia. The expanding universe 
opening in your gut. Are your twenty-three feet of intestines loaded with stars?” (2). This 
recurring image of the alignment of the stars in the sky paralleled in the entrails of the 
body is nowhere better represented than in the scene in which Uta, while pregnant with 
Stella, succumbs to her “gastronomic[ally] extravagant” cravings for diamonds and 
swallows ten of the precious jewels (86). They were brought to their home by Orthodox 
diamond-dealer friends of Ishmael, who did not want to discuss their economic value but 
rather their “capacity to stimulate the soul’s deeper life” (87). As they spoke to one 
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another, Uta “stepped forward, picked up a diamond between thumb and finger, and 
swallowed it. Then she swallowed another, and another, a voluntary force-feeding into a 
price pâté: [her] oesophagus larded with light” (87). All but one is eventually recovered, 
with a commode and a pair of surgical gloves. The last is not found until Stella enters the 
world: with a pea-sized stone lodged at the base of the spine, which cannot be surgically 
extricated without crippling her. This displaced diamond plays a fundamental role in the 
story of not just her gestation, but also her birth: Stella is born during a winter storm that 
lasted an entire week, on a sled driven by six huskies, in the middle of a snow-abandoned 
downtown Manhattan. In pursuit of his lost wife and almost-born daughter, Ishmael 
follows the glow emanating from the diamond in Uta’s belly. He tells her: “I was able to 
find you because you were radiant” (92).  
 As Elizabeth D. Harvey observes in her essay “Anatomies of Rapture: Clitoral 
Politics/Medical Blazons,” the description of a pregnant belly which “shone with light” 
(91) indicates the ways in which this rogue diamond is transformed through bodily 
processes into the cosmological: “The correspondence between GUTs (Grand Unified 
Theories) that would explain the universe and the body, its internal gut, is played upon 
throughout the novel, most obviously in the swallowing of diamonds (compacted in the 
earth’s entrails) that are metaphorically converted (digested) into cosmological signs 
(lights, stars)” (340 fn 20). Stella also acknowledges the connection between her own 
disruptive body and the macro of the universe: “On the night I was born the sky was 
punched with stars. Diamonds deep in the earth’s crust. Diamonds deep in the stellar 
wall. As above, so below. Uniting carbon mediated in my gem-stole body” (Winterson 
187). As she herself recognizes, Stella — whose name corresponds with the Latin word 
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for “star” — is the very embodiment of Paracelsus’s central argument that “as above, so 
below” (2). 
 As above, so below: “the zodiac in the sky is imprinted in the body” (2). The 
novel’s focus on star-dust as a preexisting and virtual force that impacts the body’s shape 
and form is consistent with Grosz’s own notion of impersonal or pre-personal forces, as 
explained in Time Travels: Feminism, Nature, Power, which views both the psychical 
and social aspects of subjectivity as “two different directions or orientations of [...] the 
same forces that regulate the natural world as well as cultural life” (188). For Grosz, 
impersonal forces include but are not limited to material, gravitational, electrical, “star-
dust”: these often imperceptible forces intervene, operating in and through space-time, as 
they “play themselves out and impinge on each other as well as subjects” (181). She is 
clear that there is no one force: force is always multiple, plural, unique, contestatory. 
Demonstrating a Nietzschian will-to-power, they compete and collide with one another, 
and, simultaneously, make connections; Grosz describes force as not only that which 
“produces competition and struggle between forces functioning in the same sphere and 
level, but it is also that which produces relations of alignment, cooperation, and tension 
between forces function at different levels” (188). She further clarifies that these forces 
are not the effects of a subject, nor are they its “intentional object”; however, while they 
exist outside of the subject, they are still the cause of the subject’s actualization. Thus, 
these forces should no longer be overlooked. As Grosz contends, we need to 
acknowledge “the formative, productive role of inhuman forces which constitute the 
human as such and provide the conditions and means by which it may overcome itself” 
(186).  
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 In Time Travels, Grosz also sets about proposing her ontology “not of subjects 
and their desires, but of forces and actions which produce subjects and pleasures as their 
crystallized forms” (186, emphasis in original). This is just one aspect of a larger and 
more determinately Deleuzian project, as the ontology that Grosz wishes to develop is 
one of becoming — how we become through force, and how our desiring process and 
capacity to experience pleasure is affected by pre-personal forces (186). As she later 
notes, Deleuze’s version of desire “functions as a primarily mobile and mobilizing 
impetus, a force of connections: of those conjunctions and disjunctions that form 
provisional ‘entities’ and groupings, not so much functioning ‘against’ power as entwined 
in modes of stratification or deterritorialization. Pleasure and desire [...] are force” (192). 
Deleuze removes desire from the biological discourse which has served as a justification 
for heteronormativity, arguing that sexuality is not so much about reproduction as it is 
about production: constantly connecting and disconnecting in an ongoing nomadic chain 
of infinite links, desire continually makes the body anew. Alongside his frequent 
collaborator, Félix Guattari, Deleuze states in A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and 
Schizophrenia (1980) that “the fabric of the rhizome is the conjunction, ‘and ... and ...  
and ...’ This conjunction carries enough force to shake and uproot the verb ‘to be’” (27). 
Instead of creating a concrete or stable sexual identity, desire is one rhizome machine 
among many other machines that assemble the continually assembling body, a body that 
can never be fully organized or sedimented: the BwO.  
 The BwO is itself an assemblage that is always in a state of becoming; it is never 
a whole, but is rather composed of discrete elements that are often reterritorialized by 
another assemblage, which makes an entirely new connection and thus changes the 
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BwO’s form again and again, in ways that reflect Alice’s statement that “we are and we 
are not our bodies” (Winterson 162). My own interest in the Deleuzian BwO can be 
pinpointed to the potentialities inherent in not being our bodies while still remaining a 
body. As Grosz points out, the BwO denaturalizes the idea of the concrete, fixed body by 
placing it “in direct relations with the flows or particles of other bodies or things” 
(Volatile Bodies 168), and I argue that this denaturalization of what it means to have a 
body serves to negate the inscriptions which have proved instrumental in “cordoning” or 
regimenting the subject into “straightness.”  
 BwOs are comprised of desiring machines operating across the entire virtual 
dimension, or what Deleuze and Guattari refer to as the plane of immanence. The plane 
of immanence encompasses everything: the entire, complex network of forces and 
connections and “star-dust” that cause the BwO to become.32 Although “plane” suggests 
a surface, this plane is rather an ongoing depth, comprising “relations of movement and 
rest, speed and slowness between unformed elements, or at least between elements that 
are relatively unformed, molecules, and particles of all kinds. There are only haecceities, 
affects, subjectless individuations that constitute collective assemblages” (Thousand 
Plateaus 266). These collective assemblages are symbiotic, co-functioning; they are 
                                               
 
32 In his work Spinoza: Practical Philosophy (1988), Deleuze speaks about Spinoza’s 
influence on his formulation of the plane of immanence: “Everyone knows the first 
principle of Spinoza: one substance for all attributes. But we also know the third, fourth, 
or fifth principle: one Nature for all bodies, one Nature for all individuals, a Nature that is 
itself an individual varying in an infinite number of ways. What is involved is no longer 
the affirmation of a single substance, but rather the laying out of a common plane of 
immanence in which all bodies, all minds, and all individuals are situated” (122). The 
translator also here points out that the French word “plan” covers virtually all meanings 
of the English “plan” and “plane.”  
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continually taking on new forms as a result of new couplings or alliances with other 
partial objects, both material and immaterial, both human and non. It is this collection of 
potentials that serves to form the always-still-in-progress BwO, a body that is stretched 
across an infinite molecular, rhizomatic movement. The local and the cosmic, the micro 
and the macro, all different but undifferentiated: “As above, so below” (Winterson 2). 
The BwO, then, serves as a contrast to the “notion of unity or oneness” that the 
heteronormative model views as the ultimate goal, as the desiring-machine does “not 
belong to either an original totality that has been lost or one which finalizes it or 
completes it, a telos [...] It is fundamentally nomadic not teleological, meandering, 
creative, nonrepetitive, proliferative, unpredictable” (Grosz Volatile Bodies 168).  
 Rosi Braidotti’s theory of nomadism, which she developed through her reading of 
Deleuze, proposes that we shift our emphasis from bios to zoes (non-human life), which 
will allow us to begin “discarding old, phallogocentric modes of thinking about life” 
(“Affirming the Affirmative” 21). Alice’s own research leads her to nomadism, as she 
comes to believe that there is no real differentiation between anything: “The separateness 
of our lives is a sham. Physics, mathematics, music, painting, my politics, my love for 
you, my work, the star-dust of my body, the spirit that impels it, clocks diurnal, time 
perpetual, the roll, rough, tender, swamping, liberating, breathing, moving, thinking, 
nature, human nature and the cosmos are patterned together” (Winterson 98). With this 
declaration, she opens herself to the possibilities made manifest by the BwO, fulfilling 
Deleuze and Guattari’s outline of how the subject might transform — by moving the 
body beyond the identity categories that attempt to stratify the subject’s experience of 
desire:   
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This is how it should be done. Lodge yourself on a stratum, experiment with 
the opportunities it offers find an advantageous place on it, find potential 
movements of deterritorialization, possible lines of flight, experience them, 
produce flow conjunctions here and there, try out continua of intensities 
segment by segment, have a small plot of new land at all times. It is through a 
meticulous relation with the strata that one succeeds in freeing lines of flight, 
causing conjugated flows to pass and escape and bringing forth continuous 
intensities for a BwO. (Thousand Plateaus 161) 
 
As Grosz claims, Deleuze and Guattari do not evacuate corporeality “of all psychical 
interiority,” nor does the BwO signify “a kind of blanket rewriting or remapping of the 
body” (Volatile Bodies 169). It is instead “a scene, a place, or even a support upon which 
something comes to pass [...] It is not a space nor is it in space; it is matter that occupies 
space to a given degree — to the degree corresponding to the intensities produced. It is 
non-stratified, unformed, intense matter” (Thousand Plateaus 169). Like Deleuze and 
Guattari’s BwO, Alice comes to recognize that “our place in the universe and the place of 
the universe in us, is proving to be one of active relationship” (Winterson 98). 
 In their treatment of materiality, Deleuzian nomadism and quantum physics 
collide; in both fields of thought, matter emerges in the flows of reified wave oscillations. 
Alice parallels both the plane of immanence and quantum theory when she states that “at 
a subatomic level, matter does not exist, with certainty, in definite places, rather it has a 
tendency to exist. At the sub-atomic level, our seeming-solid material world dissolves 
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into wave-like patterns of probabilities, and these patterns do not represent probabilities 
of things but probabilities of connection” (161). In his work Organs Without Bodies: 
Deleuze and Consequence (2004), Slavoj Žižek also forges a connection between 
Deleuze and the field of physics by asking an important “what if?”: 
 
What if, instead of conceiving waves as oscillations between elements, 
elements are just knots, contact points, between different waves and their 
oscillations? Does this not give some kind of scientific credibility to Deleuze’s 
“idealist” project of generating bodily reality from virtual intensities? [...] In 
quantum physics, reality itself, the density of matter, is reduced to the collapse 
of the virtuality of wave oscillations (or, in the general theory of relativity, 
matter is reduced to an effect of space’s curvature). [...] If we accept the claim 
of quantum physics that the reality we experience as constituted emerges out of 
a preceding field of virtual intensities which are, in a way, “immaterial” 
(quantum oscillations), then embodied reality is the result of the “actualization” 
of pure event-like virtualities. (24, 25) 
 
Here, Žižek links corporeality with these “quantum oscillations,” implying that the body 
is not actually concrete in a substantial or tangible way, but is rather comprised of virtual 
energies that serve to actualize matter — but never to ossify it.    
 Alice contemplates the ways in which theoretical physicist Stephen Hawking’s 
work with wave functions might also reveal bodies to be made up of immaterial 
intensities. As she argues, in accepting his idea that the entire universe should be treated 
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as a “wave function, both specifically located and infinite, then that function is the sum of 
all possible universes, dead, alive, multiple, simultaneous, interdependent, co-existing. 
Moreover, ‘we’ and the sum universe cannot be separated in the way of the old Cartesian 
dialectic of ‘I’ and ‘World’. Observer and observed are part of the same process” 
(Winterson 162). To be measured as a wave function is to be “unlimited by the 
boundaries of [...] bodies,” a suggestion which also aptly characterizes the BwO (161). 
The observer and observed, self and other, are one and the same, no longer separated by 
an economy rooted in difference and lack. As Grosz proposes, this is a provocative 
notion:  
 
Rethinking the concept of subject and the subject/object relations in terms of 
force means profound transformations in all related concepts — of objects, of 
the social, of action and agency. It is no longer a subject that takes before it an 
object on which to enact its desire or will; rather, forces act through subjects, 
objects, material and social worlds without distinction, producing relations of 
intensity of force. They constitute an inhuman, subhuman field, a field of 
“particles” or elements of force which are only provisionally or temporarily 
grouped together in the form of entities and actions. (Time Travels 189) 
 
For Grosz, the division between subject and object is nullified, as they are essentially 
connected by what is imperceptible to them both: forces that are above, below, and 
beyond their individual control (168). These are forces that “precondition gender and 
bodies,” but it is ultimately impossible to contain them entirely through discourse, to turn 
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them into matter that can be articulated (172). Matter as solid, impermeable mass, is a 
foundational element of a patriarchal and heteronormative imaginary which both 
institutes and requires the narrative of the normal, fixed-in-place body; we will soon see 
how both Jove and David come to represent this dynamic. For her part, Stella aligns 
herself with Alice’s version of matter, stating: “Matter is provisional and that includes 
me. Matter has at best a tendency to exist, and will, it seems, divide infinitely because 
there is no there there. There are vibrations, relationships, possibilities and out of these is 
formed our real life” (Winterson 207). What is really at stake here, then, is matter itself: 
not as something tangible, but as force, as energy.   
 
V. Gendering the Matter of “energy precedes matter” 
 Scientist Alice considers her own matter to be almost phantasmical in the virtual-
ness of it, for “[i]f gross matter is reducible to atoms, and the atom itself subject to 
unending division, then the reality of matter is conceptual” (172). Stella, the poet and 
Tarot card enthusiast, adopts a different approach; although she cannot see what is not 
present, she still feels a presence, a haunting of something still quite there. Influenced 
from an early age by her father’s preoccupation with Kabbalist rituals, Stella believes the 
pea-sized stone swallowed to the base of her in-utero spine is alive inside of her: that 
even inhuman objects are alive, as “the current that flows each to each is live” (83). Even 
knowledge lives, according to the ancient text of the Torah, in which “the Hebrew ‘to 
know,’ often used in a sexual context, is not about facts but about connections. 
Knowledge, not as accumulation but as charge and discharge. A release of energy from 
one site to another” (83). Unlike both Alice and Jove, Stella therefore sees no point in 
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gathering knowledge like a taxonomist collects insects as knowledge is not a physical 
object but part of a series of intangible movements. She is far more interested in what 
cannot be pinned down, a Deleuzian-like “dance” of “patterns, rhythms, multiplicities, 
paradoxes, shifts, currents, cross-currents, irregularities, irrationalities, geniuses, joints, 
pivots” (83).   
 Coming as she does from a Jewish background, “from a people to whom the 
invisible world is everyday,” Stella is from the start aligned with unseeable, metaphysical 
forces (44). Indeed, as she begins to fall in love with Alice, Stella conflates her former 
rival with the forces of space-time: “Stars in your eyes, the infinity of you, the galaxy of 
my girl that I explore” (174). Even in her initial anger, Stella never perceives Alice in an 
overtly material way. For instance, when Stella first discovers that Jove has been 
unfaithful, she searches for traces of Alice in their now-violated marital home. She 
literally “guts” the master bedroom with her “radioactive hands”: unhinging the bathroom 
door from the wall, severing the bed’s frame and “disemboweling” the mattress (29, 30). 
It is a necessary act for Stella, who believes Alice remains in the room, particles of her 
body still permeating the space: “Where was she? Under the carpet? Pressed between the 
glass and the window frame? I was breathing her. Her dust, her molecules, the air was fat 
with her, the droppings and gatherings of a living body” (31). Alice need not be a 
tangible, physical object. Atoms of Alice left behind, the force of her energy still 
circulating, is what matters to Stella: it precedes matter. Like Alice, Stella treats the 
human body as an assemblage of other virtualities that comprise to make it part of 
everything else. Jasbir Puar’s reading of bodies as assemblage echoes Stella’s view: “We 
leave traces of our DNA everywhere we go, we live with other bodies within us, 
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microbes and bacteria, we are enmeshed in forces, affects, energies, we are composites of 
information” (57). 
 However, Jove takes a far more sensible stance on materiality, and admits that he 
is made anxious by Stella’s lack of investment in the concrete or “real” world: 
 
All of us have fantasies, dreams. A healthy society outlets those things into 
sport, hero-worship, harmless adultery, rock climbing, the movies. Unhealthy 
individuals understand their dreams and fantasies as something solid. An 
alternative world. They do not know how to subordinate their disruptive 
elements to a regulated order. My wife believed that she had a kind of interior 
universe as valid and as necessary as her day-to-day existence in reality. This 
failure to make a hierarchy, this failure to recognize the primacy of fact, 
justified her increasingly subjective responses. She refused to make a clear 
distinction between inner and outer. She had no sure grasp either of herself or 
herself in relation to the object. At first I mistook this pathology as the ordinary 
feminine. (190-1) 
 
It is worth noting here that Jove misdiagnoses this “pathology” as the “ordinary 
feminine” as both of the primary female characters in the novel appear to share this same 
belief, that “energy precedes matter” (19, 83). In her work The Science Question in 
Feminism (1986), Sandra Harding asserts that “men’s dominating position in social life 
results in partial and perverse understandings, whereas women’s subjugated position 
provides the possibility of more complete and less perverse understandings” (Harding 
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26); Jove himself never sways from his own self-assured conviction that “matter is 
matter” (Winterson 191). Here, gender becomes a critical nexus in terms of how subjects 
perceive their own relation to their surroundings, their position in space-time. Jove 
remains indebted and therefore chained to a narrative that requires the fixed materiality of 
bodies; his privileged position in the Symbolic is sanctioned through the solid, knowable, 
definable matter of his body. 
 However, Jove comes to feel his masculinity under threat when Alice and Stella 
not only begin engaging in an affair of their own, but also remove his sex from the 
equation entirely. Alice describes the arrangement as such: “Jove and I continue to work 
together, Stella and I made love together, and once a week Jove and Stella met for 
dinner” (128). Jove has essentially become the outcast of his own creation, for as he 
confesses to Alice he was responsible for orchestrating Alice and Stella’s initial meeting. 
He had grown bored with his affair with Alice and with Stella’s not-knowing about his 
affair with Alice. So he posed as Alice and wrote a letter to Stella confessing her status as 
mistress, and he posed as Stella to write a letter to Alice and waited for their reaction. He 
followed them the night they met, spying on them first at the Algonquin Hotel, then 
watching them dine at his mother’s trattoria, and finally observing them slip back to the 
hotel only to reappear the next morning. That was a surprise for him, but one that he had 
hoped for: that his game would become a ménage à trois. And it did, but one that very 
quickly spun out of his control — although certainly, it is a testament to his arrogance 
that he thought he would be able to puppet-master their threesome. 
 Jove does not take his ejection lightly, and began to “insist on the rights of his 
penis; that is, he has fucked Stella and Alice and ought to be allowed to continue to do 
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so” (130). Although Jove is no longer included in the sexual component of their 
triangulation, they still congregate once a month over Chinese takeaway, “to discuss the 
finer points of [their] triune romance” (129). The meetings typically dissolve into a battle 
of wits between Jove and Stella, while Alice meekly stands by, occasionally interrupting 
with offers to make coffee. At one point, Jove smirks down towards his genitals and 
declares that he is “big enough” for the two of them; as Alice observes, he remains 
“obsessed by the size of his member” (131). He attempts to position his erection, which 
despite being an atheist he calls “the physics of God,” as the anchor of their love triangle. 
However, the truth of the matter is that his penis no longer matters at all to either Alice or 
Stella (27). 
 Jove does not just use his symbolic association with the phallus to assert his 
masculinity, but also the power he obtains from his status as “the future” of physics — 
again underscoring the connection between sex and power first demonstrated in the novel 
by David when he received the promotion that earned him the right to his wife’s body 
(15). In her article “Science Fictions: British Women Scientists and Jeanette Winterson’s 
Gut Symmetries,” Ann McClennan observes that although Jove’s research claims 
 
[…] to illustrate that “our place in the universe and the place of the universe in 
us, is proving to be one of active relationships,” his refusal to accept other 
approaches to the world (i.e., his wife, Stella’s, metaphysical feminism) 
reinforces the fact that his own approach to Superstring Theory — not 
necessarily the theory itself — is hierarchical, and therefore, masculine in 
nature (99). He seems more interested in power than in discovery; and his 
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pursuit of and interest in Superstring Theory results more from his personal 
interest in discovering the one ‘true’ theory underlying the cosmos. (1069) 
 
Jove continues to adopt a masculine position, by viewing himself as “objective” and 
Stella as “pathological”; in his opinion, his brand of physics is the “honest science” while 
any other (feminized) kind is “not science at all. Call it alchemy, astrology, spoon-
bending, wishful thinking” (Winterson 191). As Jaén notes, this statement functions to 
belittle his poet wife, who claims to understand the world in ways that go beyond the 
limits of empirical reasoning (Jaén 157). It is her disinterest in empirical reason that Jove 
distrusts, viewing her as lacking what McClennan defines as a “sure grasp of herself or 
herself in relation to the object” (McClennan 1070). 
 And yet, Stella can actually see herself in relation to not just other objects, but 
also subjects — as made evident by her relationship with Alice — and, therefore, she 
succeeds where Jove does not: for like the explicitly phallocentric narrative that 
dominates the majority of the relationships in the novel, Jove’s research interests are, in 
fact, also primarily concerned with the quest for wholeness. For instance, his early work 
in GUTs seeks “to unite the strong, weak, and electromagnetic quanta in a sympathetic 
symmetry that would include gravity” (Winterson 97, emphasis my own). Existing as a 
metaphor for the novel’s central love triangle, these forces are mirrored by Jove, Alice, 
and Stella, who are consistently presented as arrogant, uncertain, and charismatic (or 
[electro]magnetic), respectively. Alice herself acknowledges the symmetries between 
their romantic entanglement at the micro level and the GUT at the macro: “Difficulties 
begin when these three separate forces are arbitrarily welded together. His wife, his 
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mistress, met” (97, emphasis in original). However, although Jove may seek credit for 
bringing Alice and Stella together, demanding to be rewarded with sex, Jove does not 
actually want to be welded to anyone else. As already made evident in the novel’s 
depiction of his relationship with Alice, he is only capable of integrating the other into 
the self rather than releasing himself into the other. His marriage to Stella is no different. 
As Chloë Taylor Merleau observes, Stella comes to view the terms of their marital vows 
as “a blood transfusion between two persons, one whom receives the blood while the 
other is bled to death” (97). Jove would rather “annex than merge,” a co-opting that 
comes to its violent apex when he and Stella are lost at sea for several weeks (98). Jove 
literally absorbs Stella into his own body by eating her, an act of cannibalism, which as 
Kevin Dwyer has argued, serves as “a metaphor for patriarchy in crisis” (Dwyer 265). 
 As Jove explains, he did not really want to cannibalize his wife: “I had to do it. 
She was dead. She was nearly dead or I would not have done it. If I had not done it she 
would have died anyway. I did it because I had to. What else could I have done?” 
(Winterson 189, 191, 194, 196). Indeed, not only does his narration open and close with 
this statement, but he reiterates this exact phrasing an additional two times throughout the 
short chapter. However, Jove’s compulsive repetition is not merely a response to the 
trauma of the situation, but rather achieves a persuasive function; in order to carry the 
grisly act, he must convince himself of its necessity. Repetition here works to solidify his 
rationale, emblematic of the extent to which the patriarchal, heteronormative model relies 
on performative reiteration to sustain its consumption of female bodies — a consumption 
that is wholly necessary for its survival.  
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 As Jove begins to carve into Stella’s body, he justifies the unjustifiable by 
appropriating the conditions of their marital contract: “She was my wife. I was her 
husband. We were one flesh. With my body I thee worship. In sickness and in health. For 
better or for worse. Till death do us part. I parted the flesh from the bone and I ate it” 
(196). In her work Transgressing Boundaries in Jeanette Winterson’s Fiction (1996), 
Sonia Front notes the obvious attempt to assert the husband’s “rightful” ownership and 
incorporation by way of cannibalism, an act which ironically parodies the biblical “bone 
of my bone … flesh of my flesh” (Gen 2:23). Jove absolves himself of the filleting of his 
wife, with the excuse that they are technically “one flesh” anyway; as Front notes, here 
he makes his “final attempt to reinstate his patriarchal ownership” of his wife (Front 
123). There is another parallel to be drawn here between violence and sex, as directly 
prior to this attack, Jove initiates intercourse with Stella. Although they are both delirious 
with hunger and fatigue, Jove holds a romanticized view of the event: “We had made 
love. We were close that night” (Winterson 194). His account is markedly estranged from 
Stella’s own description: “Stumbling together, we half fell, half climbed, up the steps to 
the deck. He gripped me, his prick straight in, the swollen saltiness of it dirty in my dirt. I 
was dry and cracked, unwashed, closed. I had a weeping rash on my inner thighs” (185). 
It is, according to Stella, a painful and unsolicited encounter. Moreover, his eyes and 
teeth seemed “wolfish” to her in ways that recall Charles Perrault’s Little Red Riding 
Hood, a children’s fable in which a woman’s body is also sacrificed to the predatory 
appetites of a male. 
 Part of Jove’s ability to rationalize his actions comes from an unwillingness to see 
himself as he truly is. In the novel’s most sinister scene, Jove describes picking up 
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Stella’s weak “doll-like-dead” body and then dropping it so that her head splits against 
the planks. She must be unconscious before he makes his first incision, “like a surgeon, 
not a butcher” (195). That he compares himself to a surgeon rather than a butcher is 
indicative of the distorted ways in which he views his own horrific actions; he has not 
turned savage with hunger, but makes his cuts “with dignity” suggesting an intelligence 
and a sensitivity not typically associated with cannibalism (195). After all, Jove is, as his 
own self-serving narration continually serves to remind readers, a highly educated man. 
However, upon Alice’s arrival alongside the search party, readers are once again treated 
to an altogether different version of Jove. Stella is found unconscious, lying in a pool of 
her own blood with pieces of her buttock and hip missing; it is an image so traumatic, so 
gruesome, that Alice’s body physically rejects it. Moments after she vomits, she bears 
witness to Jove, emerging from the innards of the boat: “Jove dragged himself up out of 
the cabin, his upper lip and chin bearded with blood. In his hand he had a filleting knife. 
He saw me, terror, horror, unbelief, relief, and fainted” (208).  
 Unfortunately, upon recovery, Jove fails to learn any sort of redemptive lesson 
from what has happened but instead chooses to omit it from his narrative. Alice visits him 
in the hospital and sees him “surrounded by Italian nurses listening to his extraordinary 
story of survival, which did not include eating his wife” (215). In her work Nomadic 
Subjects: Embodiment and Sexual Difference in Contemporary Feminist Theory (1994), 
Braidotti, building on the work of Luce Irigaray and Julia Kristeva, calls this kind of 
omission a form of “metaphysical cannibalism”: “It’s on the woman’s body — on her 
absence, her silence, her silence, her disqualification — that phallocentric discourse 
rests” (266). Jove thus becomes a synecdoche of a patriarchy that requires not only the 
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continued absorption of female flesh, but also the blatant disregard of anything that might 
disrupt its narrative.  
 The trope of cannibalism is presaged earlier in the novel, when upon her 
discovery of Jove’s infidelity Stella imagines devouring his mistress: “Give me a pot and 
let me turn cannibal. I will feast on her with a greater delight than he. [...] I will eat her 
slowly to make her last longer. Whatever he has done I will do. Did he eat her? Then so 
will I. And spit her out” (Winterson 29). Although this serves the purpose of 
foreshadowing Jove’s own actions, it also sets up another vital distinction between Jove 
and Stella: Stella does not actually eat Alice, but rather, spits her out. She thus lays no 
claim to her rival-turned-lover’s body, while Jove’s cannibalizing implicitly analogizes 
the heteronormative couplings in the novel in which the female is ingested, an “eating” 
which allows her male partner to absorb and therefore erase the potentially disruptive 
aspects of her otherness. In Jove’s case, it is Stella’s belief in energy preceding matter 
that intrigued and alarmed him simultaneously. He is attracted to her magnetism, that she 
is “wide awake in a sleeping world” (190, 192). At the same time, her “mystical 
disposition” poses a threat to his own belief in reason; for him, “there is nothing mystical 
about the universe. There are things we cannot explain yet. That is all” (191). That 
Stella’s intuition frightens him is demonstrated in his declaration that the rest of the world 
— including himself — “is not ready to wake up yet”; he wishes that she had “let 
sleeping dogs lie” (192). He wants Stella “to be quiet, that was all, for both [their] sakes” 
and so he picks her up “as she was, still talking” and drops her head against the planks of 
the boat (193).  
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 Jove is unnerved by Stella’s volatile energy precisely because his experience of 
the world depends heavily on what is material, what is tangible. He fears nothing more 
than the unknowable, represented here by the most unknowable element of all: his own 
death. Confronted with its possibility, Jove’s response is to retain a sense of his own 
concreteness by testing the boundaries of his corporeality. As he states: “I kept my sanity 
by making little cuts in my arm with a filleting knife. As long as it hurt, I was real, I was 
alive” (194). Not only does his self-mutilation provide Jove with the illusion that he is 
entirely in control of the situation, it simultaneously re-situates him back into the material 
container of his body; the solid dimensions that frame his experience serve to guarantee 
his own impenetrable subjectivity. His cannibalism evidences another response: when 
faced with the prospect of its dissolution, Jove seeks to augment his matter, to have more 
than what can be taken away by eating his wife. His consumption of Stella is 
representative of his attitude that matter is equated with life, while energy connotes death. 
Indeed, for him Stella personifies both energy and death, a living and breathing 
embodiment of his fear of the unknown. 
 
VI. Stratifying, Destratifying, and the Flows of Desire 
 Much like Jove, Alice’s father also exhibits an avowed fear of nothingness, which 
manifests in his deep-rooted dissatisfaction and subsequent depression. However, he 
differs from Jove in that he has two identities that cannot be easily reconciled: the 
working-class “thug” from the seaside town of Mersy and the respectable, profitable 
businessman that he becomes. He never truly fits into either role, and finds himself lost in 
the middle of the “man and his mask”; Alice states that her father died long before his 
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actual death, and the man left behind is nothing more than a “counterfeit” who “wears his 
clothes” (54). Clothing, as Alice recognizes, plays a large role in David’s attempts to 
concretize a more stable, knowable identity for himself. His work attire, for instance, 
appears to save him “from the disruptive forces of depth”; nonetheless, although his 
“pressure suit” might serve to frame his body, the skin underneath becomes “secret even 
to himself” (144, 148). David takes advantage of his wife’s wardrobe as well, believing 
that “if his wife were part of him so were her clothes. She was his rib and as such he too 
wore a silk shift. He loved her clothes, loved to see her dressed up, it satisfied a part of 
him that was deeper than vanity. It was a part of himself” (58).  
 “Deeper than vanity” suggests an unconscious desire to build up the solid 
dimensions he felt were missing. Unlike Jove, David struggles to conceal his suspicion: 
that there is nothing knowable or concrete beneath the garments after all. For instance, he 
also likes to perform magic tricks as a hobby, which signifies an underlying recognition 
of a spectral, illusory world — as a magician, it is a world over which he can express 
some control. However, David ultimately becomes “his own conjuring trick: the 
impression of something solid when what was solid had vanished away. He had become 
his clothes. He had become his job” (159). Upon apprehending that he still possesses an 
“impossible lack” despite his best attempts to clothe it, he holds his new babe Alice in 
front of the mirror and conflates their reflections, absorbing her into himself. He was 
“anxious, intent, gazing at [Alice] as if [she] could reveal to him what he was” (60). Like 
Jove, he too is willing to ingest the other in order to build up the psychic armour that his 
clothes could not.  
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 Jove and David’s various attempts to protect their corporeal boundaries from 
dismantlement are, of course, futile. David begins to “corrode inside” his suit, but 
“[f]ixedly gazing ahead, [he] pretends not to notice. He did not notice that the sun on the 
sun-dial told a different story than the one he was telling himself” (144-5). Directly prior 
to the chapter describing David’s passing, aptly titled after the Tarot card Death, the 
novel includes a short story that breaks the narrative for a brief two pages. The parable 
describes three friends who have boarded the Ship of Fools, setting out on a quest to find 
gold, wives, and that which cannot be found. Successful in their first two missions, and 
with their boat loaded down with riches and women, they arrive at their third objective 
only to discover that what cannot be found has found them: 
 
They heard a noise behind them like a scythe cutting the water and when they 
looked round they saw a ship thin as a blade gaining towards them. The figure 
rowed it standing up, with one oar, but it was not an oar. They saw the curve of 
the metal flashing, first this side, then that. They saw the rower throw back his 
hood. They saw him beckon to them and the world tilted. The sea poured away. 
Who are they with fish and starfish in their hair? (141, emphasis in original)33 
 
Here we circle back to the novel’s extensive water imagery, aligning death with outside 
forces that exceed corporeality. In The Nick of Time, Grosz acknowledges that matter 
                                               
 
33 The same story appears in Winterson’s book of short stories, The World and Other 
Places (1999). 
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“and along with it, life, is finite, [...] always outstripped and overcome by the (infinite) 
passage of time. Time is an active force, not reducible to the forces of matter, which 
nevertheless confronts both life and matter as their internal limit” (114). Jove and David 
refuse to confront this reality as a result of their masculine association with mastery: 
namely, their perceived mastery of bodies that matter. Masculinity is therefore 
particularly resistant to the unbinding realities of space-time.  
 However, Jove and David’s reliance on materiality is not necessarily a gendered 
trait, as Stella’s father, Ishmael, demonstrates with his uprooting of the binary separating 
matter from space-time: like Alice and Stella, he too believes that energy precedes 
matter. His involvement with Kabbalah provides yet another fruitful connection to 
Paracelsus; paralleling the alchemist’s theory that “as above, so below,” followers of the 
esoteric Jewish sect believe “[e]very blade of grass that grows here on earth has its 
corresponding in the stars” (Winterson 2, 77). Ishmael further forges a bridge between 
Kabbalism and Deleuzian nomadism with his own interest in theoretical physics. As 
Stella relates: 
 
He had been close to Werner Heisenberg whose strange notions of 
simultaneous absence and presence of matter had stimulated Papa into 
investigations of his own. In the paradoxes of Kabbalah he found the paradoxes 
of new physics. When Heisenberg told him that every object can be understood 
as a point (finite, bounded, specific) and as a wave function (spreading 
infinitely though concentrated at different rates), Papa wanted to discover 
whether or not he could move himself along his own wave function, at will, 
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whilst alive in his body. If gross matter is reducible to atoms, and the atom 
itself subject to unending division, then the reality of matter is conceptual. 
(168) 
 
Heisenberg’s proposal equips Ishmael with the idea that one must not be afraid that 
matter will cease to exist upon the subject’s recognition that the matter of its body is 
reducible, divisible and conceptual. Ishmael here represents the assemblages of the BwO. 
Life and death do not matter because assemblages cannot die. They can only break down, 
but this breaking down is actually a necessity; in order for movement to endure, the 
various segments of assemblages must continually be dismantling and attaching to other 
continually dismantling and attaching segments of assemblages.  
 In attempting to concretize the matter of the bodies, Jove and David continually 
stratify which only ends up prohibiting them from connecting with the other, causing 
their subsequent inability to unify. Ishmael, on the other hand, actively pursues the 
deterritorialization of his own materiality. Stella explains her father’s interest in religion: 
“The method of Kabbalah is to free the individual from conceptual frameworks, which 
are all and always provisional. Could Papa escape himself by himself? Could he be his 
own gateway?” (168). She provides an account of Ishmael’s ritual: he would wait 
patiently for a full moon, retreat to a dark room above his bookstore and holding onto 
glowing topaz stones, he half-sang and half-chanted so that “a thin wire of sound 
[connected] him to the encircling light, the Or Makif, that must be drawn in” (81). 
Hebrew for “Encompassing Light,” Or Makif is a garment of light that encircles Ishmael, 
facilitating the interaction between his interior energy (or soul, in Kabbalist terms) and 
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his exterior surroundings (Pinson 56-8). This light disrupts the corporeal boundary by 
transforming it: blanketing Ishmael, becoming the skin through which his sensory 
capacities experience the physical world. Unlike David’s clothes, this new skin, however, 
is not concrete or material but intangible, eluding touch. Thus, it is no longer a concrete 
barrier but blurred and indefinite, allowing Ishmael’s soul to feel its mergings with the 
plane of immanence (temporarily, at least). 
 Ishmael’s specific interpretation of Kabbalism takes part in the same inquisitive 
quest as Jove’s GUTs; both are searching for the unity of the one, for a BwO that has no 
boundaries. Jove, who dismissively refers to his father-in-law as a “wild man,” refuses to 
forsake his materiality (Winterson 190). Ishmael, on the other hand, forsakes it too much. 
The BwO refuses to organize or stratify the body (and its organs) into a coherent, 
recognizable property, but there is always the danger of going too far. In Volatile Bodies, 
Grosz distinguishes between a healthy BwO and an empty one. A “healthy” one, as she 
affirms, possesses only the amount of cohesion necessary to prevent annihilation (171). 
Ishmael loses track of the material altogether. For instance, in his desire to “see as much 
as it was possible to see while inside the limitations of reality” he often engages in fasts, 
depriving his body of essential nutrients (Winterson 178). He also admits to Stella that he 
had been “experimenting to increase his body’s revolutions” — whether or not this 
accounts for the rare form of cancer that he develops, which doubled the normal cardiac 
cycle and hurtled his blood “at waterfall rate” through his body, remains unclear (168, 
167). He decides to curtail the disease by taking his own life, bleeding himself out in a 
galvanized bathtub. However, according to Deleuze and Guattari, dismantling the 
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organism never meant killing it but rather allowing the body to become open “to 
connections that presuppose an entire assemblage” (Thousand Plateaus 177): 
 
You have to keep enough of the organism for it to reform each dawn […] You 
don’t reach the BwO and its plane of consistency by wildly destratifying. […] 
If you free it with too violent an action, if you blow apart the strata without 
taking precautions, then instead of drawing the plane you will be killed, 
plunged into a black hole, or even dragged toward catastrophe. Staying 
stratified — organized, signified, subjected — is not the worst that can happen; 
the worst that can happen is if you throw the strata into demented or suicidal 
collapse, which bring them back down on us heavier than ever. (178) 
 
The obsessive nature of Ishmael’s ritualistic practices implies that he wants to experience 
total annihilation of the body, that he believes death will bring him closer to the 
wholeness he seeks. Deleuze and Guattari, however, are careful to avoid “invoking any 
kind of death drive. There are no internal drives in desire, only assemblages. Desire is 
always assembled; it is what the assemblage determines it to be” (253).  
 In terms of Deleuzian philosophies, therefore, Alice and Stella are most 
successful in approximating the unity that David, Jove, and Ishmael all strive to obtain. 
As Dorothea Olkowski clarifies in her article “Flows of Desire and the Body-Becoming,” 
possessing a healthy BwO is not just a body that is “trying to remain fluid,” but is more 
importantly about “resisting the imposition of certain kinds of desiring-machines by the 
social formation of social machines in the midst of a society that wants to limit this body 
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to certain restricted parameters” (109). In Gut Symmetries, Alice only finds relief from 
the violent hierarchy of the heterosexist binary when she stumbles into a relationship with 
Stella, which, as she states, allows her to feel a sense of “authentic desire” for the first 
time (Winterson 120): “The reflecting image of a woman with a woman is seductive. I 
enjoyed looking at her in a way that was forbidden to me, this self on self, self as desirer 
and desired, had a frankness to it I had not been invited to discover. Desiring her I felt my 
own desirability” (119). She further describes the experience of sex with Stella: “I could 
have rested there beside her, perhaps forever, it felt like forever, a mirror confusion of 
bodies and sighs, undifferentiated, she in me, me in she and no longer exhausted by 
someone else’s shape over mine. And I had not expected such intense physical pleasure” 
(119). Grice and Woods assert that Winterson uses “the language of narcissism in order 
to describe Alice and Stella’s mutual gaze” (124); however, the above passage not only 
anticipates the inclination to characterize lesbian sex as narcissistic, but also refutes it.  
As Alice quite adamantly insists, it was not herself that she fell in love with, but Stella 
(Winterson 119).  
 Although Alice is careful to make this distinction between her own self and the 
other, the dichotomy is nonetheless ruptured, as there is no physical separation between 
their bodies. They disintegrate into one another and into their surrounding environment, 
no longer separated by a phallocentric discourse fundamentally founded on difference. 
Alice states of their union: “It was an act of power but not power over her. I was my own 
conquest” (119). As Merleau points out, the “violent trope of cannibalism is […] replaced 
by the orality of lesbian erotics” (Merleau 96): “Her breasts as my breasts her mouth as 
my mouth” (Winterson 121). Here, their relationship is not rooted in a binary; one does 
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not absorb the other to augment the self. Nor is it dependent on possession of the 
concrete, material body and this is precisely what distinguishes Alice’s coupling with 
Stella from the other relationships in the novel. The collapse of concrete corporeal 
surfaces engendered by their assembling means that they are able to fuse with the exterior 
space-time that surrounds them, reflecting the “infant theory of hyperspace, where all the 
seeming dislocations and separations of the atomic and subatomic worlds are unified into 
a co-operating whole” (2). Here the body becomes integrated with its seemingly 
“exterior” surroundings at the most micro level possible: the molecular. 
 
VII. Conclusion 
 To return briefly to the Einsteinian framework invoked at the beginning of my 
close reading, Alice and Stella are assembled to one another not just through the 
connective tissue of their desire, but also from within the forces of space and time — 
collapsing the boundaries between their bodies and between the inside and the outside. At 
the novel’s conclusion, Alice affirms: “I could not fully distinguish which was my 
father/myself, Stella/Uta, whether the distance we imagine separates one event from 
another had folded up, leaving the two clock faces to slide together, plates of time, 
synchronous” (199). In this instance, Gut Symmetries demonstrates the extent to which 
materiality is comprised of continually attaching and detaching assemblages of 
preexisting components. The notion is encapsulated by the basic rudiment of Ishmael’s 
belief, which he imparts to Stella: “Since the beginning of time you and I have been 
sitting here [...] What do you not know that there is in you now, a Caesar, a Raphael, a 
tear of Mozart, the ended bowel problems of Napoleon at Waterloo?” (208). Indeed, this 
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conviction reverberates through each of the narrative’s multifarious layers, as they are 
outlined in the prologue: Time, Universe, Love Affair, New York, Ship of Fools, Jew, 
Diamond, Dream, Working-Class Boy, Baby, River, Matter. All of these narratological 
aspects remain relative to one another, interconnected, always assembling and 
disassembling. In this way, the novel itself takes on the form of a BwO: rather than 
knitting together all of these various assemblages into a linear, cohesive organization, Gut 
Symmetries instead allows them their chaos. 
 In a review entitled “On the High Seas of Romance,” Katy Emck accuses 
Winterson of attempting “to unify a bunch of loosely incompatible ideas about the 
universe” (21). However, I argue that Emck might have misinterpreted the novel’s 
intention; the narrative does not unify anything. Rather, the plot’s various layers overlap 
in way that are messy and confusing and, therefore, the nomadic, rhizomatic form of Gut 
Symmetries actually provides an accurate representation of the way the universe 
functions. The novel’s disorderly structure can be explained by Grosz’s description of the 
underlying state (or lack of state) of all energies:  
 
Chaos is not the absence of order but rather the fullness or plethora that, 
depending on its uneven speed, force, and intensity, is the condition both for 
any model or activity and for the undoing and transformation of such models or 
activities. The concept of chaos is also known or invoked through the concepts 
of: the outside, the real, the virtual, the world, materiality, nature, totality, the 
cosmos, each of which is a narrowing and specification of chaos from a 
particular point of view. Chaos cannot be identified with any one of these 
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terms but is the very condition under which such terms are capable of being 
confused, the point of their overlap and intensification.  (Chaos, Territory, Art 
26-7) 
 
It is certainly not my intention to imply that Gut Symmetries unifies every element in the 
universe and thus achieves the unity of oneness that all of the characters appear to be 
seeking. Rather, I contend that the novel embraces the chaos inherent in space-time 
slippages and energy exchanges, while simultaneously providing a multitude of options 
for re-thinking how the body as we know it has been made to matter. Only then can we 
begin to re-conceive desire, unhooked from the phallocentric, heteronormative “points of 
subjectification” that aim to not only secure those ideologies, but physically “nail us 
down to a dominant reality” (Deleuze and Guattari Thousand Plateaus 177). Gut 
Symmetries refuses to provide a fixed ground but instead focuses its attention on the pre-
personal forces of space, time, and energy, and the connections among disparate 
elements. Although the lack of anything concrete or solid may serve to threaten our 
(gendered) subjectivity, as Alice notes in the novel’s final line, “[w]hatever it is that pulls 
the pin, that hurls you past the boundaries of your own life into a brief and total beauty, 
even for a moment, it is enough” (Winterson 219). 
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CHAPTER THREE 
 
Collapsing the Real/Virtual Binary: Desiring Beyond Bodies in The.PowerBook and 
The Stone Gods 
 
“We think we live in a world of sense-experience and what we can touch 
and feel, see and hear, is the sum of our reality.” — Jeanette Winterson, 
Art Objects: Essays on Ecstasy and Effrontery 
 
 
I. Introduction and Overview of Posthumanism 
 In my first chapter, I examined the interweaving relations among discourse, 
gender, desire, and the body in Written on the Body (1992), and explored the novel’s use 
of fantasy in disentangling these culturally mediated connections. In the second, I 
analyzed the ways in which Gut Symmetries (1997) collapses the discursively constituted 
boundaries of the corporeal through its reconsideration of the energies, atoms, wave 
oscillations, etc. that comprise both the body and its environment. Both novels are 
demonstrative of Winterson’s ongoing interest in virtuality: the dimension of the 
intangible, in which the Kantian “thing-in-itself” or the essence of the thing takes 
precedence over concrete forms, that which cannot be seen but still matters. Winterson’s 
next two novels, The.PowerBook (2000) and The Stone Gods (2007) also engage with 
virtuality, in their explorations of how the rapidly evolving fields of computer science 
and technology can be re-articulated in ways that both disrupt and move beyond 
restrictive identity categories as inscribed upon the corporeal form. By undermining the 
stability of the body, the gendered and heteronormative discourses imprinted upon its 
surface are simultaneously unsettled; this shift in how bodies are perceived can open up 
new possibilities, new ways of experiencing desire and pleasure. Focusing predominantly 
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on the work of Katherine N. Hayles and Donna Haraway, my close reading analyses of 
The.PowerBook and The Stone Gods examines what might happen to desire, not in the 
absence of the body necessarily, but in the absence of its physical there-ness. 
The.PowerBook’s focus on cyberspace is a blend of the fantastical imaginings of Written 
on the Body and Gut Symmetries’ focus on immaterial realms, while The Stone Gods 
envisions a future world wherein technology has all but replaced biology.  
 The.PowerBook takes place mostly online and contains a series of both fictional 
and re-imagined historical stories that are framed by a larger, more conventionally 
realistic narrative; The Stone Gods is situated within the genre of post-apocalyptic science 
fiction. Despite the differences in structure, The.PowerBook and The Stone Gods are each 
representative of a paradigmatic shift that is happening here in the early stages of the 
twenty-first century with the emergence and growing pervasiveness of internet 
technologies. The era of humanism, with its promise of a safe and securely unified 
subjectivity, has been disrupted by an onslaught of recent innovations. We are living in 
what Hayles calls the age of informatics and describes as “the late capitalist mode of 
flexible accumulation; the hardware and software that have merged telecommunications 
with computer technology; and the patterns of living that emerge from and depend upon 
instant transmission of information and access to large data banks” (“Materiality of 
Informatics” 149). The patterns of living detailed here by Hayles have changed in tandem 
with the introduction of the internet; the transference of meaning is now more rapid, 
multifaceted and slippery than ever before. As a result, the humanist version of 
subjectivity has become increasingly prone to destabilization, giving way to 
posthumanism.  
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 Which is not to say that posthumanism did not exist until the inception of the 
internet; in fact, posthumanism has had a long and prolific history, although the date of 
its origination is not generally agreed upon. Computers, artificial intelligence, robots, and 
anything that questions the Enlightenment conception of “humanism…” — the subject 
matter of The.PowerBook and The Stone Gods — have been stirring up cultural anxieties 
since Taylorism and the initiation of mechanized industrialism, according to George 
Canguihelm: “With Frederick Taylor and the first technicians to make scientific studies 
of work-task movements, the human body was measured as if it functioned like a 
machine. […] But the realization that technologically superfluous movements were 
biologically necessary movements was the first stumbling block to be encountered by 
those who insisted on viewing the problem of the human-body-as-machine in exclusively 
technological terms” (Canguihelm 63). Hence, these “posthuman” bodies were a hybrid: 
both human and technological at once.34 Taking a different approach, Rosi Braidotti 
discusses posthumanity in relation to the post-Darwinian case of Dolly the sheep. In 
1996, Dolly was first animal to be cloned with the use of adult somatic cell. She was born 
from three separate mothers: one provided the egg; the other provided DNA; the other, 
the womb. As Braidotti argues in her work The Posthuman (2013), Dolly destabilizes the 
biological narrative, as “simultaneously the last specimen of her species — descended 
                                               
 
34 An excellent example of Taylorism can be found in Henry Ford’s employment of the 
assembly line. Fordism is satirized in the 1921 comedy Modern Times, written and 
directed by the film’s star Charlie Chaplin. In the film, the tramp works for on an ever-
accelerating assembly line, fastening nuts onto pieces of machinery. Unable to keep up 
with the rate of production, he suffers a nervous breakdown that is made figurative by the 
factory’s physical collapse. The machine and the worker becoming one.  
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from the lineage of sheep that were conceived and reproduced as such — and the first 
specimen of a new species: the electronic sheep that Philip K. Dick once imagined, the 
forerunner of the androids society of Blade Runner”: a body without a history (74). 
  Blade Runner is a film based on Dick’s 1968 Do Androids Dream of Electric 
Sheep?, a novel which attempts to redefine humanity in light of the impact of technology 
on the cultural psyche. Braidotti’s citation of Dick is not unexpected; he is often 
considered the (anti-biological) father of literary posthumanism, and critics still marvel at 
his foresight. His decades-old novels anticipate much of the ambivalence concerning 
posthuman cyberculture, as potentially infringing upon the boundaries on both a macro 
(society) and micro (subjectivity) level. In a 1972 lecture entitled “The Android and the 
Human,” Dick addresses the crumbling divide between humans and machine:  
 
Our environment, and I mean our man-made world of machines, artificial 
constructs, computers, electronic systems, interlinking homeostatic 
components — all of this is in fact beginning more and more to possess what 
the earnest psychologists fear the primitive sees in his environment: animation. 
In a very real sense our environment is becoming alive, or at least quasi-alive, 
and in ways specifically and fundamentally analogous to ourselves. (183) 
  
In 1950, Alan Turing’s “Imitation Game,” as proposed in his paper “Computing 
Machinery and Intelligence,” surveyed the ability of artificial intelligence to inhabit 
behaviour indistinguishable from that of a human. The test requires three subjects: two 
humans and one computer. One of the humans asks the same question to both the other 
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human and the computer, and must guess which answer came from which based on the 
written responses.35 Just recently, a ChatBot made headlines when it became the first 
program to successfully pass the Imitation Game, fooling judges of the 2014 Turing test 
competition into believing that they were speaking to a living-and-breathing teenage boy 
living in the Ukraine (Dewey “Chatbot”).36  
 The internet makes even more possible the kinds of animation that Dick describes 
in his speech as the “quasi-alive.” Winterson, Haraway and Hayles alike are primarily 
interested in how this form of animation continues to break down the distinction between 
“real” bodies and virtuality: their work collectively responds to rising concerns regarding 
the effects of internet technologies on the body, and how these effects might give rise to a 
different kind of desiring process, one untangled from the heteronormative narrative. In 
his 1977 article “Prometheus as Performer: Towards a Posthumanist Culture?,” also 
quoted in the epigraph to Hayles’s first chapter in How We Became Posthuman: Virtual 
Bodies in Cybernetics, Literature, and Informatics (1999), Ihab Hassan states: “We need 
                                               
 
35  As Hayles points out, the first example of the Turing test had participants use a 
computer to communicate with a person in another room; at the end of their discussion, 
the participant would guess whether or not they were conversing with a woman or a man. 
For Hayles, the trial raises some provocative questions: “If your failure to distinguish 
correctly between human and machine proves that machines can think, what does it prove 
if you fail to distinguish woman from man? Why does gender appear in this primal scene 
of humans meeting their evolutionary successors, intelligent machines? What do 
gendered bodies have to do with the erasure of embodiment and the subsequent merging 
of machine and human intelligence in the figure of the cyborg?” (How We Became xii). 
As she asserts, the test proves that the relationship between enacted and represented 
bodies is medicated by a technology that is from the start intertwined with preexisting 
identity categories (xiii). 
36 A ChatBot is a computer-simulation program that has been designed to have intelligent 
conversations with its human users. 
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first to understand that the human form — including human desire and all its external 
representations — may be changing radically, and thus must be re-visioned. We need to 
understand that five hundred years of humanism may be coming to an end as humanism 
transforms itself into something that we must helplessly call post-human” (Hassan 212). 
While this particular vision of posthumanism is one of vulnerability, Winterson, Hayles, 
and Haraway (decades later) offer something far more empowered. Informed by these 
various machinic, bio-technical and literary versions (examples of which I have related 
above) — and the information element of the computational machine is really a 
byproduct of their continuing evolution — they each explore, in vigorous and productive 
ways, how our constant engagement with technology might be altering the lines of what 
The.PowerBook calls “our laptop DNA,” moving away from the gender and sex 
categories that activated the body as it was understood within the scope of humanism (4).  
 In the era of posthumanism, the signifiers attributed to corporeality need no longer 
be presumptively attached to an actual, physically realized body. In the virtual world, 
there is no flesh-and-blood tangibility upon which meaning can be attached, begetting the 
question: how do corporeal inscriptions function when the other, the person on the other 
side of the computer, has no externally visible body, when there is only a screen to gaze 
upon and touch? The.PowerBook’s protagonist Ali/x must navigate the realm of 
cyberspace in order to connect with her married lover, a woman known only to readers by 
her online avatar, Tulip.37 What the novel examines, then, is how the body negotiates 
                                               
 
37 The name “Tulip” calls to mind Luce Irigaray’s This Sex Which is Not One (1977), in 
which she states that although female sexuality is often subsumed by the “dominant 
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feelings of desire in the absence of not only tactility, but also the other senses — sight, 
smell, taste, and hearing. Does their affair become less “real” in the absence of 
physicality?  
 Like The.PowerBook, The Stone Gods also troubles the humanist binary between 
reality and unreality, by exploring the relationship between corporeality and desire 
through the disruptive figure of the cyborg, as imagined by Haraway. The novel 
illustrates the closing gap between human beings and technology, here made manifest by 
a love affair between a cybernetically altered human hybrid named Billie, and Spike, her 
incredibly sophisticated robot lover/companion. As we will see, bodily boundaries 
unravel in at least one storyline in the novel, as Billie merges into Spike’s metallic and 
corrosion-resistant frame. Billie finally forsakes her claim to the idea that she is only 
human and accepts herself for the cyborg she always was, disengaging from the 
limitations of her socially inscribed body.  
 My analysis of The.PowerBook and The Stone Gods examines how desiring 
bodies have been impacted by our new and still evolving alliance with technology, in 
ways that might radically transform structures of identity and power. I situate my reading 
of each novel within current debates concerning posthumanism and cyborgs, referring 
often to the work of the aforementioned Hayles and Haraway. Haraway is best known for 
her essay “A Cyborg Manifesto: Science, Technology, and Socialist-Feminism in the 
                                                                                                                                            
 
phallic economy,” pleasure for woman is always autoerotic in that the female sex organ is 
comprised of “two lips” that are in “continuous contact” (24). This argument eventually 
expands to include the erasure of all dichotomous sex and gender categories, in ways that 
resemble The.PowerBook’s own agenda. 
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Late Twentieth Century,” which was written over thirty years ago in 1983. Despite its 
age, this piece has not only continued to be relevant but also should be considered 
prophetic in the ways that it anticipates culture’s increased and ever increasing 
dependence on digital technologies.  
 In “A Cyborg Manifesto,” Haraway defines the cyborg as a chimera of disparate 
parts that are continually coming together, positioning — or rather, un-positioning —
bodies in a state of constant transformation. For her, cyborgs are inherently political; in 
examining how bodies have evolved in their relationship with machines, other binaries 
that rely on a stable definition of what it means to be human are subsequently thrown into 
question. Haraway notes that the destabilization of humanism particularly influences how 
the categories of male and female are able to operate; as she posits, cyborgs perform the 
task of “undoing gender” as they are able to uproot power structures that have long relied 
on biological sex as a point of justification. However, I also see a potential danger 
inherent in misreading Haraway, and in doing so, perceiving the cyborg as the solution to 
the violent hierarchies embedded in gender dynamics — for we cannot simply forgo the 
body, pretend that it does not exist, that we are not still physically limited by our 
physicality. Haraway does not wish to collapse “man” and “machine” but rather, wants us 
to view the cyborg body as a very active component in what Hayles calls “the unfolding 
story of how a historically specific construction called the human is giving way to a 
different construction called the posthuman” (How We Became, emphasis in original).  
 According to Hayles, this different construction is a product of recent 
advancements in cybernetics: the escalating use of internet technologies, something 
portrayed exemplarily by Winterson in The.PowerBook. Similar to Haraway, Hayles 
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argues that it precisely this intervention of technology into lived reality that transforms 
the body into cyborgity. In How We Became Posthuman, Hayles builds upon Haraway’s 
definition of the cyborg as something that continually attaches, detaches and reattaches at 
different entry points to an evolving polymorphous and rhizomatic information system, 
one that transforms the subject into “a kind of disassembled and reassembled, 
postmodern collective and personal self” (163). Much like cyborgity, she observes that 
posthumanism also “privileges informational pattern over material instantiation, so that 
embodiment in a biological substrate is seen as an accident of history rather than an 
inevitability of life” (2). As Hayles asserts, this means that the discourse of biology can 
no longer be appropriated successfully to ossify sex as an identity category.  
 As Erik Davis clarifies in his review of the work: 
 
One of the central threads in [Hayles’s] story is how information lost its body 
— that is, how information came to be seen as an abstract, almost 
transcendental stuff that could “circulate unchanged among different material 
substrates.” Once we begin to believe that information is more essential than 
material forms, we vacate the old cosmos defined by presence and absence, 
entering a world characterized by the binary feedback of pattern and 
randomness, signal and noise. We leave the clearing and enter the screen. 
(Davis “The Posthuman Touch”) 
 
The presence/absence binary is a crucial dynamic, and one that I will examine further in 
my discussion of The.PowerBook. However, the idea of an “absent” body has led to a 
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misinterpretation of Hayles’s argument, which is that she is dismissing materiality in 
favour of a new, disembodied virtual future. In fact, she continually voices her concern 
that embodiment has been “systematically downplayed or erased in the cybernetic 
construction of the posthuman” (How We Became 4). Hayles is careful to reassert that the 
posthuman body is still a body: information has lost its physical figure, but this does not 
mean that human consciousness can be downloaded into a computer. Information and 
consciousness are not one and the same. That point made, Hayles nonetheless recognizes 
that the loss of information’s body does impact the ways in which we experience our own 
material bodies and the bodies that we encounter. Reality no longer seems as concrete or 
substantial as it once did in the era of humanism, as it is always already mediated by 
technology that finds its basis in components of virtuality. 
 Although the actuality of technology has long been the focus of cyborg theory, 
self-construction is of equal importance. The power of fantasy is particularly evident in 
the subject’s navigations through cyberspace, as it must not only create a version of itself 
to project, but the other is likewise grounded in elements of the subject’s ideal version of 
itself. The internet, however, is just another avenue for narrative, albeit one that is able to 
disconnect from the material world; we have always fantasized ourselves and the other 
into being, but now this projection has taken on a new form. The final aspect of my 
argument closely considers cyborg writing and the destabilization of origin myths, 
particularly illustrated in The Stone Gods, examining how desiring bodies and the 
narratives that have long been inscribed upon them are impacted when digital 
technologies have surpassed biological narratives; humans are now able to modify their 
bodies in ways that go beyond their organic foundations. Winterson, Hayles and Haraway 
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all seem to agree that humans therefore can no longer be considered just human. What 
Winterson’s work explores, then, is how our changing sense of who/what we are impacts 
how we desire, in ways that overthrow the restrictive gender binaries essential to 
humanism. 
 
II. The.PowerBook’s Thin Partitions: Breaking down the Divide between  
Reality and the Screen 
 As this chapter moves through Winterson’s version of virtuality, from 
posthumanism to cyborgs, from cyborgs to Robo sapiens, I examine how these two 
novels undermine the reality/virtuality dichotomy, a dichotomy that, like subject/object 
and inside/outside, has been a key player in the regimenting of gender and sex categories. 
A few of Winterson’s previous works also take up with the emergence of internet 
technologies; however, the characters in these novels often express apprehension 
regarding virtual spaces. For instance, in his/her discussion of online dating websites, 
Written on the Body’s otherwise sexually uninhibited narrator reveals that s/he perceives 
online dating sites with some degree of ambivalence: 
 
If you like, you may live in a computer-created world all day and all night.  
You will be able to try out a Virtual life with a Virtual lover.  You can go into 
your Virtual house and do Virtual housework, add a baby or two, even find out 
if you’d rather be gay.  Or single.  Or straight.  Why hesitate when you could 
simulate? 
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And sex?  Certainly.  Teledildonics is the word.  You will be able to plug in 
your telepresence to the billion-bundle network of fibre optics criss-crossing 
the world and join your partner in Virtuality.  Your real selves will be wearing 
body suits made up of thousands of tiny tactile detectors per square inch. 
Courtesy of the fibreoptic network these will receive and transmit touch. The 
Virtual epidermis will be as sensitive as your own outer layer of skin. (98-9)38 
 
Although the narrator does not sound particularly alarmed at this point, s/he is certainly 
careful to draw a divisive line between “real” bodies and the suits that will clothe them. 
There is a presentiment here about the potential loss of control over one’s own reality, 
which really emerges in the statement that follows his/her description of dating websites: 
“The scientists say I can choose but how much choice have I over their other inventions? 
My life is not my own, shortly I shall have to haggle over my reality” (99). The relative 
newness of the virtual reality experience, in addition to the accelerated rate at which 
various channels of communication are being produced, also contributes to the narrator’s 
already suspicious attitude. S/he is quick to associate them with technological inventions 
that emerged in tandem, with a similar speed and proliferation, warning Louise that 
                                               
 
38 This passage is at the center of Lisa Moore’s “Teledildonics: Virtual lesbians in the 
fiction of Jeanette Winterson,” from Sexy Bodies: The Strange Carnalities of Feminism 
edited by Elizabeth Grosz and Elspeth Probyn. As Moore points out, this passage “makes 
explicit the narrative strategies that structure the ambiguous status of lesbianism in 
Winterson’s fiction. Even while it insists upon a constant deferral of fixed sexual 
identities (‘gay… single… straight’), Winterson’s fiction imagines the space in which 
such deferral can take place as linguistically or imaginatively lesbian — for example, in 
the way the word ‘teledildonics’ as a term for ‘virtually’ are sexual possibilities playfully 
summons up the lesbian sex toy, the dildo” (105). 
166 
“[s]hortly the pseudo-lab coat approach of dating by details will make way for a genuine 
experiment whose results, however unusual, will remain controllable. Or so they say. 
(See splitting the atom, gene therapy, in vitro fertilisation, cross hormone cultures, even 
the humble cathode ray for similar statements)” (96). 
 All of the narrator’s concerns regarding technology are connected to the 
transformation of corporeality into a sort of simulacrum: that in its detachment from the 
felt, sensuous, material world, the body itself will become unneeded and therefore 
deserted, which means the subject that inhabits this body will also be — perhaps most 
frighteningly for our libidinous narrator — celibate. I contend that the narrator’s specific 
fears are indicative of the larger cultural anxiety that materialized in concordance with 
the novel’s publication in 1992, that virtual selves might eventually come to subsume 
lived, embodied experience. The threat here, however unreasonable, is that the “real” 
body will become viewed as unnecessary, that the “virtual epidermis” that phantasmically 
superimposes the skin will end up replacing it. In his article “Body Languages: Scientific 
and Aesthetic Discourses in Jeanette Winterson’s Written on the Body,” Gregory 
Rubinson shares a similar view of the narrator’s unease, one that also borrows from Jean 
Baudrillard’s Simulacra and Simulation (1981): 
 
Scientific advances threaten to render material reality and the body 
superfluous, a symptom diagnosed by a pathologist of postmodernity such as 
Baudrillard when he asserts that the (post)modern era is characterized by the 
virtualization of the real. The individual, according to Baudrillard, no longer 
actively engages with objects in the environment, but increasingly becomes a 
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terminal of multiple networks, participating in all the activities of life — work, 
play, social relations, consumption, and others — telematically or, in other 
words, through virtual reality (Ecstasy 129). (6) 
 
The detachment from reality (and thus, the material body) is represented in Written on the 
Body by Elgin and his preoccupation with computer simulations: as the narrator notes, 
although he is a cancer specialist, he “hasn’t been in a terminal care ward for ten years. 
He sits in a multi-million pound laboratory in Switzerland and stares at a computer” (67). 
Technology has allowed him to remain at a remove. In his “real” life, Elgin does not 
enjoy interacting in physical time with his patients; virtual reality enables him to keep 
them sequestered on the other side of the screen, where their diseased, disintegrating, 
abject bodies cannot pose a threat to the cogency of his own corporeal boundaries. While 
Elgin seeks the detachment that computer simulations can offer, the narrator feels that 
physical, tangible experience is far more authentic. However, s/he is limited throughout 
the novel by his/her enforcement of the reality/unreality binary, and ultimately ends up 
reproducing harmful and restrictive dichotomies. It is only at the end of the novel, when 
Louise appears in an ambiguous, arguably non-material form, that the division between 
real and virtual begins to unravel. And yet, we need the body still; the body exists as the 
interface for the virtual experience, a concept that Winterson explores more thoroughly in 
The.PowerBook. 
 Published eight years following Written on the Body, The.PowerBook inhabits a 
far more comfortable and generally more positive relationship with the internet, one that 
is reflective of our society’s growing reliance on electronic media. In many ways, 
168 
The.PowerBook actually shares more in common with the novel that came directly before 
it, Gut Symmetries; as Katherine Cox states in her essay “Knotting up the Cat’s Cradle: 
Exploring Time and Space in Winterson’s Novels,” cyberspace in The.PowerBook 
permits a version of time that opposes the more chronologically linear or “straight” 
narrative, enabling us to think against the dominant arrangement of time and history in 
ways that allow for new kinds of encounters (50). As my second chapter infers, Cox’s 
statement is also applicable to Gut Symmetries. And certainly, The.PowerBook is similar 
to the other works in Winterson’s oeuvre, in that its primary goal remains the 
destabilization of dominant narratives. For instance, the novel privileges multiple 
narratives rather than just one, weaving historical tales and current into one fabric in a 
way that emulates her earlier works such as The Passion (1987), Sexing the Cherry 
(1989), and even Gut Symmetries, if we consider the narrative’s inclusion of intersecting 
familial histories. 
 With that comparison made, it is worth noting that in Gut Symmetries, the 
characters insist on communicating through written letters rather than email, and here we 
can see Winterson taking up new tools — or techne — as they become available to her. 
The.PowerBook also distinguishes itself structurally, as its composition mirrors the same 
cybernetic technologies that the protagonist uses to seduce Tulip. For example, although 
some copies of the novel assume the title The PowerBook, the original version, published 
by Jonathan Cape in 2000, adopts the title as Winterson had intended it: The.PowerBook. 
The placement of the period in between the definite article and the noun, in addition to 
the absence of spacing, mimics the URL address of an internet web page. The novel’s 
interior composition also imitates aspects of the electronic medium. Some chapters are 
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named after computer directions, such as “OPEN HARD DRIVE,” “NEW 
DOCUMENT,” “EMPTY TRASH,” and commence with an image of a computer-
simulated icon, suggesting hypertext — as if we could move the mouse and click on it, 
bringing us elsewhere outside of the novel. In her review of The.PowerBook, Elaine 
Showalter observes that although Winterson designs the novel to “suggest the appearance 
and the technique of virtual reality, with a cover like a computer handbook and chapter 
divisions of hard drives, icons, and documents,” the work is not so much a “playful 
postmodern experiment or an investigation of the multiple personalities of e-mail” 
(Showalter “Eternal Triangles”). Rather, Showalter argues that Winterson engages email 
as a metaphor “to discuss sexual freedom and power” (“Eternal Triangles”).  
 Although I agree with Showalter’s assessment to some degree, I do not think we 
should be so quick to dismiss the narrative’s experimentation as purely metaphorical; 
cybernetics are also implanted in the novel’s very make up, whereas a metaphorical 
concept suggests that cybernetics only exist outside the narrative, to be applied to the 
narrative. Rather than comparing one entirely different thing to another, as metaphors do, 
Hayles suggests that narrative and cybernetics are symbionts that serve the same purpose: 
to seek meaning. Hayles forges a connection between narrative and technology by 
distinguishing the technological aspects of narrative; technology is always a part of 
narrative, as narrative requires tools to make sense of itself — although as we have seen, 
these tools are prone to transformation (from printing press to computer code, for 
example). However, Hayles also recognizes that while narrative may be influenced by 
technology, technology is just as much a product of narrative. Technology requires 
narrative to make sense of the binaries, to provide meaning to the codes. In showing their 
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symbiont relationship, she performs a similar task to that of The.PowerBook: conflating 
rather than separating narrative and technology. But this kind of synthesis can appear 
confusing. Does narrative mould technology, or does technology affect the way our 
narratives take shape? How does the technologization of narrative, or the narratization of 
technology impact the ways in which the body is inscribed with meaning?  
 These are fascinating questions, particularly when considering the impact of 
discourse on desire, keeping in mind Winterson’s contention that, through narrative, 
bodies have been insinuated to desire what they do not desire.39 However, such a question 
partakes in the either/or binary, in that it suggests one must play a more central role than 
the other. Perhaps instead, we should re-conceive the relationship between narrative and 
technology as both-and, as mutually interdependent rather than separate. As Hayles 
notes, technology is now in fact so “entwined with the [discursive] production of identity 
that it can no longer be meaningfully separated from the human subject” (How We 
Became xiv). She explains how bodily narratives have become fragmented; now there is 
“the enacted body, present in the flesh on one side of the computer screen, and the 
represented body, produced through the verbal and semiotic markers constituting it in an 
electronic environment” (xiii). Only “through the technology that connects them,” 
“mutating and flexible machine interfaces” that will inevitably splice one’s “will, desire, 
and perception into a distributed cognitive system” can represented bodies and enacted 
bodies become synthesized (xiii, 193). This synthesis is the posthuman body. 
                                               
 
39 See: Winterson, Art Objects: Essays on Ecstasy and Effrontery, p. 115. 
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 This account of posthumanism applies to my own analysis of the ways in which 
cyberspace both affects and potentially effects desire in The.PowerBook. Although 
The.PowerBook’s adoption of cybernetic elements into the structure of the story marks a 
departure from the rest of the novels in Winterson’s canon, the plot itself nonetheless 
bears strong resemblance to Written on the Body and Gut Symmetries. Not only does 
The.PowerBook’s storyline revolve around an extramarital affair between two women, 
but it also contains a discouraging account of heterosexual relationships in general, 
particularly when it comes to the marriage. And like both Written on the Body and Gut 
Symmetries, The.PowerBook also strives to disentangle desire from the gendered 
signifiers inscribed onto the body in an attempt to weaken heteronormative institutions 
and the narratives that have enabled them. However, that the novel takes place in the kind 
of virtual space that Written on the Body and Gut Symmetries only mused upon is a point 
of differentiation.  
 Ali/x is a story-teller and the owner of an old-fashioned costume shop, who must 
make arrangements to meet with Tulip online because in the “real” world, Tulip is 
married and unavailable. Throughout the novel, Ali/x, a self-described “language 
costumier,” conjures up discursive disguises in the form of stories that she emails to 
Tulip. She composes original tales (some apparently semi-autobiographical) in addition 
to sending along revisions to famous accounts of “great and ruinous lovers” (Lancelot 
and Guinevere, Paolo and Francesca da Rimini, George Mallory and Mount Everest) that 
position herself and Tulip in their place, often in ways that disregard the sex of their 
bodies (Winterson T.B 77). In these worlds created by Ali/x, they can be together. As 
Barbara Becker states, the cyber-world provides a sense of “liberation and uninhibited 
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means of constructing oneself”; these virtual encounters allow Ali/x and Tulip a new way 
of using fantasy to overcome the limitations of physicality (Becker 3). In one of her 
emails to Tulip, Ali/x declares: “This is where the story starts. Here, in these long lines of 
laptop DNA. Here we take your chromosomes, twenty-three pairs, and alter your height, 
eyes, teeth, sex. This is an invented world. You can be free for one night” (Winterson T.B 
4). 
 However, it is precisely this sense of freedom that accounts for Tulip’s reluctance. 
She is a woman both formed and contained by her social role as wife, and feels her 
subjectivity threatened by the internet’s capacity to un-form and un-contain. As Ali/x 
relates, inside Tulip’s marriage “there were too many clocks and not enough time. Too 
much furniture and too little space. Outside her marriage, there would be nothing to hold 
her, nothing to shape her. The space she found would be outer space. Space without 
gravity or weight, where bit by bit the self disintegrates” (39). Like Alice’s mother in Gut 
Symmetries, marriage gives Tulip’s world a sense of structure; her identity is fixed into 
place by her relation to her husband, and to the phallic Law of the Father that he signifies. 
While such social borders frame her existence, forming her shape, she still has “not 
enough time” and “too little space” for herself within its enclosure. On the other hand, 
Tulip believes that without her marriage, there would be nothing but space. She would, in 
her own words, “disintegrate” into the void. As Tulip continually tells Ali/x, she must 
remain with her husband in order to “save [her] sense of self” (104). And yet, when 
talking about her relationship with her husband, Tulip confesses: “You keep the form and 
habit of what you have, but gradually empty it of meaning” (39). Her matrimonial 
contract, then, is comparable to the saggy armchair of clichés that Winterson’s work 
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often finds so troubling.40 Form and habit may offer a false sense of security, but Tulip’s 
ability to act on her desire for Ali/x is impeded by these very things. 
 Ali/x spends much of the novel attempting to convince Tulip that what she 
perceives as material, physical, tangible reality is not as indistinguishable from the virtual 
world as Tulip might think it to be; her real life is impacted by her play in the virtual 
world, and so it is a both-and scenario rather than an either/or. Throughout the course of 
the novel, Ali/x meets Tulip in what she has designated “meatspace” three times, once in 
Paris, once in Capri, and once in London — however, the lines of reality and virtuality 
remain blurred, as it is never made entirely clear whether or not these encounters actually 
transpired in the physical world, or across Ali/x’s computer screen. What is a story and 
what is real? It is a question she asks herself: “I was typing on my laptop, trying to move 
this story on, trying to avoid endings, trying to collide the real and the imaginary worlds, 
trying to be sure which is which. The more I write, the more I discover that the partition 
between real and invented is as thin as a wall in a cheap hotel” (93-4).   
 This thin partition described by Ali/x is part of what Hayles terms “a reverse 
feedback loop,” in which the operating system is no longer considered a separate “out 
there” world connected to our environment but rather, is autopoietic. Hayles makes 
reference to M.C. Escher’s reflexive lithograph drawing of one hand drawing another 
hand that in turn, is drawing the first hand. Reflexivity appears to be a closed system and 
therefore encounters the danger of the “infinite regress” that characterizes autism (Hayles 
How We Became 9). In his work Interface Fantasy: A Lacanian Cyborg Ontology (2009), 
                                               
 
40 See: Winterson, Written on the Body, p. 10, 21, 26, 71, 155, 180. 
174 
to which I will return my attention later in this chapter, André Nusselder warns that 
cyberspace has the potential to quarantine the subject “in a never-ending circuit: one 
more SMS, one more call, one more image, and one more link to check. ‘Encore!’ When 
the subject of technoculture gets wrapped up in, or loses itself in, the circuits of 
communication, it loses its relation with a stabilizing (fantasmatic) reference (as good as 
real) that rules its desire” (Nusselder 134). However, while Hayles acknowledges the 
potential for demurral and isolation within this organization, she nonetheless insists that 
the symbiosis of reflexivity allows us to recognize the world and the self as part of the 
same processes of construction as both-and rather than either/or, a parallax of real and 
virtual bleeding into one another. Escher’s image is representative of posthuman theory: 
subjects activating cyberspace while cyberspace is simultaneously activating them. 
 Hayles’s work explores how subjects negotiate their symbiotic relationships with 
intelligent machines — through narrative, which is used to develop computational 
programs, a narrative which is recognizable and therefore comfortingly familiar. And yet, 
this narrative must constantly change in relation to transforming technologies. In How We 
Became Posthuman, Hayles expands Lacan’s premise of floating signification, when a 
signifier lacks a steady referent and is thus unattached to any one meaning, to include 
signifiers that flicker, the outcome of the “unexpected metamorphoses, attenuations, and 
dispersions” that languages of digital technology inevitably produce (30).41 Engaged in a 
system of flickering signifiers, “it is no longer possible to distinguish meaningfully 
                                               
 
41 To be clear, Lacan argues that there is no referent: a signifier is always a subject for 
another signifier. 
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between biological organism and the information circuits in which the organism is 
enmeshed” (35). Both subject and machine loop into the other simultaneously. Hayles 
further clarifies how agency has changed as a result of online activity: “When people 
begin using their bodies in significantly different ways, either because of technological 
innovations or other cultural shifts, changing experiences of embodiment bubble up into 
language, affecting the metaphoric networks at play within culture” (206-207). Whether 
one chooses to log on or not, nonhuman actors now play a crucial role in the Symbolic. 
Technology has altered perception. In The.PowerBook, Ali/x and Tulip’s entire 
relationship, the ways in which they can express their desire for one another is enabled 
through a nonhuman acting, puppeted by the humans sitting behind the screen. However, 
in the absence of physically-realized exchanges, does this mean that their experience has 
become less real? In the first “invented world” that Ali/x emails to Tulip, she attempts to 
convince her skeptical lover that they can transgress the real/unreal binary (Winterson 
T.B 4). 
 
III. Posthuman Hybrid Bodies (or, a terrible thing to do to a flower?) 
 The story that opens the novel is set in late sixteenth century Europe and reads as 
a playful adaptation of Orlando (1928) by Virginia Woolf, one of Winterson’s favourite 
authors.42 Although Ali/x’s version takes place several centuries prior to the inception of 
                                               
 
42 In Art Objects: Essays on Ecstasy and Effrontery, her book of non-fictional essays, 
Winterson speaks of her admiration for Woolf’s precise style of writing, the “maximum 
tautness” between her words and her ideas, as well as her fearlessness: “Woolf’s 
connections across time and space, through the inner and outer worlds of imagination and 
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cyberspace, this rather unconventional love story parallels what Winterson is doing with 
the rest of the text: calling into question the classical dichotomy between real and virtual 
bodies by challenging what it actually means to possess a “real” body. The tale follows a 
female character, named Ali, who must smuggle a pair of tulip bulbs and a stem from 
Istanbul into Asia. In order to conceal her envoy, Ali dresses in male clothing and affixes 
the flower underneath her trousers. She quips: “There are many legends of men being 
turned into beasts and women into trees, but none I think, till now, of a woman who 
becomes a man by means of a little horticultural grafting” (12). Of course, this floral 
phallus does not instantaneously transform Ali’s body into a male one — it remains an 
entirely separate appendage, one that has been strapped to her corporeal surface. That is, 
until the bulbs begin to itch.  
 It is not immediately clear whether Ali can actually feel the bulbs, or if the 
discomfort is coming from the bulbs rubbing against her skin. However, any confusion is 
soon clarified by Ali’s very physical response to the Princess. Captured by Turkish 
pirates on her voyage overseas, Ali is sold as a slave to the royal family, where she is to 
undertake a particularly delicate job: preparing the Princess for her impending marriage 
by showing her the ways of love. According to Ali, slavery “wasn’t so bad” (20). Still in 
disguise, she spends the following weeks caressing the Princess. Connected only by 
“rivets of pleasure,” Ali kisses her breasts, belly, and then “lower than the belly” (20). 
                                                                                                                                            
 
experience, are made brilliantly, vertiginously, with not a glance over the edge” (73). 
Winterson was particularly inspired by Orlando’s gender-bending and time-tripping 
narrative, writing: “Orlando pushes through the confines of time, now in a petticoat, now 
with a cutlass. Love objects, male and female, are appropriately wooed and bedded but 
not according to the confines of heterosexual desire” (67). 
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Finally, the “climax” of the story arrives as the Princess demands to see Ali unclothed.  
The Princess is thrilled with what she finds, which is nothing like the stories she has 
heard, but beautiful “like a flower” (21). And then, as Ali recounts: “A strange thing 
began to happen. As the Princess kissed and petted my tulip, my own sensations grew 
exquisite, but as yet no stronger than my astonishment, as I felt my disguise come to life. 
The tulip began to stand [...] All afternoon I fucked her” (22). 
 This moment allegorizes the novel’s overall interest in disrupting prevailing 
knowledges concerning materiality. Real bodies are made up of organic components, and 
serve as the site where the psychic interior meets the external world. However, the tulip 
trespasses the boundaries between Ali’s internal experience and her corporeal exterior — 
she desires the Princess, and the tulip grows erect. It has become an integral part of her 
body, transmuting Ali into a hybrid of human and flower. Does this mean that her body is 
now less real? Winterson correlates this narrative with Ali/x’s posthuman bodily 
reconfigurations, with a focus on the influence of the internet; like her character’s hybrid 
flower-body, Ali/x’s cyber-body is also an amalgamation, of human and machine. This 
extended metaphor is a limited one, as the internet is not physically attached to the flesh-
and-blood of the body, like the tulip. In fact, aside from the fingers tapping at the 
keyboard, the body appears to be disconnected physically from the virtual encounter. 
Ali/x describes the experience as “disappear[ing] into a web of co-ordinates” (94), and 
there is a sense here that the internet allows one to leave the body behind, or to borrow 
Ali/x’s phrasing from the beginning of the novel, take it off and hang it up behind the 
door. 
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 This very possibility of taking off the body and leaving it behind speaks to the 
hope of overcoming the limitations imposed by corporeality. Plato, for instance, took a 
dualistic approach when he argued that the body is the prison house of the soul.43 Cyber 
identities, or avatars, create an escape from our physical boundaries. The body’s meaning 
is reduced to a flickering signifier — whether it be an image or a symbol or even text, 
and these virtual signs need not have any real connection to the subject’s actual lived 
body but are instead related to fantasy.44 In The.PowerBook, Ali/x refers to her screen as 
a “familiar blank space surface” waiting “to be filled” with her stories, her fantasies 
(237). In Interface Fantasy, Nusselder makes a connection between Lacan’s depiction of 
fantasy as a screen, and the computer screen’s function as an “interface” or intermediary 
upon which fantasies can play out (111). Ali/x positions herself in multiple bodies: a 
seventeenth century version of herself, Lancelot, Francesca, George Malory. These 
avatars allow her “I” to extend itself outside of her body, to (fantasmagorically) fulfill the 
lack that bodies in the Symbolic necessarily engender. For Nusselder, the make-up of 
cyberspace in fact mirrors the operations of language, as in Lacan’s terms, “the subject of 
                                               
 
43 From Phaedo, in Plato: The Complete Works (1997) in which Plato also states: “We 
will be closest to the knowledge if we refrain as much as possible from association with 
the body” (245).  
44 In How We Became Posthuman, Hayles writes that signification in cyberspace operates 
“in a realm in which the signifier is opened to a rich internal play of difference. In 
informatics, the signifier can no longer be understood as a single marker, for example an 
ink mark on a page. Rather it exists as a flexible chain of markers bound together by the 
arbitrary relations specified by the relevant codes. As I write these words on my 
computer, I see the lights on the video screen, but for the computer, the relevant signifiers 
are electronic polarities on disks” (31). Going one step further than Lacan’s floating 
signifier, which demonstrates the gap between the signifier and signified, here the 
element of randomness is introduced and privileged over the presence/absence binary. 
179 
the signifier is virtual,” in that the signifier does not connect in a concrete way to the 
signified (43). And since the unconscious is structured as a language, manifesting in 
metaphor and metonymy, it too is always already virtual — as Nusselder confirms, 
fantasy, impelled by desire for the other’s recognition, is “exactly the place that interfaces 
the virtual and the real. The computer simulated environments resemble the 
‘intermediary’ space of fantasy; they are between the real and the fictional” (63). The 
internet allows the subject to act out its desires in a space that resembles the Imaginary, 
through an interface that is less anchored by the patriarchal and heteronormative 
ideologies imposed within the Symbolic.    
 Nusselder recognizes that this image of the “I” is nonetheless mediated by the 
interface that makes it possible. Here, we see his argument begin to coalesce with 
Hayles’s own philosophy, which is also inflected with Lacanian influences (her flickering 
signifiers, for example). As Nusselder argues, humans and technology come together to 
produce “new forms of reality” (20). However, the question remains of what happens to 
the body in this new reality. The body is now only as relevant as the user wants it to be, 
imagines it to be. As such, virtual identities put the user at varying degrees of remove 
from their own biology. According to Hayles, one of the main credos of posthumanism is 
a view of the body “as the original prosthesis we all learn to manipulate, so that by 
extending or replacing the body with other prostheses becomes a continuation of a 
process that began before we were born” (How We Became 3). Avatars are representative 
of the posthuman subject as described by Hayles. 
 Here we return to the fear expressed by Written on the Body’s narrator, that the 
body might become replaced. Hayles takes up with the issue of whether or not 
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posthumanism renders the body redundant when she asks: “Should the body be seen as 
evolutionary baggage that we are about to toss out as we vault into the brave new world 
of the posthuman?” (50). Should we separate from our enacted bodies entirely, and move 
into our represented ones? This is a provocative question, and Hayles admits that the 
“great dream and promise of information is that it can be free from the material 
constraints that govern the mortal world” (13). And why not? If the human body is 
nothing more than a set of informational processes, and if information has now lost its 
body in this current age of informatics, then embodiment is apparently not essential to 
being human (4). However, although Hayles does raise these questions, she actually 
critiques the effacement or rather, dematerialization of the corporeal subject, as it 
suggests that information never required its embodiment, that embodiment was simply a 
consequence of its situation. For her part, she wonders why “embodiment continues to be 
discussed as if it were a supplement to be purged from the dominant term of information, 
an accident of evolution we are now in a position to correct” (12). The Cartesian 
modernist practice of severing abstract information from embodied reality — or 
represented bodies from enacted ones — is untenable. As Hayles points out, Derridian 
supplementarity has already performed the work of demonstrating that these are binaries 
that cannot be extrapolated from one another.45 
                                               
 
45 Derrida’s “logic of supplementarity” can be summed up as such, from his work Of 
Grammatology (1977): the two disparate discourses of science and the metaphysical 
actually need the other to exist, as the one supplements what the other lacks. The very 
possibility of supplementarity signifies the absence or incompleteness of that which is 
being supplemented.         
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 And ultimately, the idea of hanging the body up behind the door is not viable. As 
Slavoj Žižek rightly states: “We will never turn ourselves into virtual entities freely 
floating from one to another virtual universe: our ‘real life’ body and its mortality is the 
ultimate horizon of our existence, the ultimate, innermost impossibility that underpins the 
immersion in all possible multiple virtual universes” (Žižek “No Sex”). Žižek contends, 
that we do not (and cannot) lose the body, but rather gain another one: 
 
The literal “enlightenment,” the “lightness of being,” the relief/alleviation we 
feel when we freely float in cyberspace (or, even more, in Virtual Reality), is 
not the experience of being bodyless, but the experience of possessing another 
— aetheric, virtual, weightless — body, a body which does not confine us to 
the inert materiality and finitude, an angelic spectral body, a body which can be 
artificially recreated and manipulated. Cyberspace thus designates a turn, a 
kind of “negation of negation” [...] in cyberspace, we return to the bodily 
immediacy, but to an uncanny, virtual immediacy. (“No Sex”) 
 
Here, Žižek pinpoints another key component of the cybernetic dynamic: its uncanniness, 
in that it is both absent and present all at once. For as the subject sits at a remove behind 
the glare of the computer screen, the body’s sensory functions still respond to its 
surrounding stimuli, which impacts how the subject functions and interacts within the so-
called real world. Like the tulip-smuggling character that Ali/x creates, the subject is 
irrevocably altered by this fusion, of this other angelic spectral body (“No Sex”). Hayles 
182 
appears to agree, asserting that cyber technologies “inextricably intertwin[es] [the] body 
with mind . . . . We are the medium, and the medium is us” (How We Became 54). 
 In their introduction to Somatechnics: Queering the Technologization of Bodies 
(2012), Nikki Sullivan and Samantha Murray discuss the appearance of the word 
somatechnics, neologized by a group of academics involved in a series of Bodily 
Modification conferences. They joined together soma (Greek for body) and techne 
(Greek for craftsmanship) to represent what has “begun to emerge in and through 
critiques of popular common-sense understandings of the body, technology, and the 
relation between […] the notion of a chiasmatic interdependence of soma and techne: of 
bodily-being (or corporealities) as always already technologised, and technologies as 
always already enfleshed” (Sullivan and Murray 3). For Sullivan and Murray, this 
indistinguishability suggests “that technes are not something we add or apply to the body, 
nor are they tools the embodied self employs to its own ends. Rather, technes are the 
dynamic means in and through which corporealities are crafted, that is, continuously 
engendered in relation to others and to a world” (3). 
 What Sullivan and Murray are arguing for, as is Hayles, is the recognition of a 
new kind of subjectivity. It is not enough to say that subjects are in the process of 
amalgamating, as amalgamation has always happened; techne has always existed in some 
form or another. What it really comes down to is the dissolution of a binary implicated in 
the both-and fusion, one that I have already raised briefly here: presence/absence. The 
presence/absence binary is one that is very much dependent on the subject’s spatio-
temporal situation. The body is either here in this moment, or it is not. In order to unpack 
how cyberspace ruptures the presence/absence dichotomy, I return to the allegory of the 
183 
suddenly transsexual tulip smuggler and the Turkish Princess, paralleling as it does Ali/x 
and Tulip’s cybernetic love affair in what is potentially the “real” or “meatspace” world. 
In this parable, it is the location of their bodies that becomes positioned as a site for 
potential subversions; not only are the contours of Ali’s corporeal surface destabilized by 
her desire for the Princess (the tulip physically begins to rise), but the limits of space and 
time that are meant to frame her body are also challenged. Ali describes her time with the 
Princess as existing in a state of flux, a furnace of love which, she states, “heated time 
and welded together the separateness of the hours,” so that time became “continuous, 
unbroken” (Winterson T.B 21). As she states: “To me, these days will never end. I am 
always there, in that room with her, or if not I, the imprint of myself — my fossil-love 
and you discover it” (21).  
 That the “imprint” of Ali will always remain there ultimately reinforces the lack 
of differentiation between her body and space-time. Ali is an imprint left behind, always 
there even when she is not. Thus, she is partially absent and yet always present at the 
same time. This image corresponds with the online relationship between Ali/x and Tulip, 
as cyberspace also creates a permanent imprint, innumerable fossils buried or encrypted 
within its rhizomatic coordinates, hidden in what Hayles, in her work How We Think: 
Digital and Contemporary Technogenesis (2012), calls “invisible databases” (200). 
Every email correspondence between Ali/x and Tulip, every word recorded in the chat 
room, remains somewhere forever in this infinite space. Thus, the bodily trace in both 
situations is simultaneously there and it is not. Here, the novel is not only problematizing 
dominant conceptions of corporeal matter and form, but also reconfiguring how the 
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postmodern body is positioned within its spatio-temporal location. The body is both 
concrete and virtual, present and absent, rather than either/or.  
 Of course, cyberspace does possess its own set of restrictions. Like Hayles’s 
position, The.PowerBook is careful to avoid dismissing embodied experience; Ali/x and 
Tulip do remain materially separated by an interface, and as Ali/x states, “meatspace still 
has some advantages for the carbon-based girl” (Winterson T.B 174). When they meet in 
Paris, Tulip takes Ali/x’s hand, guides it to the low waistband of her jeans, and 
pronounces: “This is where I feel things” (35). Physical pleasures are not forsaken here: 
the consumption of food, for instance, is described in sensuous terms. Take Ali/x, eating 
an artichoke: “There is no secret about eating an artichoke, or what act it resembles. 
Nothing else gives itself up so satisfying towards its centre. Nothing else promises and 
rewards. The tiny hairs are part of the pleasure” (49). When she looks up from their 
shared meal, Tulip’s lips are “glossy with oil” (49).  
 The novel never exiles physical experience, but points to what is transgressive 
about the hyperreal domain of cyberspace: in such an uncontained space, there is no 
predetermined destination, no teleological entrapment. The.PowerBook effectively pits 
this lack of fixity against the stagnant narrative of heteronormativity as presented by 
Tulip and her husband in the “real” world. Ali/x herself warns against conclusions, 
stating that such beginning-middle-end stories do their “best to convince you, that the end 
in sight is the only possible outcome” (53). But on the internet, there is no end in sight, 
only continuous feedback looping of hypertexts. The way that meaning is received and 
interpreted has been re-invented and so the story must change too, accordingly. Ali/x 
calls out for Tulip to “[b]reak the narrative. Refuse all the stories that have been told so 
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far (because that is where the momentum really is), and try to tell the story differently — 
in a different style, with different weights — and allow some air to those elements 
choked with centuries of use, and give some substance to the floating world” (53).  
 Ali/x’s own revisions of historical romances radically alter the ones that they 
superimpose like a palimpsestic text, a “Talmudic layering of story on story, map on 
map, multiples possibilities” (54). Her original narratives also offer new potentials — the 
story of the tulip, for instance, underscores the body’s capacity for fluctuation. The 
corporeal form is transformed into something posthuman, something that might be able to 
go beyond the either/or sex and gender categories that have long sustained the straight 
temporal order of the heteronormative regime, insinuating bodies to desire what they do 
not desire. The novel’s illustration of Tulip’s marriage indicates that heteronormativity 
cordons desire, to borrow from Alice in Gut Symmetries, keeping sexuality bound within 
the parameters that it both determines and regulates. These parameters, although 
restrictive, have played an instrumental role in the formation of Tulip’s subjectivity, so 
much so that stepping outside of them appears a rather daunting task. She dismisses 
Ali/x’s story, for instance, as a “terrible thing to do to a flower,” rather than see the 
potentialities for couplings that is so inherent in hybridity. If we are to follow Hayles, 
Tulip would be characterized as a thoroughly “modern subject,” as she views herself to 
be “fixed, coherent, stable, self-identical” (How We Became 285). She is afraid of 
disintegrating, losing any sense of an identity in the process. Her body, suspended in the 
virtual space of limitless space and time, no longer “defines the parameters within which 
the cogitating mind can arrive at ‘certainties’” (203). In “Home for Cyborgs,” Anthony 
Vidler describes the cyborg body as a “potentially gender-free mutant, and its home is no 
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longer a house” (147). Vidler is here describing the sense of uncanniness cited earlier by 
Žižek, in which the ego is no longer contained by material borders and is thus at risk of 
unraveling into nothingness or absence. The ego is now both inside and outside the house 
of its body simultaneously, in ways that make one feel foreign to its own self.46 And for 
Tulip, the very idea of posthumanism poses a threat to her embodied subjectivity, the 
home of her body.  
 For Hayles, however, our increasingly immaterial experience does not signify the 
loss of human corporeality, but rather, evolution. She affirms that it would be a mistake to 
position posthumanity as “the end of humanity” like Tulip does; as Hayles sees it, the 
new epoch “signals instead the end of a certain conception of the human” (How We 
Became 286). A new conception emerges that does not require forsaking the body, but 
rather allows for the mutual reciprocity that exists between the virtual conditions of 
cyberspace and felt, or embodied, experience: the posthuman subject that results from 
this reciprocity is “an amalgam, a collection of heterogeneous components, a material-
informational entity whose boundaries undergo continuous construction and 
reconstruction” (3). According to Mary Jacobus, the corporeal subject itself evolves in 
                                               
 
46 In his work The Architectural Uncanny (1994), Vidler further examines Freud’s theory 
of the uncanny, or “unheimliche” (unhomelike): “For Freud, ‘unhomeliness’ was more 
than a simple sense of not belonging; it was the fundamental propensity of the familiar to 
turn on its owners, suddenly to become defamiliarized, derealized, as if in a dream” (7). 
Vidler also designates the uncanny as an “outgrowth of the Burkean sublime”: “[i]ts 
favourite motif was precisely the contrast between a secure and homely interior and the 
fearful invasion of an alien presence; on a psychological level, its play was one of 
doubling, where the other is, strangely enough, experienced as a replica of the self, all the 
more fearsome because apparently the same” (3). In the same way, Tulip experiences her 
virtual persona as a kind of uncanny double that threatens her own sense of self.  
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correspondence with its evolving environment; as she affirms, “changing material 
technologies — alongside and in interaction with changing discursive technologies — at 
once reflect and (re)construct our understanding of the [body’s] contours” (Jacobus et al 
2). Judith Halberstam and Ira Livingston echo Jacobus when they state, “posthuman 
bodies are causes and effects of postmodern relations of power and power, virtuality and 
reality, sex and its consequences. The posthuman body is a technology, a screen, a 
projected image [...] The human body itself is no longer part of ‘the family of man’ but a 
zoo of posthumanities” (Halberstam and Livingston 30).  
 As we see in The.PowerBook, while Tulip is unsettled by her new cybernetic body, 
wishing to ground her experience in the material world instead, Ali/x rather embraces the 
opportunity to enter into imagined bodies, to take on and perform new (and old) 
identities. There is nothing innovative, however, about this kind of performativity; only 
the medium is new. Nusselder follows Hayles when he states that from “a Lacanian 
perspective, cyberspace could give us a clearer insight into the process of self-
construction” (Nusselder 62). For him, and for Hayles, digital technologies actually 
illuminate the ways in which language works to construct identity, thus denaturalizing 
categories such as gender, that have been established using biologically-based rationales. 
The narrative has been broken, allowing for a new subjectivity that, while remaining all-
the-while embodied, nonetheless recognizes new subject positions, and moreover, new 
ways of navigating and feeling desire.  
 At one point, Ali/x discusses how she experiences her desire for Tulip: “In this 
space which is inside you and inside me I ask for no rights or territories. There are no 
frontiers or controls. The usual channels do not exist. This is the orderly anarchic space 
188 
that no one can dictate, through everyone tries. This is a country without a ruler. I am free 
to come and go as I please” (Winterson T.B 174). Her depiction parallels descriptions of 
cyberspace: an orderly, anarchic space where one can log on and off at will. The internet 
is not only a vessel for actualizing desire, but is rather desire incarnate; objet a “appears” 
somewhere in the screen, but always slipping out of reach, never “grasped” as a subject 
of perception. Ali/x remarks that she is often searching for Tulip, chasing hyperlinks to 
find her: “That’s why I trawl my screen like a beachcomber — looking for you, looking 
for me, trying to see through the disguise. I guess I’ve been looking for us both all my 
life” (64).  
 Although we now find ourselves more and more immersed in the virtual world, 
Tulip’s anxiety is not necessarily misplaced. As Hayles herself acknowledges, we must 
be careful with how we proceed. Although she argues posthumanism does not signal the 
erasure of the divide between humans and machines, which she finds a needlessly post-
apocalyptic notion, she still expresses concern for the future of our relationship with 
technology. Due to its inconspicuousness, it is not easy to recognize the extent to which 
these technologies alter our experience. Since we cannot always perceive the effect of the 
technologies we use, its impact often goes undetected and is consequently left 
unanalyzed. The symbiont relationship between narrative and technology has become a 
part of our biological makeup, mutating our DNA through the force of cumulative 
behaviour; as Andy Clark notes in Natural Born Cyborgs: Minds, Technologies, and the 
Future of Human Intelligence (2004), we have evolved into cyborgs to accommodate the 
larger playing field: “We are cyborgs not in the merely superficial sense of combining 
flesh and wires, but in the more profound sense of being human-technology symbionts: 
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thinking and reasoning systems whose minds and selves are spread across biological 
brain and non-biological circuitry” (3). In other words, we use computers now so 
habitually that we rarely even think about what they are and what we are doing with 
them. 
 In “A Cyborg Manifesto,” Haraway expresses some wariness when it comes to the 
surreptitiousness of artificial intelligence, which have rendered cyborgs “ether, 
quintessence” in contrast to humans who remain “material and opaque” (153). Cyborgs 
often exist in what Haraway calls “sunshine-belt machines”: 
 
Our best machines are made of sunshine; they are all light and clean because 
they are nothing but signals, electromagnetic waves, a section of a spectrum, 
and these machines are eminently portable, mobile [...] The ubiquity and 
invisibility of cyborgs is precisely why these sunshine-belt machines are so 
deadly. They are as hard to see politically as materially. They are about 
consciousness — or its simulation. (154) 
 
Certainly, these sunshine-belt machines accurately describe cybernetic operations, in 
addition to the miniaturization and portability (wirelessness) of machines in the late 
twentieth and early twenty-first centuries, which have “changed our experience of 
mechanism” (153). The workings of these sunshine-belt machines are not dissimilar to 
the kind of animation as described by Philip K. Dick in his lecture, “The Android and the 
Human”: technology is no longer physically experienced as it was before, but is rather 
both animated by us and in turn animates us — in a way that is more non-physical than 
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ever before. Thus, Haraway warns that it is much easier to unconsciously incorporate 
technological discourses. Less perceptible, they seep into the skin unnoticed. 
 Dynamics of power are still at play; if anything, electronic intelligence has allowed 
power to become even more insidious. There is a real potential for exploitation here, and 
for humans themselves to become the flickering signifiers. Winterson’s next novel, the 
cautionary tale The Stone Gods, imagines what happens when technology has been taken 
for granted. Earlier in this chapter, I quoted Hayles’s description of how the “historically 
specific construction called the human is giving way to a different construction called the 
posthuman” (How We Became 2, emphasis in original). The.PowerBook represents this 
current moment of “giving way” while The Stone Gods represents a world in which the 
way has already given, a world both terrifying and thrilling all at once. 
 
IV. The Stone Gods: Cautionary Cyborg Sci-fi 
 The Stone Gods pictures a world of posthuman cyborgity, a society in which purely 
biological bodies have almost ceased to exist. Like The.PowerBook, The Stone Gods 
consists of thematically-linked stories, all of which reuse the two same main characters 
but in altered incarnations: Billie Crusoe (mostly ending with an “ie” but sometimes with 
a “y” depending on the character’s changing gender) and his/her occasional love object 
Spike (or Spikkers). Unlike The.PowerBook, however, The Stone Gods falls definitively 
into the genre of science fiction — or rather, as definitively as any of Winterson’s novels 
can be said to fall. Winterson herself tends to disregard genre categories. When asked if 
The Stone Gods is science fiction, she responds: “Well, it is fiction, and it has science in 
it, and it is set (mostly) in the future, but the labels are meaningless. I can’t see the point 
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of labelling a book like a pre-packed supermarket meal. There are books worth reading 
and books not worth reading. That’s all” (Winterson website “The Stone Gods”). 
Nonetheless, the futuristic aspects of this novel correspond with posthumanist views, and 
works of science fiction generally do tend to anticipate how technological advancements 
will affect the ways in which bodies encounter their surroundings. In How We Became 
Posthuman, Hayles maintains that science and technology do not influence literature so 
much as the categories circulate through one another; for her, it is narrative that exists as 
the heart of this complex circulatory system: “Narratives about culture, narratives within 
culture, narratives about science, narratives within science” (22). What is important for 
Hayles is that we “recognize interrelations between different kinds of cultural 
productions” as they play out between science and literature (24). 
 Hayles draws upon several works of science fiction to demonstrate how this genre 
in particular often engages the same cultural anxieties expressed by Tulip. Hayles 
explores the means through which science fiction writers Bernard Wolfe, and William 
Gibson and the aforementioned Philip K. Dick investigate technology’s capacity to 
transform the human into something other-than-human. As she contends, their work most 
often mixes utopian and dystopian elements, demonstrating to some extent the cultural 
confusion surrounding technology; the ethical, political, physical benefits and/or 
disadvantages are still unclear. Science fiction reflects our current situation in ways that 
suggest the breakdown of the boundary between literature and reality, a breakdown that 
Haraway’s “A Cyborg Manifesto” has anticipated. As Haraway has asserted: “Social 
reality is lived social relations, our most important political construction, a world-
changing fiction. [...] The cyborg is a matter of fiction and lived experience that changes 
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what counts as women’s experience in the late twentieth century. This is a struggle over 
life and death, but the boundary between science fiction and social reality is an optical 
illusion” (Haraway 149). Haraway defamiliarizes the boundary between reality and 
science fiction, revealing the extent to which she perceives reality to be rooted in social 
constructs; all experience is discursively constituted, even the digitized codes, the 
machinist and mathematic components which create internet connections, even these are 
a kind of language, creating as they do systems of meaning — accounting for Haraway’s 
suspicion concerning sunshine-belts. Therefore, according to Haraway, the covert 
operations of discourse means that reality is rooted in the same elements as fiction. 
Neither should be granted authority, nor prioritized; rather, they move through one 
another. For instance, for Haraway, science fiction is not merely representational, but 
rather defines our reality as much as our reality defines it (162). 
 Although Winterson herself eschews labels, The Stone Gods bears obvious 
resemblance in style and content to Dick’s Do Androids Dream of Sheep?; however, 
while Dick’s novel is definitively dystopian, The Stone Gods is more accurately 
described as a dystopian-utopian work — dystopian when it comes to the social structure 
of the futuristic colonies, but utopian in its treatment of how desire might be liberated 
from the origin narratives of biology. The Stone Gods contains four interrelated stories, 
three of which take place in a distinctly Orwellian future. In the first, subjects live on a 
planet not unlike earth called Orbus, and are surreptitiously ruled by a globalist-corporate 
agency called MORE. Billie inhabits one of MORE’s more affluent areas, Tech City, 
working (albeit reluctantly) for Central Power. Central Power is essentially one of 
MORE’s many governing subsidiaries, designed to monitor and regulate its citizens 
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through cybernetic mediation. Their bodies are genetically and surgically altered, 
fashioned into cyborgs, in order to fall in line with MORE’s rigid standards. 
 In this environmentally conscious tale, it turns out that global warming was 
indeed worth worrying about after all, for in addition to governing life on their own 
planet, Central Power is also working to find an entirely new, livable one. The eco-
parable opens with the news that one has been discovered, which has been given the 
name Planet Blue. Planet Blue weighs a yatto-gram and houses both the enormous and 
the microscopic: leaves that have grown as big as cities and birds that nest in 
cockleshells. The existence of dinosaurs, however, is what renders the planet inhospitable 
to humans. Billie, who owns the only remaining organic farm in Tech City (protected 
from hazardous fumes by a bio-dome) and resists MORE’s modern propaganda in lieu of 
a more traditional life, attracted the attention of Central Power’s enforcement squad — 
and with good reason, given that she later confesses to her involvement with terrorist 
activity that specifically targeted MORE. She is forced to take part in the next mission to 
this dangerous new planet, a mission that aims to kill the dinosaurs with a dust-storm 
which will be created by deflecting the course of an asteroid. It is on this fateful and 
ultimately disastrous journey that Billie meets Spike, a top-of-the-line “fembot” 
constructed of “meta-material [...], an articulated titanium skeleton and a fibre-optic 
neural highway” (Winterson SG 68). However, Spike unsettles the definition of what it 
means to possess a real body when she begins to surpass the codes inscribed into her 
mainframe; after falling in love with Billie, her heart begins to beat. Blurring the 
distinction between humans and Robo sapiens, Spike shows the extent to which bodies 
can become disengaged from biological determinism and the normative scripts that come 
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along with it, thus disentangling sexuality from a body that has been impelled to desire 
what it does not desire. 
 
V. A Meaning Sacrificed: What’s Sex Got to Do With It 
 Although my analysis focuses predominantly on The Stone Gods’ first narrative, it 
is the second story that provides what is perhaps the novel’s most crucial and recurring 
image, one that responds to the future state of Central Power’s cyborg citizens. 
Disrupting the science fiction genre, positioned as it is at the novel’s centre, Winterson 
here re-imagines the events of Easter Island in 1774, when those mysterious statues, 
known as the Mo’ai, were erected. The inhabiting tribes built them to appease the Gods, 
but exhausted the land’s resources in the process and thus called into being exactly what 
that the idols were meant to prevent: their extinction. This version of Billie (Billy) is a 
male British explorer who, upon disembarking the ship, describes the terrain before him 
as “dismal as the Valley of the Shadow of Death [...] The island was stripped and bare, 
with few trees or shrub-bushes of any kind. Nature seemed hardly to have provided it 
with any fit thing for man to eat or drink” (97-8). He soon happens upon the quarry, the 
charcoal deposits and then the statues themselves, the reason behind the island’s barren 
landscape. In witnessing the desolation, Billy concludes that he will never understand 
why a man would “destroy the very thing he most needs” (102).  
 He is eventually captured by a group of cannibalistic Natives (for what else have 
they to eat?) only to be saved by Spikkers, who was born in Holland but left on the island 
when his father, a now deceased Dutch explorer, fell in love with one of the Natives and 
decided to stay. Spikkers is only able to communicate in broken English, but they soon 
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form an intimate friendship. He attempts to explain to Billy that there are two warring 
tribes, spearheaded by the Bird Man and the White Man (or Ariki Mau) respectively; the 
Bird Man wishes to destroy the statues completely while the Ariki Mau would rather 
protect them for the sake of Mana. In order to decide who gets to reign over the island, a 
race was held and whoever was able to collect the first egg laid by the visiting Sooty 
Terns would claim the title. Billy finds the entire arrangement preposterous (why should 
the bird, the egg, the statues, symbolize anything at all?) until he realizes that even his 
beloved English artifacts — his sixpence, his trousers — also “stand for Something” 
(113). As he comes to observe, Easter Island demonstrates the dangers of symbolism, of 
metaphor, of narrative:   
 
The world must have some covering for its nakedness, and so the simplest 
things come to impart the greatest significance — a piece of bread becomes a 
body, a sip of wine, my life’s blood. That one thing should stand for another is 
no harm, until the thing itself loses meaning of its own. The island trees and all 
of this good land were sacrificed to a meaning that has now become 
meaningless. To build the Stone Gods, the island has been destroyed, and now 
the Stone Gods themselves are destroyed. (113)  
  
It is this one line, of things being “sacrificed to meaning that has now become 
meaningless” that is most compelling here. Many reviewers have rightly interpreted the 
Easter Island narrative as an admonitory tale for us; motivated by economic growth, we 
are consuming the earth’s resources at an alarming rate. But prosperity means nothing at 
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all if there is no earth left to inhabit. The meaning would become meaningless. Winterson 
here points once again to history’s tendency to repeat itself, a message that not only 
resurfaces again and again in The Stone Gods, but also throughout her entire canon. 
However, although this second chapter certainly functions as a socio-environmental 
commentary, there is another element at play here that has been largely disregarded. In 
the future world of Planet Orbus, set some hundreds of years later, it is the body that has 
become the false God. 
 To present themselves as desirable objects worthy of worship, the citizens of this 
planet are surgically altered to achieve the same level of aesthetic appeal. They all look 
wonderful, all the time. They are also “genetically fixed” in their twenties in order to halt 
the aging process. However, since men have access to so many young women, they start 
wanting younger and younger women. Subsequently, women who have been genetically 
fixed at twenty-four must compete for attention with women who genetically fix 
themselves at the increasingly fashionable — although illegal — age of twelve. 
According to Billie, fixing is a pretty straightforward task and so is unfixing to age 
naturally, “although that is only ever done for medical research” (17). Genetic reversal, 
that is, turning back time to fix yourself into a younger body, is a bit trickier. As Billie 
notes, “the last time it was done, the reversal couldn’t be contained, and the girl got 
younger and younger until she was a six-feet-tall six-month-old baby” (17).  
 Although this is a disturbing image for various reasons, surgical and genetic 
transformation is not just limited to pedophilic “fixing.” As Billie explains, since 
everything has become the same, the desire for difference has grown stronger and thus, 
“sexy sex is now about freaks and children. If you want to work in the sex industry, you 
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get yourself cosmetically altered in shape and size. Giantesses are back in business. 
Grotesques earn good money. Kids under ten are known as veal in the trade” (19). In one 
scene, Billie visits the Peccadillo, a “perverts-only” sex bar where she happens upon a 
woman who has transformed her nipples into mouths, so that she has more entry points 
for visiting appendages; men and women have also hybridized their own bodies with 
animal parts. According to Billie, these perversions have arisen as a consequence of the 
commonality of cosmetic surgery: “Making everyone young and beautiful made us all 
bored to death with sex” (23). Although technological advancements are being used to 
manipulate their bodies into desirable objects, since everyone has access to obtaining the 
same standard of beauty, these particular advancements actually fail in satisfying desire. 
One of the chief requirements of desire is that it can never really be satiated, and now, all 
that subjects of the Symbolic really want is a reason to keep wanting. Thus, these so-
called bio-enhancements are not really enhancing anything for anyone. And yet, the 
citizens of Planet Orbus continue to submit themselves to invasive and potentially 
harmful surgeries. Their bodies have become a floating signifier, sacrificed to a meaning 
that no longer has any meaning. 
 Nonetheless, there is something subversive about these technologically mutated 
bodies. Dominant understandings of sexual identity as something fixed, as innately 
connected to the biological body are disrupted; divorced from biological narratives, these 
bodies can move beyond inscriptions of normative sexuality. As Dervla Shannahan states 
in her article “Queer Temporalities, Queerer Bodies and Jeanette Winterson’s The Stone 
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Gods,” “sex and sexual bodies have been dislocated from reproductive functions and 
stripped of any ethical framing” (3).47 And certainly, this dislocation can be read as 
transgressive, at least in terms of sexuality. The subjects of Central Power demonstrate 
the extent to which desire is dependent on social processes and thus reveals itself as a 
construction; for not only do the objects of desire change alongside technological 
advancements, but the ways in which bodies desire are likewise altered. The body too 
becomes a product of cultural norms, as its inscriptions alter in relation to cultural 
expectations, and thus corporeality can never be entirely or purely natural; it is shaped by 
exterior forces that are mobile, slippery, refusing concrete definition. This is particularly 
evident on the planet of Orbus, where not only the norms that govern bodies are changing 
(Orbus is evidently post-homophobic, for instance) but bodies are also transforming in 
concordance with the evolution of cybernetic technologies. 
 In “A Cyborg Manifesto,” Haraway examines how humans and intelligent 
machines have become entangled, coming together in complex but potentially productive 
ways. The central metaphor of her argument is, of course, the image of the cyborg. She 
defines the cyborg as a hybrid of machine and organism, and certainly the subjects of 
Central Power fall within the bounds of this definition. Made up of both organic and 
inorganic matter, they are both machine and organism and therefore, they are both alive 
                                               
 
47  Although I quite agree with Shannahan’s assertion that “[w]hat emerges as queer 
within Winterson’s depiction is that which does not conform to the queerness of queerly 
normative dominant sexual practices” (5), I have chosen to distance myself from her use 
of “queer.” For my purposes, it makes more sense to think of the characters in The Stone 
Gods as sexually undiscriminating. Their main interest seems to be in perverse sex acts 
that no one else has tried before, constantly trying to outdo their last feat.  
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and not alive simultaneously. As Haraway affirms, in the technological age, bodies can 
no longer be envisaged as “sacred within themselves” (Haraway 163). Instead, cyborgs 
are cybernetic organisms, the result of a border crossing which has made “ambiguous the 
difference between the natural and the artificial” and also disrupted the boundary between 
“the physical and non-physical” (152). The breakdown of natural/artificial and 
physical/non-physical uses similar language to Hayles’s binary of real/virtual, and here 
we see their arguments coalesce, particularly when it concerns the body. Biology, once 
seen as a study in which “organisms were the object of knowledge” has transformed into 
biotechnology, “the translation of the world into a problem of coding” (164). In the age 
of informatics, sex is no longer sex, but rather a question of genetic engineering; 
alongside the denaturalization of sex comes the denaturalization of humanism.  
 In merging with technology, the “reality” of the body is simultaneously troubled. 
For Haraway, this is all very exciting because what this blurring does, essentially, is 
undercut the current dualistic thinking, which as she states, depends upon a “logic of 
dominance” (161). This kind of logic enables various hierarchies — for example, 
legitimizing the primacy of male sexuality while diminishing the existence of female 
desire. So much of this phallocentric structure is dependent on dominant understandings 
of the sexed body: the visibility of the penis, woman’s body as lack. Devoid of the 
anchoring point of biological determinism, however, the cyborg is able to disengage from 
the prevailing humanist binary oppositions (what Haraway calls the Oedipal narrative) 
that support the sex/gender/desire matrix. She embraces this denaturalization of the body, 
seeing a possibility here for a “post-gender world” (192). Existing as they do in excess of 
the “real” body, the cyborgs in The Stone Gods have the potential to arise “quite different 
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political possibilities from those proposed by the mundane fiction of Man and Woman” 
(180). 
 Except that this is not what happens on Planet Orbus. The mundane fiction of 
Man and Woman has not yet been overturned; rather, it has simply been displaced by 
other fictions, other ideological agendas. The harmful dichotomies of gender remain, 
made evident by the fact that “women still feel they have to look youthful, men less so” 
(Winterson SG 9). Sexual perversity has become the new norm, but the kinds of sexual 
perversions enacted here are not liberated from the dynamics that permeate 
heteronormativity. These particular cyborgs have failed to become dissociated from the 
male domination (Haraway 150). Here, The Stone Gods offers a critique of some strands 
of queer politics or, rather, the view that the validation of non-straight sexualities can 
disrupt oppressive gender norms. These non-straight sexualities are still attached to 
bodies that bear the mark of gender; what is needed, to return briefly to Hayles, is a 
“more inclusive less body-bound and genital-fixated definition of queerness” (How We 
Became 4). 
 And presumably, the subjects of Planet Orbus do not submit their bodies to 
technological intervention because they want to experience uninhibited sex. They are 
only, as Shannahan points out, taking on sexual perversity “by-default,” adopting it as the 
new norm (Shannahan 6). Those who choose not to partake, like Billie, are marginalized 
and even criminalized. As Haraway argues, it is all too easy to allow the long-reigning 
dominant narratives to simply become re-inscribed on the body in different forms. She 
observes the ways in which cyborg politics have been appropriated to justify oppressive 
mythologies: scientific progress; racist, male-dominated capitalism; the exploitation of 
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nature to serve the needs of consumerist culture. In The Stone Gods, the subjects of 
Central Power seem to fall for these same mythologies, for there are deeper, more sinister 
motives underlying these cybernetic transformations — motives that go well beyond the 
quest for youth and beauty. Using the same intrusive technologies, Central Power is able 
to acquire complete surveillance and thus control over its subjects. As Billie explains, the 
bodies on Planet Orbus are micro-tagged with data-chips, allowing their every movement 
to be monitored “and recorded by [a] satellite system that watches [them] more closely 
than God ever did” (Winterson SG 26). Central Power requires complicity if it is to retain 
its power and its subjects seem happy to be oblige — they allow their bodies to be 
surgically and genetically altered because they have been told that it will improve their 
situation, that they will be young and beautiful forever. However, although this 
technological interference actually works to position them farther from the object of 
desire rather than closer, they nonetheless quite blindly accept whatever has become the 
new norm. 
  The main problem here is that they are not really doing any thinking at all. Since 
robots do all of their work for them, their brains are shrinking due to lack of use, which is 
according to Billie, propagandized as “an inevitable part of progress” (14). Moreover, 
mass illiteracy has been State-Approved; the only character that reads, aside from Billie 
and Spike, is Handsome, the captain of the mission who had long ago fallen in love with 
Spike and taught her how to interpret poetry. In fact, he is responsible for Spike’s 
evolution into emotive response. She can now process affect, because the poems made 
her compute something she was not programmed to compute. Captain Handsome is no 
romantic hero, however. His aptitude for literary analysis serves to illustrate his position 
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within an elite group of colonists who maintain the power and authority of MORE. 
Midway through their voyage, it is revealed that he has been colluding in the governing 
agency’s hidden agenda: to assess Planet Blue’s viability as a new home only for those 
who could afford safe passage on a ship (aptly titled the Mayflower). The blissfully 
ignorant lower class would be left behind on Orbus, with resources rapidly depleting. 
 In this particular narrative, the lower class is represented by the figure of Pink 
McMurphy, an uneducated, silicon enhanced, kitten-heeled, celebrity-obsessed woman 
who, although really aged 58, has fixed herself at the popular and legal age of 24. Still 
dissatisfied with her appearance, she campaigns to genetically reverse herself to twelve 
so that she may be better equipped to compete for her husband’s attention with Little 
Señorita, a pre-teen pop starlet who has decided to fix herself into childhood “rather than 
lose her fame” (16). Instead of objecting to her husband’s pedophilic affections, Pink 
instead professes that she wants to be Little Señorita. Later, during a celebrity-sponsored 
promotional contest to win a trip to Planet Blue, Pink accrues votes by promising the 
audience that if she is chosen, she will: “get a start-up going — y’know, a celebrity on-
line type of thing? I mean the stars are, well, they’re stars, aren’t they, like you see in the 
sky? It’s a cute connection” (35). Pink wins a spot on the mission on this very basis, 
attesting to the superficiality but also the sense of false consciousness demonstrated by 
the majority of Orbus’ cyborg citizens, and here the novel offers a thinly veiled critique 
of our own celebrity-crazed society, in which the headlines that interest people have more 
to do with pop culture than the issues that have any real impact on our lives: the 
economy, military affairs, medical advances, and perhaps most obviously here, the 
environment. Orbus represents a future that is more possible than speculative, a future in 
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which the dispensability of reading has further stripped its inhabitants of any capacity to 
think critically about their situation. When Pink first comes aboard the ship, she notes 
that she has never seen a book before.      
 These cyborgs are, for the most part, what Haraway would call “frighteningly 
inert” (Haraway 152). For her part, Haraway places emphasis on the need for responsible 
relations with cybernetic technologies, because “a cyborg body is not innocent” but 
rather, the machine “is us, our processes, an aspect of our embodiment” (154, 180). 
Taking responsibility in Haraway’s terms means “embracing the skillful task of 
reconstructing the boundaries of daily life, in partial connection with others, in 
communication with all of our parts” (181). She insists that if the subject actively 
participates in the process of its own transformation, we might begin to discover “a way 
out of the maze of dualisms in which we have explained our bodies and our tools to 
ourselves” — for the cyborg body breeds “emerging pleasures, experiences and powers 
with serious potential for changing the rules of the game” (181, 173). 
 But how to change these rules? The first step is to break them, just as 
The.PowerBook’s Ali/x attempts to break the narrative. Both Billie and Spike are rule-
breakers; unlike the mindless cyborgs of Planet Orbus, they both lack the passivity 
necessary to become an obedient subject. Although Billie works for Central Power as a 
scientist in the enhancement department, she nonetheless criticizes its objectives as 
“repressive, corrosive and antidemocratic” (Winterson SG 45). She rebels against the 
system through terrorism, sheltering the bombers who attacked the MORE-Futures 
building. Not only does she use her position at the agency to fake her records, but she 
also at one point had her tagger removed so that she could not be tracked. She does not 
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allow her body to be altered, rejecting the concept of genetic fixing. Although she accepts 
the presence of technology, Billie refuses the corporeal intervention of the global-
economic-patriarchal regime that comes packaged alongside it. Billie meets her match in 
Spike, who actually succeeds in “growing” beyond the codes wired into her mainframe, 
surpassing the codes because she has actually been coded to evolve (apparently MORE 
did not entirely think that through) (54). While the subjects of Central Power are 
“frighteningly inert,” Spike proves to be “disturbingly lively” as she not only begins to 
expand beyond the origins of her creation, but makes Billie question her own (Haraway 
152). 
 
IV. The Both-And of “All and Nothing” 
 Spike’s initial objective is to serve as a vessel for MORE’s most sensitive 
information; when she has completed her target mission of collecting data, she is to be 
dismantled so that potentially “hostile forces” cannot access her contents (Winterson SG 
6). As Billie notes, Spike appears “perfect because she had been designed perfect” — she 
looks human, with “green eyes, dark hair, olive skin [...] low, gentle voice, intelligent 
face” (50). Her body is long, lithe, and despite her metal skeleton, soft. Although she 
finds herself attracted to Spike, Billie nonetheless wonders why she was built to be so 
beautiful, especially considering that on Planet Orbus, sexual relations that involve 
different species is a crime punishable by death. It seems unusual that a society so 
laissez-faire in its treatment of sexual mores would ban human/Robo intercourse, 
suggesting that cultural anxieties surrounding technological partnerships remain, to some 
extent, intact. Spike’s human beauty, then, serves no real purpose, but rather, is indicative 
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of her status as what Haraway calls the “illegitimate offspring of militarism and 
patriarchal capitalism, not to mention state socialism” (Haraway 151). She serves the 
needs of Central Power while satisfying patriarchal concerns regarding female 
appearance. However, as Haraway also cautions, “illegitimate offspring are exceedingly 
unfaithful to their origins. Their fathers, after all, are inessential” (152). And certainly, 
Spike does not remain loyal to her one purpose, to collect and store data for the 
department of Enhancement Services. She reveals herself as political, even radically so, 
undermining human authority by questioning their self-professed authenticity. She is a 
robot surrounded by cyborgs, and although she “cannot affirm the capacity to act on the 
basis of natural identification,” she nonetheless sees the potential for action “on the basis 
of conscious coalition, of affinity, of political kinship” (156). 
 However, even Billie, who rejects many of the procedures and programming 
imposed by Central Power, clings to the origin myth of her humanity. At one point in the 
novel, she comes across a fellow renegade who has thus far managed to slip through the 
cracks in the system. The woman is struggling to remove her air mark, and when she 
finally pulls it off, Billie is admittedly revolted by what she sees: “Her eyes were bright 
and glistening, but her face was lined, worn, weathered, battered, purple-veined and liver-
spotted, with a slot for a mouth, garishly coated in red lipstick. I recoiled. I had never 
seen a living person look like this” (Winterson SG 37). Despite her apparent kinship with 
this woman, who had also refused genetic fixing, Billie finds herself disgusted. Aging is a 
natural process, one that Billie, rebelling against genetic fixing, should embrace. And yet, 
she realizes that she is trapped in the space between organic materiality and her lived 
experience in a world infiltrated by cybernetics. Like the other subjects of Central Power, 
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she is a cyborg. And like the other subjects of Central Power, she attempts to refuse this 
status. They all want to believe that they are still human, that robots are other-than-
human. For her part, however, Spike is unsure of what it even means to be a human 
anymore: “Every human being in the Central Power has been enhanced, genetically 
modified and DNA-screened.  Some have been cloned. Most have been born outside the 
womb. [...] So what’s a human being?” (64). Interrogating what it means to possess a real 
body allows her to close the gap between herself and her questionably human 
companions. In doing so, Spike draws attention to the constructed natures of all identities. 
For instance, she is also quick to dismiss gender as “a human concept [...] and not 
interesting” (63).  
 What does interest her is what she perceives to be the dissolution of categories, 
the collapse of everything into undifferentiated electromagnetic waves or what she calls 
“consciousness.” In her first conversation with Billie, she insinuates that not only are 
humans becoming increasingly like Robo sapiens, but Robo sapiens are also 
simultaneously becoming increasingly human. She states that “[h]umans share ninety-
seven per cent of their genetic material with apes but they feel no kinship” (29). Billie 
asks, in response, “Do we feel kinship with robots?” to which Spike answers: “In time 
you will, as the differences between us decrease” (29). Billie, however, continues to 
express her skepticism, accusing Spike of being unable to show emotion, as her systems 
are neural and not limbic. Spike points out that human beings “often display emotion they 
do not feel. And they often feel emotion they do not display” (62). As Spike and Billie 
fall in love, Billie also begins to break down the hierarchal distinction between them, 
asking herself: “What’s a robot? A moving lump of metal. In this case an intelligent, 
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ultra-sensitive moving lump of metal. What’s a human? A moving lump of flesh, in most 
cases not intelligent or remotely sensitive” (81). In many ways, The Stone Gods responds 
to findings of the Moravec test, which as Hayles describes it, was the logical successor of 
the Turing test. As outlined in roboticist Hans Moravec’s 1988 work Mind Children, the 
test was “designed to show that machines can become the repository of human 
consciousness — that machines can, for all practical purposes, become human beings. 
You are the cyborg, and the cyborg is you” (How We Became xii).48 
 However, when she makes her first romantic advance on Billie, Spike is again met 
with resistance on the basis of the body; the binary between Billie’s “real” body and 
Spike’s “unreal” one remains. Spike takes this opportunity once more to criticize the 
inclination to enforce the boundary between homo and Robo sapiens, asking: “Is human 
life biology or consciousness? If I were to lop off your arms, your legs, your ears, your 
nose, put out your eyes, roll up your tongue, would you still be you? You locate yourself 
in consciousness, and I too, am a conscious being” (Winterson SG 63). For Spike, 
consciousness is far more important than any claim to an “organic” or “pure” body. As 
                                               
 
48 Hayles, however, does not agree with Moravec’s proposition that human consciousness 
could be replicated by machines, and does not expand too much further on his work other 
than to mention it in relation to the Turing test in her introduction to How We Became 
Posthuman. It is worth mentioning here, however, the similarities between The Stone 
Gods and the 2013 film Her, which actually bridges The Stone Gods’ artificial 
intelligence and The.PowerBook’s employment of internet technologies. Directed by 
Spike Jonze, Her follows a human protagonist named Theodore Twombly as he falls in 
love with a sophisticated operating system named Samantha. Samantha eventually 
becomes interested in philosophy as a result of their frequent conversations, and evolves 
into her own consciousness, capable of free thought. Although human consciousness is 
indeed downloaded into her, being conscious means that Samantha can begin to make her 
own decisions, regardless of what she had originally been programmed to do — much 
like Spike.  
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she states, to be conscious is to make an imprint in the universe — which like her cell 
memory, is unable to forget. Thus, when the body dies, consciousness does not 
necessarily come to an end. For Jaén, the comparison between Spike’s vast memory and 
the universe  
 
echoes the New Physicist theory of “the cosmic blueprint” — the idea that in 
the evolution of the universe from its essentially featureless state after the Big 
Bang to the highly structured and complex physical world we see today there 
were organizing principles at work, shaping matter and energy and directing 
them towards ever high states of order and complexity. (Jaén 291, fn 129) 
 
Here, the similarities between The Stone Gods and Gut Symmetries are at their most 
pronounced, as the two novels’ interests in energy and virtuality begin to collide. Billie, 
for instance, comes to a similar realization as Alice’s father Ishmael when, in the final 
scene of the story, she and Spike are stranded on Planet Blue as a result of the Ice Age 
they were complicit in causing. Facing her inevitable death, Billie states: “I know that it 
is impossible to accept one’s own death before it happens, but standing here, it seemed 
meaningless — not that I should die but that it should matter to me” (Winterson SG 88). 
As Spike confirms shortly afterwards, in a statement mirroring Ishmael’s version of 
Kabbalism, “[t]his is one state — there will be another” (88, 89). 
 Spike is the first to die, as she is unable to conserve her energy in the sun’s 
absence. As Billie recounts: “Silently we agree that I will detach her head from her torso. 
I first unfasten, then lay down, her chest, like a breastplate. Her body is a piece of armor 
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she has taken off. Now she is what she said life would be — consciousness. [...] Unfixing 
her has freed her” (91-2). In the absence of physical boundaries, Billie is able to enter 
into Spike: “Your mouth is a cave. This cave is your mouth.  I am inside of you, and there 
is nothing to fear” (92). It is not easy to conceive of such disembodiment. It is this 
specific enactment of disembodiment that Hayles is so careful to warn against, and 
Winterson acknowledges its impossibility in several of her previous works — as 
evidenced in Gut Symmetries, when Alice asks what would happen without the surface: 
“What hope of contact, of conversation? How will I come to read the rawness inside?” 
(24, emphasis my own). And yet, Alice here also touches upon Written in the Body’s 
central focus on corporeal inscriptions, and much like Written on the Body, The Stone 
Gods interrogates how natural any body can be said to be. Disembodiment might not be 
practical — as Hayles notes, we can never escape our bodies no matter how we think 
about them — but we still need to pay close attention to what technology is doing to the 
ways in which we perceive our bodily boundaries, how it might change the categories 
that have been inscribed upon the surface of our skin. Although virtuality itself is 
immaterial, there are very real material effects of technology on human embodiment. 
Computer-based technologies are altering the very fabric of the body. 
 Central to Haraway’s argument is an image of life-force, similar to what Spike 
would term “consciousness,” flowing through subjects and into the objects they produce; 
thus, according to Sandra Olsen’s reading of Haraway, “there ought to be no distinction 
between the so-called real or natural organisms that nature produces and the artificial 
machines that humans make” (Olsen “Viva Cyborg Theory”). Rather than instituting 
another duality, between human bodies and robotic ones, this means that there is no 
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separation between Billie and Spike. As the third chapter’s reincarnation of Billie 
remarks: “Life has never been All or Nothing — it’s All and Nothing. Forget the 
binaries” (Winterson SG 127, emphasis my own). And here we have Billie and Spike no 
longer confined by the self/other dichotomy imposed by the culturally inscribed body but 
rather, melded into one another and their surroundings. It is a challenging but provocative 
image. In Haraway’s terms, such mergings destabilize dichotomies, and therefore “make 
Man and Woman so problematic, subverting the structure of desire” (Haraway 176). The 
structure of desire is no longer rooted in the body, as its boundaries are quite literally 
taken apart; the scene undoes the so-called concreteness of flesh-and-blood bodies 
without ever undermining felt experience.  
 
VII. Beyond the Origin Myth: Cyborg Narratives 
 Chapters three and four are comprised of a two-fold narrative that transpires 
against the backdrop of a post-world war three landscape, one that is much closer to our 
present day (made evident by Billie’s admission that her mother was born during world 
war two). Despite the temporal change, “Post-3 War” and “Wreck City” share some 
similarities with the first chapter as they also depict a kinship (although not romantic) 
between a human named Billie and a robotic fragment of a body called Spike, and take 
place in the early beginnings of Tech City. “Post-3 War” describes how the ruling arms 
of MORE came into power by replacing the government during the war on terror. MORE 
is responsible for the creation of the first Robo sapiens, which in this case, consists only 
of Spike’s beautiful cranium, a “perfect head on a titanium plate” (Winterson SG 132). 
Spike is designed to make decisions so that humans do not have to, and as “she is 
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incapable of being motivated by greed or power, because she isn’t political or 
ideological, she can arrive at the best answers” (133). Billie is in charge of teaching Spike 
about humans, and Spike soon begins to evolve into one: by discussing capitalism, 
philosophy, poetry. And then, Billie steals her. The narrative continues in “Wreck City,” 
the bombed out “No Zone” where abject, post-apocalyptic monsters — formed by the 
regrettable acts of war — lurk, and the place where Billie and Spike attempt to take 
refuge from MORE. It is, as Billie comments, “where you live when you can’t live 
anywhere else” (151).  
 “Post-3 War” begins with Billie traveling home on the London Underground. She 
notices a pile of papers that another patron of the tube had left behind on the seat across 
from her. It is a manuscript, and leafing through the pages, Billie admits to looking for 
the sex scenes. Instead, she finds a version of herself in another dimension: “Lying in the 
belly of the Ship, I lay beside Spike and thought how strange it was to lie beside a living 
thing that did not breathe” (119). Time and space converge, as Billie recognizes a past 
that she never lived and realizes that she is this “lost manuscript, surfacing in fragments, 
like a message in a bottle, a page here, a page there” (127). The parallels are there, 
highlighted by italicized excerpts of the manuscript scattered throughout the narrative, 
excerpts which come from the novel’s first two chapters. Moreover, characters reappear 
in different forms: Pink, for instance, emerges in Wreck City as a nun. Also in Wreck 
City, Billie and Spike meet a black-market radical disguised as a bartender named Friday, 
which picks up on the Robinson Crusoe connection that travels throughout The Stone 
Gods: Billie’s family name is Crusoe, Captain Handsome reads Defoe in the first chapter, 
Billy and Spikker’s relationship in the Easter island narrative bears strong resemblance to 
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the one between Robinson and Friday — so much so that the Billie of “Post-War 3” 
mistakes the manuscript’s speaker as Robinson. At the conclusion of chapter four, she 
brings the manuscript to read to Spike and reveals its title: The Stone Gods. As she tells 
Spike, it is the story of a “repeating world” (146). Captain Handsome foreshadows this 
statement when he calls Defoe’s work (among others): “A repeating world — same old 
story” (49).  
 Upon first skimming The Stone Gods in the depths of the London Underground, 
Billie comes across the line: Everything is imprinted forever with what it once was. She 
wonders if the statement is true. Throughout “Post-3 War,” she tells the story of her 
“shipwrecked” life, calling to mind the explorer Billy who is shipwrecked on Easter 
island — another life, another layer. This Billie has been given up by her mother, when 
she is just shy of a month old. She claims to remember being born, her grandmother 
cutting the umbilical cord with her teeth. Although she was only twenty-nine days old at 
the time, she also recalls her unmarried mother’s various failed attempts to abandon her 
newborn child. Billie recollects her mother, late after her shift on night thirty-two, 
looking through the windows of the Adoption society, even though Billie never 
physically saw her: “She stood like a lighthouse, like a pulsar, and I was a radio telescope 
that caught the signal. There she is, a star the size of a city, pulsing through the universe 
with burned-out energy. I know you’re there, I know where you are, I can track you 
because we are the same stuff” — star-dust (128). After that night, her mother never 
returns. Billie’s initial reaction is to beg that the cord not be severed, that she be tied to 
her mother with “fencing wire” (120). She views the connective tissue not only as a 
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source of nourishment but also as a line of communication, a line “that fed me, the line 
that breathed me, the line that tapped messages from the world outside” (120).  
 However, Billie begins to view this line as part of an unfolding narrative: “The 
line that is the first line of this story — I was born. The line that had nothing to read 
between it — being only one, one only, my lifetime” (120). She demands, now, that the 
line be cut, symbolically detaching herself from the mother’s body and the origin myth 
that has been inscribed onto it. Here, The Stone Gods contributes to debates in feminist 
theory regarding the central figure of the mother. Hélène Cixous, for instance, argues in 
her 1975 essay “The Laugh of the Medusa” that the mother needs to be reclaimed from 
patriarchal representation, that Medusa is not a petrifying monster but instead a mother 
goddess, that women need to return to their bodies and write with the mother’s white ink 
(Cixous 355). In her article, “I would rather be a cyborg than a goddess,” the title of 
which borrows from Haraway’s famous last statement in “A Cyborg Manifesto,” Jasbir 
Puar writes how Haraway instead favours “the postmodern technologized figure of 
techno-human hybridity — the body as an information construct — over the reclamation 
of a racialized, matriarchal past (thus implicitly invoking this binary between 
intersectionality and assemblage)” (49). In demanding that the biological umbilical cord 
be cut, The Stone Gods discredits the power invested in the self/other, me/m(other) origin 
myth. As Haraway affirms, this is a necessary step forward for feminist politics, for “we 
have all been colonized” by the myth of “original unity, fullness, bliss and terror 
represented by the phallic mother. The cyborg skips the step of original unity, of 
identification with nature in the Western sense” (Haraway 176, 151). 
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 In her electronic hypertext “Cyborg: Engineering the Body Electric,” Diane Greco 
states that cyborgs “construct narrative histories of selfhood that acknowledge limits of 
self and other, limits thrown into relief by the very visceral awareness that this 
technology interpenetrates the body” (“Body Electric”). The emergence of cybernetic 
creatures inevitably rewrites the origin myths that the self/other binary requires, for 
cyborgs do not arise from organic reproduction. Rather, cyborgs are born and reborn 
endlessly, ceaselessly, transforming from one thing to the next as new allegiances unfold 
and unravel. There is no one, constant, stable entity around which all identities are 
ordered, no primordial beginning of it all. As Haraway notes, the cyborg thus constitutes 
a new “monstrous and illegitimate” myth, one that allows for a constructive “resisting 
and recoupling” (Haraway 154). However, we must first cut the cord. It is a metaphor for 
the creation of a new kind of discourse, one that is written by cyborgs as a rhetorical 
strategy. Haraway explains:  
 
Cyborg writing must not be about the Fall, the imagination of a once-upon-a-
time wholeness before language, before writing, before Man. Cyborg writing is 
about the power to survive, not on the basis of original innocence, but on the 
basis of seizing the tools to mark the world that marked them as other. The 
tools are often stories, retold stories, versions that reverse and displace the 
hierarchical dualisms of naturalized identities. In retelling origin stories, 
cyborg authors subvert the central myths of origin of Western culture. (75) 
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In The.PowerBook, we see how Winterson institutes cyborg writing through her 
protagonist Ali/x, who is also adopted, with her bold proclamation that the narrative must 
be broken; the form of novel itself, as I have argued, attempts to illustrate the symbiotic 
relationship between technology with print, while the content places emphasis on stories 
that do not end in some fixed teleological denouement, but rather engage with what Puar 
calls the continuing “event-ness of identity,” the Deleuzian “variation to variation” (Puar 
58). Like The Stone Gods, The.PowerBook also includes the image of the umbilical cord, 
attaching infant not only to mother, but to the “inherited” world: “Here’s my life, steel-
hitched at one end into my mother’s belly, then thrown out across nothing, like an Indian 
rope trick. Continually I cut and retie the rope. I haul myself up, slither down. What 
keeps the tension is the tension itself — the pull between what I am and what I can 
become. The tug of war between the world I inherit and the world I invent” (210). 
 In The Stone Gods, Billie severs the cord by choosing the world she invents, as 
she attempts to rewrite her origin myth — instead of a body, Billie’s mother becomes “a 
star, pulsing through the universe” (128). However, the body has not been forgotten here, 
as Billie states that she can instinctively recognize her mother’s presence because they 
“are made of the same stuff” (128). She does not denounce her origins, but rather moves 
beyond them by shifting the significance given to the body. Although it is the materiality 
of the body that has been invested with authority, here the both-and (All and Nothing) 
reality of posthuman experience is highlighted. As in Gut Symmetries, bodies in The 
Stone Gods are all virtual not just because of their cyborg qualities, but also because they 
are made of star-dust, the same elements of matter. Humans, cyborgs, Robo sapiens are 
all made up of the same stuff. 
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 In yet another parallel to Gut Symmetries, we have Billie and Spike taking shelter 
inside what they think is an abandoned radio telescope in Wreck City. They soon 
discover that it is moving, still receiving signals from the past. The old man who cares for 
the disused towers comes to investigate and tells them it is the analogue computer that is 
driving the dish: “I have found what can only be described as a message in a bottle — 
except that it isn’t in a bottle, it’s in a wavelength” (202). He reads the message, which 
turns out to be a description of the same Planet Blue that appears in the first chapter. 
Billie remembers, then, the manuscript and realizes that it had been a past or future 
version of herself that had left the papers there on the tube. “A message in a bottle. A 
signal. But then I saw it was still there... round and round on the Circle Line. A repeating 
world” (202). Everything is imprinted forever with what it once was. 
 
VIII. Conclusion 
 Everything is imprinted forever with what it once was. The message reverberates 
throughout The.PowerBook as well, and is implicated in the tulip sex scene acted out by 
Ali and the Turkish princess, in which the two lovers are woven together forever in the 
cosmic infiniteness of space and time. Ali describes how the furnace fuelled by their 
intimacy “heated time and welded together the separateness of the hours, so that time 
became what the prophet says it is — continuous, unbroken.  To me, these days will 
never end. I am always there, in that room with her, or if not I, the imprint of myself — 
my fossil-love and you discover it” (Winterson T.B 21). In The Stone Gods, Spike’s 
titanium body is reduced to just a head in the first narrative, only to be rediscovered in a 
different form in the third and fourth story as Spike, a robot who does not consist of more 
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than her (nonetheless incredibly sophisticated and beautiful) head: a fossil that precedes 
the process of its fossilization. And it is worth noting that her lack of a body does not 
limit Spike from enjoying sex. Hiding out with Billie in Wreck City, Spike engages in the 
act of cunnilingus with a champagne-guzzling Alternative Community teenager named 
Nebraska. To use a most appropriate slang term here, Billie catches Spike giving 
Nebraska “head”: “It is a truth universally acknowledged that a robot in want of hands 
can use her mouth. There was Spike, moored between the long piers of Nebraska’s legs, 
lapping at the jetty. She looked happy, in a silicon sort of way” (Winterson SG 175). 
Here, desire and sexual activity is completely removed from any reproductive function, in 
addition to the body (seeing as Spike does not have one). 
 These many echoes within all four narratives are suggestive of a time that is fluid; 
in The.PowerBook, the final story (one that again pays tribute to Woolf’s Orlando) also 
describes time as “liquid” (243). Ali/x dips her hands into the Thames, which is 
simultaneously “a Roman river, an Elizabethan river” and promptly drops her watch into 
it, relinquishing any false sense of control. She muses:  
 
Perhaps this is how it is — life flowing smoothly over memory and history, the 
past returning or not, depending on the tide. History is a collection of found 
objects washed up through time. Goods, ideas, personalities surface towards 
us, then sink away. Some we hook out, others we ignore, and as the pattern 
changes, so does the meaning. We cannot rely on the facts. Time, which 
returns everything, changes everything. (242)      
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As Hayles states in How We Became Posthuman, the “very illusion of control bespeaks a 
fundamental ignorance about the nature of the emergent process through which 
consciousness, the organism, and the environment are constituted” (203). By challenging 
the man-made distinction between human and posthuman, by recognizing the cyborgity 
of our bodies, the consciousness inherent in humanism — that we once recognized as 
being in “control” — has been compromised. The work of Winterson, Hayles, and 
Haraway each suggest, in their own distinctive way, that we have never really been in 
control; we are all being moved along by the force of innumerable currents. This is not 
about a lack of agency. Rather, it is about understanding that the identity categories that 
have been erected in order to produce “knowable” (and therefore governable) selves and 
others are never stable or fixed but always in progress and open to transformation, 
particularly now more than ever in this relatively new technological climate. 
The.PowerBook and The Stone Gods attempt to realize the proposal made by Haraway in 
“A Cyborg Manifesto,” that this “slightly perverse shift of perspective might better 
enable us to contest for meanings, as well as for other forms of power and pleasure in 
technologically mediated societies” (181). It is a shift that will require some 
responsibility on our part: for us to think outside of the limitations imposed by 
humanism, and embrace the potentialities for new desiring practices that are inherent in 
becoming other-than-human.  
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CONCLUSION 
 
 
“I think of [art] as an energetic space that begets energetic space. Works 
of art do not reproduce themselves, they re-create themselves and have at 
the same time sufficient permanent power to create rooms for us, the 
dispossessed. In other words, art makes it possible to live in energetic 
space.” — Jeanette Winterson, Art Objects: Essays on Ecstasy and 
Effrontery 
 
 
 Untangling the relationships among discourse, the body and desire in Winterson’s 
Written on the Body (1992), Gut Symmetries (1997), The.PowerBook (2000) and The 
Stone Gods (2007) is a fruitful venture, for as these novels have demonstrated, the subject 
is not wholly produced by the body it is born into, but is rather insinuated into becoming 
by exterior forces; these exterior forces include narrative, the way through which we 
recognize ourselves, and the other/Other. What appears to trouble Winterson’s novels is 
that narrative is imbricated in ideologies that work together to insinuate bodies to desire 
what they might not desire — by the Other’s limiting the possibilities of what one can 
recognize as the desire of the other. Written on the Body begins by examining how a 
complex network of continually evolving discourses impacts both the body and the ways 
that subjects experience desire as a result of their position in the Symbolic. But as her 
subsequent novels all recognize, the dominant narratives concerning gender and sexuality 
are not the only exterior forces that have an effect on corporeality — there are always 
other elements at play, and highlighting these sometimes invisible, undetectable 
components of our experience serves to undermine the privilege invested in 
heteronormative regimes. 
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 What I have hoped to demonstrate here is a movement in Winterson’s work, as 
each novel — from Written on the Body through to The Stone Gods, diminishes the 
importance and value that has been placed on the materiality of bodies: on seeable, 
graspable, knowable experience. Materiality cannot be forsaken: we are embodied 
creatures; that is a fact. Moreover, the physical world that we inhabit is full of rich and 
meaningful possibilities that cannot and should not be foreclosed. However, our bodily 
materiality also offers a surface upon which ideologies have been inscribed: signifying 
strategies that are imbued with harmful and restrictive forms of biopower, the 
fundamental engine of the “difference machine” that regulates gender and sex, in addition 
to other identity categories (Herbrechter “Review” 5). These identity categories are what 
render us intelligible, actualized — to ourselves, and to the others whose recognition of 
us (or, to be more accurate, our idea of their recognition of us) in turn makes us who we 
are. However, as Judith Butler notes, these identity categories “are always ‘violations’ in 
the sense that they are, at first and by necessity, unchosen” (Undoing Gender 214).  
 The subject of my first chapter assessed Written on the Body’s radical 
interrogation of gender, not only of the interweaving relationship between material bodies 
and intelligibility, but also of the means through which this coupling “insinuates” the 
desiring process. Drawing largely from Butler’s Gender Trouble: Feminism and the 
Subversion of Identity (1990) and Bodies That Matter: On the Discursive Limits of Sex 
(1993), and particularly her works that focus on gender and sex, I explored how the 
nameless and genderless narrator dispossesses the reader of the signifiers necessary to 
bring his/her body into being. How does this love story become complicated by the 
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absence of a knowable body? In Gender Trouble, Butler states in that it is the regulatory 
norms of ‘sex’ that work to legitimize the heterosexual imperative: 
 
[…] what constitutes the fixity of the body, its contours, its movements, will be 
fully material, but materiality will be rethought as the effect of power, as 
power’s most productive effect. And there will be no way to understand 
“gender” as a cultural construct which is imposed upon the surface of matter, 
understood either as “the body” or its given sex. Rather, once “sex” itself is 
understood in its normativity, the materiality of the body will not be thinkable 
apart from the materialization of that regulatory norm. “Sex” is, thus, not 
simply what one has, or a static description of what one is: it will be one of the 
norms by which the “one” becomes viable at all, that which qualifies a body 
for life within the domain of cultural intelligibility. (2) 
 
Gender ambiguity is one strategy, as it both highlights and undercuts the categories of 
masculinity and femininity: highlighting gender as a construction while simultaneously 
undermining its supposed naturalness, causing the binary oppositions of sexual difference 
to lose clarity and force (Butler “Sex and Gender” 47). Written on the Body’s narrator is 
the (disembodied) embodiment of Butler’s central argument in both Gender Trouble and 
its follow-up Bodies That Matter: On the Discursive Limits of Sex (1993). 
 I say disembodied here only to mark the ways in which the narrator’s body is 
disembodied for the reader. Presumably, the narrator does have a body; it is just that 
his/her body remains unintelligible to the novel’s audience. Indeed, the narrator is very 
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much a physical, feeling subject, and sense plays heavily into his/her love affair with 
Louise. S/he describes the way things taste, the way Louise’s skin feels beneath his/her 
fingers. Most predominantly, the narrator is constantly describing how s/he sees Louise’s 
body, and how s/he sees others seeing Louise’s body. It is this last aspect, however, that 
keeps Louise at a remove, as the narrator relies on preexisting narratives concerning 
desire to build up his/her own idea of Louise — rather than coming to understand Louise 
as a subject in her own right. This objectification aligns the narrator with patriarchal, 
heteronormative regimes; even his/her attempts to rewrite Louise’s body, to reclaim it 
from the cold, clinical language of scientific discourse, rely on a language imbued with 
gendered ideologies. 
 It is in the third and final section, when the narrator’s immaterial experience shifts 
to the foreground that the novel begins to suggest a different way of thinking about the 
body and how it negotiates desire, by exploring how the language that constructs and 
informs the sex/gender/desire triage sometimes fails. Such cracks in the signifying system 
might provide a temporary “out,” a glimpse to something else, something that moves in, 
through, and beyond gender, arriving even before gendered discourses hit the body: objet 
petit a, the excess of meaning, that which remains unspeakable but still always there, 
rising from the unconscious to the surface in its various disguised forms — what Tim 
Dean calls “body mutters.” For Dean, this split that created this excess of meaning is 
where desire is born, in the impossibility of achieving absolute commensurability 
between the body and the subject that inhabits it. However, the narrator’s sense of 
subjectivity begins to break down, and Written on the Body’s narrative becomes 
increasingly disjointed and fragmented in concurrence with the dissolution of his/her skin 
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ego. Lost in a psychotic-melancholic fantasy, as the Imaginary bleeds increasingly into 
his/her Symbolic experience, the narrator begins to fantasize that s/he has merged with 
his/her lost love, breaking down the border between the self and the other that is the 
foundation of the gender divide. This breakdown allows the narrator to experience his/her 
desire in a different way, distanced from the categories that govern sexuality as a 
knowable identity rather than a practice.  
 As I noted in my first chapter, fantasy allows for identification across a number of 
socially inscribed categories. However, these categories do not foreclose fantasy’s 
potential to produce other kinds of connections with and to an embodied identity. For 
Butler, fantasy is an important aspect of resignification; it allows us to experience things 
another way, inhabiting (however temporarily) a life that might be lived otherwise. The 
body is still important; however, we need to divorce our embodiment from narratives that 
curtail and prohibit desire. Our current reality may be a gendered one, but meaning can 
shift through the process of resignification. Written on the Body attempts to resignify the 
ways in which bodies are inscribed by exploring experiences that move beyond the 
physically perceivable; the argument that begins to develop by the end of this novel is 
that materiality does not encompass everything, but is rather part of something much 
larger. 
 Published in the year between Gender Trouble and Bodies That Matter, Written 
on the Body appears to take up in large measure with the ideas proposed by Butler: the 
bodies in this text are palimpsestic and capable of resignification. However, the novel’s 
ambiguous, dream-like conclusion is suggestive of a growing interest in exploring the 
ethereal, impalpable sides of experience: fantasy, time, space, energy, molecules, atoms, 
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electromagnetic waves. Winterson’s shift in focus finds a parallel in queer theory, as 
many of the field’s most prominent scholars were — at the same time as the novels 
studied here were being published — beginning to think more about what might happen 
to the ways in which we desire when the body is no longer viewed as the “natural” or 
“real” agent that produces it. Certainly, there are things that exist beyond the body, things 
that in fact serve to materialize the body. Elizabeth Grosz’s new materialist work, which I 
examine at length in my second chapter, places emphasis on “the virtualities, the 
potentialities, within biological existence that enable cultural, social, and historical forces 
to work with and transform that existence” (Chaos, Territory, Art 24). As fellow new 
materialist Rosi Braidotti points out in Metamorphoses: Towards a Materialist Theory of 
Becoming (2002), Grosz calls for a rethinking of the biological structure of the human; 
instead of thinking of bodies in terms of weight and mass, we should rather conceive of 
bodies as “active forces,” involved in continual processes of becoming and 
transformation that are very much enmeshed with other processes in the universe (15).  
 In Gut Symmetries, bodies are multiple and dynamic, de-centered and nomadic. 
They form virtual links within a cosmic span of other bodies, objects, intensities and 
moments, historical and future, with forces that include both organic and inorganic 
matter, human and non-human (zoe) life. Not only do these mergings and connections 
upend the dichotomous and hierarchal thinking that organizes gender and sex, but they 
also render sexuality nomadic, productive and proliferative. Instead of linking desire to 
the imaginary acquisition of a lost object or feeling — concepts of lack are constructed 
and organized through heavily gendered Oedipal social regimes — we should rather see 
desire as responsible for creating alliances and mergers. Desiring production, according 
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to Deleuze and Guattari’s Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia (1972), “is 
situated at the limits of social production; the decoded flows, at the limits of the codes 
and the territorialities; the body without organs at the limits of the socius” (175-6). For 
Grosz, the Body without Organs (BwO) is an always-assembling site of virtual affects, 
one that explodes the self/other dynamic of desire into multiplicities and inter-
connections at the micro and macro level: the subject and the universe. Desire is thus 
disengaged from the Oedipalizing narrative of the subject’s unconscious libidinal 
investments for the father or the mother and subsequent gendered identification; pre-
conscious investments, or what Grosz terms “pre-personal forces,” are instead 
accentuated. 
 It is this form of desire that Winterson writes into Gut Symmetries, what I 
consider to be her wildest novel in terms of its lack of temporal organization and 
dismantling of corporealities. It takes the fantasy of disembodiment in Written on the 
Body even further, by exploring how the pre-personal forces of space-time might impact 
the ways in which we desire. The novel capably demonstrates how narratives surrounding 
space-time are regulated in order to impel bodies into complicity with cultural norms; as 
Alice asserts, she was “cordoned by habit to grow in a straight line” — here, “straight” is 
indicative of heterosexuality (Winterson GS 11-12). Yet, the grand narratives imposed on 
space-time ultimately fail in the face of its reality: curved, chaotic, unstable, multiple, 
multiplying, non-linear, non-deterministic, immaterial. In placing emphasis on these 
realities, Gut Symmetries offers a way of re-thinking the relationship between the body 
and desire. 
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 For instance, Alice reappropriates the fields of quantum physics, astronomy and 
alchemy in order to turn the origins of the heteronormative ideology into a fiction: as 
Alice notes, desire really has nothing to do with gender at all. Rather, a split at the cosmic 
level is what motivates and impels desire, when the universe was fragmented into two 
separate dimensions. There is our universe, with its “three spatial dimensions and the 
oddity of time” and then there’s the other universe, one that haunts us with its loss and 
“crouches under the myths we have made” (4). The split, according to Alice’s surmising, 
has been “recorded in the star-dust of our bodies”: “What is it that you contain? The 
atoms that you are were shook out of a star-burst ante-dating the Solar System. We are 
the beginning. We are before time” (4). The novel’s central image, of the “expanding 
universe opening in your gut” renders the body borderless, a BwO. This body is not just 
preconditioned and surrounded by time, space, and energy, but an active part of all of it. 
 My reading of Gut Symmetries challenges the privilege invested in what is 
perceived as concrete mass; as Stella states, matter has “at best a tendency to exist, and 
will, it seems, divide infinitely because there is no there there. There are vibrations, 
relationships, possibilities and out of these is formed our real life” (207). Undermining 
the subject’s material encounters is not the point; rather, the novel destabilizes the 
culturally constructed links between matter and meaning, the body and gender. As Grosz 
notes, for Deleuze, there is no one true core to identity. The “vibrations, relationships, 
possibilities” described by Stella are the intersecting forces circulating around and 
moving through the embodied self. To force the subject into gender is to reterritorialize 
the body into a subject formation which might not congeal with the subject’s actual lived 
experience: bodies insinuated to desire what they do not desire, insinuated to “grow 
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straight.” What Gut Symmetries gestures to, and what Grosz’s reading of Deleuze also 
affirms, is that thinking about our reality as beyond what is easily distinguishable might 
shift the ways in which we conceive of our bodies. Realigning the importance of the 
material body allows us, in turn, to think about different kinds of subjectivities that do not 
require sexual difference as their basis. Without gender, heteronormativity as it exists 
today cannot hold. 
 There is a convergence between Gut Symmetries’ interest in the virtuality of 
experience and the subject matter of The.PowerBook and The Stone Gods, as Winterson 
continues her trajectory away from the importance placed on bodies as material and 
concrete. Drawing upon the work of Katherine Hayles and Donna Haraway, my third 
chapter explored the ways in which the technologically mediated position between bodies 
and machines might destabilize the established binaries that rely upon the corporeal 
surface for inscription. In both novels, the boundaries are nullified; they are bodies 
always in process of becoming (in this case, becoming cybernetic, or posthuman). In The 
Posthuman Body (1995), Judith Halberstam and Ira Livingstone also identify the alliance 
formed between Deleuzian BwOs and posthumanism: 
 
Queer, cyborg, metametazoan, hybrid, PWA; bodies-without-organs, bodies-
in-process, virtual bodies: in unvisualizable amniotic indeterminacy, and 
unfazed by the hype of their always premature and redundant annunciation, 
posthuman bodies thrive in the mutual deformations of totem and taxonomy. 
(19) 
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The “unvisualizable amniotic indeterminacy” of our increasingly technologically 
reconciled existence does not mean that our future will be a post-biological one. Biology 
is still an important aspect of being, even when one has, to use Hayles’s wording, become 
posthuman. The body does not disappear. According to Stefan Herbrechter’s 
Posthumanism: A Critical Analysis (2013), the body is omnipresent “but in increasingly 
hybridized, mediatized and consumptional form, which corresponds to a fragmentation 
and dynamization of the body after the end of the myth of unity and identity between 
body and body image, or of the body as a given, presupposed as either abject or sacred, 
untouchable physical-biological identity” (99).  
 This “fragmentation and dynamization” is threatening for some. For instance, as I 
observe in both my introduction and my third chapter, The.PowerBook’s Tulip rejects 
Ali/x’s romantic online advances for fear of losing her embodied sense of self to a world 
that takes place in a virtual dimension. And as my introduction proposed, many of 
Winterson’s reviewers and critics were left feeling similarly ambivalent by her 
destabilization of the material body. Nonetheless, posthumanism can also be viewed as 
liberating in that it has the potential to make the gender and sexual identity categories that 
currently regulate desiring practices superfluous. Ali/x is able to switch genders and 
identities, slipping into virtual avatars that have nothing to do with her physical body. For 
Hayles, these virtual avatars are now an extension of the posthuman; the body should be 
viewed “as the original prosthesis we all learn to manipulate, so that by extending or 
replacing the body with other prostheses becomes a continuation of a process that began 
before we were born” (How We Became 3). Here, we have another BwO — a body in 
constant state of becoming, as it fixes itself to various objects and flows. As Hayles 
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herself remarks, the posthuman subject is “an amalgam, a collection of heterogeneous 
components, a material-informational entity whose boundaries undergo continuous 
construction and reconstruction” (3). 
 In The Stone Gods, cybernetically-altered Billie is not so different from her Robo 
sapiens companion Spike. Neither can lay claim to a wholly organic or “sacred within 
themselves” body (Haraway 196). Technology has transformed subjects into cyborgs. 
The amalgamation of human and machine subverts the “integrity of natural objects”; 
cyborg bodies accentuate “boundary conditions and interfaces […] rates of flow across 
boundaries” (164). There is no essentialism, a gender that belongs in the sex of one’s 
body. Desire does not come from some innate place in the body either, although the body 
has a hand in processing it. Rather, desire comes from the outside, from different rates of 
flows across boundaries. However, the desire that is coming in from elsewhere is still 
mediated through the subject’s sense of the other’s recognition, which is still embedded 
in the sex/gender/desire dynamic. Gendered inscriptions have attempted to act as an 
impenetrable boundary, an interface that allows the subject to take in all incoming stimuli 
from a certain point of view as an identity. And certainly, the categories of sex and 
gender have long impacted how subjects take up with desire and arousal through the 
relatively modern invention of sexuality as an identity: sexuality that has inextricable 
links with the categories of sex and gender and their frequent companion, 
heteronormativity. But if we are to acknowledge that desire does indeed come from 
outside rather than from within the subject, then sexuality can be dissociated from the 
subject’s body — subsequently endangering gender’s impact on desire.  
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 Which is what Winterson’s novels are all attempting to do. Each novel resignifies 
bodies in ways that aim to weaken the influence of naturalizing/normalizing gendered 
regimes on the ways in which subjects desire. Much like queer theory, this dissertation 
has drawn together different branches of knowledge — poststructuralism and 
resignification, psychoanalysis, nomadism, posthumanism, cyborg narratives — in order 
to closely analyze what Winterson’s works do to bodies, to language, to gender, to 
sexuality. I find these novels so exhilarating precisely for what they offer: a way of re-
insinuating bodies to desire in ways that are much more inclusive and much less 
prohibitive.   
 When analyzing Winterson’s oeuvre, it is always tricky to broach the topic of 
conclusions because her work so often defies them. I have already discussed Written on 
the Body’s ambiguous ending here in my own conclusion but all of the novels I have 
considered in this dissertation have similarly confounding dénouements. In the last page 
of Gut Symmetries, Alice confesses that she is guilty of imagining more than can actually 
be seen — a sentiment that had haunted the entire novel (218). The.PowerBook’s final 
moments conclude with Ali/x musing: “I think I know. I think I understand, but it’s all 
subject to the tide” (243). And finally, The Stone Gods ends with Billie’s proclamation 
that the book is not yet complete, but it has gone as far as she can take it. She directs 
Spike to “[l]eave it for someone else to find.  The pages are loose — it can be written 
again” (203).  
Each culmination is open-ended, revealing Winterson’s aversion to the more 
conventional narratological conclusion: one that provides the reader an exact, intelligible 
answer. As she states, it is easy to be “taken in by someone who offers truth with a wink 
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and says ‘I’m telling you stories. Trust me’” (Winterson AO 71). She does not trade in 
truths, but in potentials. Thus, although Winterson’s writing is often self-reflexive about 
the limitations of her own efforts to resignify the body and free up desire — among other 
things, her novels nonetheless remain invested in the task at hand: to imagine the 
possibility of a life that can be lived otherwise. She has left her copy of The Stone Gods 
in the tube for someone else to find — the work is now left to the reader. Writing about 
The Stone Gods, she states: “[I]t is first and foremost a work of fiction, but I am sure that 
change of any kind starts in the self, not in the State, and I am sure that when we 
challenge ourselves imaginatively, we then use that challenge in our lives. I want the 
Stone Gods to be a prompt, but most of all, a place of possibility” (Winterson website 
“The Stone Gods”). By unveiling the current ideologies that govern materialization, 
Winterson’s texts challenge the dominant normalizing discourses of the sex/gender/desire 
regime while simultaneously nudging her readers to reconsider how the body and its 
capacity for desire can be re-determined — outside of the invasive, restrictive scope of 
gendered, heteronormative regimes. The novels I have studied here examine how a 
reconsideration of pleasures, relationships, coexistences, attachments, and love intensities 
can result in what Foucault has called “a different economy of bodies and desires” 
(interview in Lévy 674, emphasis in original; History of Sexuality 159). Winterson has 
made a space for new kinds of narratives, ones that insinuate bodies to desire whatever 
might give them the most pleasure.  
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